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Abstract 
 
This thesis is concerned with the aftermath and afterlife of violence (Gómez-Barris 2009) in post-
coup Chile from the perspective of the second generations of victims of state violence perpetrated 
during the dictatorial period (1973-1988), the modes of inheritance of family political memories 
and the mechanisms of inhabitation of such family legacies. Drawing on Plummer’s ‘documents of 
life’ approach (Plummer 2001)and Avery Gordon’s theory of haunting (Gordon 1998), the research 
is based on thirty one family life story interviews and two group interviews.  
This thesis critically dialogues with the Holocaust tradition and its legacies for the memory field, 
arguing for a critical awareness of ‘what is helped and what is hindered’ by its lens (Huyssen 2003). 
Departing from the widespread belief that trauma is something ‘other’ to everyday life, this thesis 
is based on Das’ assertion that political violence unfolds in the everyday life and its modes of 
inhabitation (Das 2007). Denaturalizing the family as a site of ‘pure memories’, the thesis is 
focused on family political memories of state violence and their modes of remembering and 
transmission to the second generation. It explores the way in which political violence has been 
passed on to the second generation in the form of familial legacies and embedded in local patterns 
of political, social and family relationships. The thesis draws attention to the context in which 
these memories are produced, but also sheds light on how they are transformed into stubborn 
memories through their familial transmission. Basing itself on this double perspective, the thesis 
illustrates how, as a consequence of the politics of fear, opposition memory became invested as a 
family possession. It explores how political memory was at the same time both something to 
conceal and something to inhabit and own, triggering a sense of loyalty and belonging. The thesis 
also shows how not every experience is rendered as a family memory but those that are undergo a 
process of selection in which gendered models of family relationships also play a role. Examining 
the production of family countermemories, the thesis concludes that the second generation 
makes of family memory not only a place for tradition and affective ties, but also for contestation, 
moral interpellation and rupture.  
  
4 
 
Acknowledgments 
 
While I was writing this thesis an important personal event took place: the birth of my son Mateo. 
So the first words are for him, for all that it has meant for him to have a mother immersed in 
books, ghosts and writing, and for having made of his life a story of airplanes, farewells and 
airports since he was born.  
This thesis has been possible with the help of many people. The first of these is Federico, my 
husband, who adapted his personal life to the needs of my studies; thanks for leaving your home 
in Uruguay and coming with me to London and Santiago, when this was necessary for my 
fieldwork and the writing up of my thesis. I know it has all been a great family effort and a proof of 
commitment. To my parents, who have always given me so much confidence and support that I do 
not have sufficient words to thank them enough.  
I would also like to thank Victor J. Seidler, my supervisor, who taught me to listen sociologically to 
personal experience, and by doing so, gave me access to my childhood experiences during the 
dictatorship. He also taught me to focus on the how, rather than the what. But his influence went 
beyond that: he showed me the importance of thinking with authenticity, beyond conventions and 
even if doing so challenges theory. He taught me to think with the heart, and to give space to the 
unthinkable or the unspeakable. He has influenced me not only as his student or a sociologist, but 
as a person.  
I also need to thank my friends and colleagues. To Constanza Ceresa, because without her London 
would have been a cold place, and because her work on poetry illuminated my work and also 
showed me its limitations. Clair Morrow, because her mix of wisdom, strength and goodness of 
heart are all and more of what I can expect of a friend. Alice Hohenlohe, because our intellectual 
connection and her generous comments on my drafts have helped me to understand why I was 
writing this thesis. Benny Lu, because his intellectual elegancy always brought a new author to 
illuminate my work and because he was always there to be counted on. Thanks to my wonderful 
friends Ana Gross and Lucía Ariza, because our friendship was based on the difficult connection 
between motherhood, academic life and womanhood. Their uneasiness with narratives and 
documents of life showed me how many ways of thinking sociologically there are. Thanks to Ann-
Cristina Lange, because our initial talks helped to frame my position with respect to memory 
5 
 
studies. I also want to acknowledge and thank Carolina Aguilera, my friend and colleague, whose 
erudite knowledge of contemporary Chilean history gave me tools and perspectives with which to 
enrich my thesis. I also want to thank Ximena Tocornal and Mireya Dávila for her comments on an 
early draft, and Les Back and Nirmal Puwar for their insightful comments on my work during the 
upgrade examination and for encouraging me to ‘let the ghost in’. Thanks to David Gorman for his 
patient correction of the drafts and his generous comments and references; to Maria José Jara, 
Mixia Cárdenas and Sandra Papic for their various contributions during the fieldwork. Thanks to 
my dearest friends María Berríos and Sophie Halart for their support and friendship.  
This thesis was funded by the Presidente de La Republica scholarship, awarded by the Chilean 
government. It also was awarded a grant from the Central Research Fund of London in 2010 and 
the Thesis 2013 award from the Museum of Memory and Human Rights. I would like to express my 
gratitude for this institutional support which made this research possible.   
Finally I want to thank my grandfather, who taught me the art of story-telling from early childhood 
and because it was through his working class history that I learned, first hand, about social class, 
political memory and state violence.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
6 
 
Contents 
 
Preface .................................................................................................................................... 11 
Chapter 1: Mapping Chilean history and memory after the military coup ..................................... 13 
Introduction: When The Past Matters ...................................................................................... 13 
The Division Of Memory ........................................................................................................... 17 
The Moral Opposition to the Dictatorship ................................................................................ 19 
The Recovery of Democracy ..................................................................................................... 20 
1990-1998  A decade of Social Disenchantment ....................................................................... 22 
Beyond memory and forgetting ............................................................................................... 24 
1998- 2003: The memory boom ............................................................................................... 27 
Stern’s ‘battle for hearts and minds’ ........................................................................................ 28 
2003 up today: Forging Memorias militantes ........................................................................... 29 
Towards a Memoria Militante .................................................................................................. 31 
The Manicheism of Memory .................................................................................................... 33 
Second Generations: Beyond the dichotomist memory impasse? ............................................. 35 
Chapter Conclusions ................................................................................................................ 37 
Chapter 2: The legacies of the Holocaust and the status of family memory .................................. 39 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 39 
The Trauma Paradigm: A debate .............................................................................................. 41 
Local responses to political violence and the divided memories context ................................... 43 
Inhabiting the aftermath of Political Violence ........................................................................... 47 
The intergenerational transmission of memories ..................................................................... 48 
The second generation ............................................................................................................. 50 
Postmemory ............................................................................................................................ 54 
7 
 
Family Memory in the aftermath of violence ............................................................................ 58 
Chapter Conclusions ................................................................................................................ 63 
Chapter 3 ................................................................................................................................. 65 
Researching Chilean Memory Across Generations .................................................................... 65 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 65 
The origins of the Project ......................................................................................................... 67 
Framing the post-coup second generation category ................................................................. 71 
The opposition’s second generation ......................................................................................... 73 
Breaking the silence: the biographical interview and the children’s gaze ...................................... 75 
Landing in the Fieldwork: Life Stories Interviews ...................................................................... 78 
Recruiting Interviewees............................................................................................................ 79 
Complementary interviews: ......................................................................................................... 83 
Conducting interviews.............................................................................................................. 84 
Discussing Methods: the Narrative Approach and its limitations .............................................. 87 
Letting the Ghost In ................................................................................................................. 89 
The ethical insight .................................................................................................................... 90 
Chapter Conclusions ................................................................................................................ 92 
Chapter 4: The culture of fear and its afterlife .............................................................................. 93 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 93 
The Culture Of Fear .................................................................................................................. 95 
The fear tactic .......................................................................................................................... 95 
Fear and everyday life .............................................................................................................. 98 
Passing On Fear To The Second Generation: The Afterlife Of Violence .....................................101 
David’s Life Story.....................................................................................................................102 
The Poisoned Knowledge As A Rite Of Passage ........................................................................104 
8 
 
Inhabiting landscapes of fear ..................................................................................................107 
Keeping Secrets.......................................................................................................................109 
Changing landscapes and stubborn memories .........................................................................111 
Haunting fears ........................................................................................................................112 
Fieldwork Catastrophic Fantasies ............................................................................................114 
Chapter Conclusions ...............................................................................................................116 
Chapter 5:Political stigmas and family legacies ............................................................................118 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................118 
The Intergenerational Effects of the Dictatorship ........................................................................120 
The Imaginary of the Other .....................................................................................................122 
The language of salvation ........................................................................................................124 
Introducing my encounter with Marcela: fieldwork notes .......................................................126 
Marcela's life story ..................................................................................................................128 
Troubled remembering: inheriting political stigmas ................................................................129 
Feeling safe in the Culture of Fear ...........................................................................................132 
The Ambivalence of Passing ....................................................................................................134 
Dwelling in family histories .....................................................................................................137 
Stains and Marks .....................................................................................................................139 
Appropriating legacies ............................................................................................................141 
Chapter Conclusions ...............................................................................................................143 
Chapter 6: Family Memory and the Intergenerational Remembering of Political Violence ...........145 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................145 
The everyday life transmission of family political memory ..........................................................147 
Official memories, family memories ........................................................................................151 
Introducing Gabriel: His family story .......................................................................................153 
9 
 
Remembering a non-past from abroad ....................................................................................155 
Intergenerational remembering ..............................................................................................156 
Unspoken narratives ...............................................................................................................159 
Returning to the Culture of Fear ..............................................................................................161 
The duty of memory................................................................................................................163 
Haunting dreams ....................................................................................................................165 
Interviewing the Third Generation: Introducing Eliana and Gustavo ........................................166 
Their family life stories ............................................................................................................167 
Growing up among divided memories .....................................................................................168 
Dealing with family legacies in the aftermath ..........................................................................170 
Conclusions .............................................................................................................................173 
Chapter 7: Family Countermemories ...........................................................................................174 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................174 
Examining Los Rubios and El Edificio de los Chilenos Countermemories ..................................176 
Gendered militancy and gendered bereavement .....................................................................181 
The model of Antigone ............................................................................................................182 
My first encounter with Tamara: Contesting generational remembering .................................184 
Contradicting the Past: Unmaking Memory Frameworks .........................................................186 
Tamara’s family story ..............................................................................................................187 
Assessing the Past ...................................................................................................................189 
Grand narratives v/s everyday life ...........................................................................................190 
Against the causa ....................................................................................................................191 
Struggling against the reification of victimhood .......................................................................193 
Reclaiming the value of intimacy .............................................................................................194 
Introducing Ernesto ................................................................................................................196 
10 
 
Ernesto’s family story ..............................................................................................................196 
Forgetting the Past ..................................................................................................................197 
Contesting the Hero ................................................................................................................199 
Unsuitable memories ..............................................................................................................202 
Gathering the Past ..................................................................................................................203 
Conclusions .............................................................................................................................205 
Chapter 8: Concluding Remarks ..................................................................................................207 
i) Everyday Life and Trauma: Inhabiting Memories of Political Violence ..............................207 
ii) The authoritarian regime and the memory landscapes ....................................................211 
iii) Stubborn Memories or the Stability of Memory ...............................................................213 
iv) The family as memory producer ......................................................................................218 
v) The afterlife of violence ...................................................................................................221 
vi) The second generations and the dilemmas of memory ....................................................223 
 
  
11 
 
Preface 
In 1973 the three-year long socialist government of Salvador Allende was abruptly interrupted by a 
Military Coup, which was the prelude to 17 years of dictatorship in Chile. On the 11th September, 
La Moneda Palace was bombed by a section of the army which considered that the country was on 
the verge of a civil war. Public activities were forbidden, unions were dismantled and a politics of 
fear was put into practice. After the coup, a neoliberal regime was installed which had a deep 
impact on Chilean culture and the local regimes of memory. It was a time of persecution, death, 
unemployment and exile for some; but a time of order, stability, privatization and enrichment for 
others. 
I was born in 1978, during Pinochet’s regime of fear. I remember my childhood: I believed there 
were prehistoric animals hidden under the carpet, fluorescent spiders creeping along the walls at 
night and giant insects living in the garden. Although those fantasies were part of my daily life, I 
never talked about them to anyone, not even my parents. I was a child with a strong sense of 
privacy. As a child of opponents of an authoritarian regime, I was aware of a radical distinction 
between inside and outside, between privacy and social relationships, between home, 
neighborhood and school. At home we were allowed to do things that outside home we could not 
do; there were family stories that could only be told at home.  I always knew it was a secret that 
my parents had been members of the Communist Party before the coup and that my father went 
into clandestinity for months. The story of my grandfather’s kidnapping by the secret police and his 
experience of being tortured was never told to anyone, to the extent that it still sounds like a 
fictional memory to me. Despite the smoothness of everyday life of my childhood, I grew up feeling 
some aspects of my personal life were secrets I had to protect from others. It was not the told story 
alone which shaped my sense of self; those unsayable stories were equally important. At the heart 
of this idea, it was the feeling that in the presence of others I had to make a great effort. I could 
not just be who I was; I had to be someone else. In every social encounter - outside my family -
there was implied a process of simulation. From a very early age, I learnt to be two: one who 
follows the rules and one who silently distrusts them.     
I remember the end of the dictatorship in 1988 as one of the happiest days ever. I was 12 years old 
and for first time we could use the public space to expose our secret. After decades of social 
movements, the opposition managed to win the Plebiscite under the slogan “Chile, la Alegría Ya 
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Viene”. These were years of social euphoria during which a significant number of exiles returned to 
the country. But afterwards, I forgot about politics and lived my adolescence intensively. Despite 
the fact that during my childhood  being part of the opposition to Pinochet had been fundamental 
to my family identity, after 1988 the past did not find an easy role in the present. Looking back on 
my own story I find no memories related to the decades of fear until 1998. My personal amnesia is 
correlated with a broader phenomenon of forgetting, but also with long term forms of memories 
which I aim to illuminate in this thesis.  
In 1998, however, Pinochet was detained in London and the House of Lords decided that he could 
be allowed to face an attempt to extradite him to Spain to be investigated for human rights 
abuses. After hearing the news, I experienced a state of euphoria. I did not understand why I had 
such an overwhelming reaction after almost a decade living in democracy. I started to think of the 
past as a seething presence, even when it was absent. I realized, for instance, that I rarely talked 
about my family experiences of that period; but I would still become furious at people if they 
showed support for the dictatorship.  
This thesis is concerned with family legacies and the affectivity of politics. It is about how we are 
marked by intimate life and family stories, and how intimacy, affects, pain, shame and pride are at 
the center of the way we remember the past. After all, I resort to an understanding of memory 
which looks at the patterns of everyday life and the crucial role of families in its making.  
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Chapter 1: Mapping Chilean history and memory after the military coup 
Crises of memory are moments that highlight the relations 
between individual memory and group memory, 
concerning a past event that is stipulated as important by 
the group at a given time.  
(Suleiman 2012, 5)  
 
Introduction: When The Past Matters 
In 2008 I visited Doña Agustina in the village in the north of Chile where she lived. A humble 
woman in her late fifties, the widow of one of the desaparecidos of Augusto Pinochet’s military 
regime, she has never recovered from the disappearance of her husband (how one could recover 
from such an event?). When I asked her about the days that followed the 1973 military coup, she 
stood in silence and after a while she started weeping. At that moment, Doña Agustina’s son, who 
was in his mid-thirties, came into the room and asked her if she was all right. He looked at me in a 
slightly disapproving way, which mirrored how uneasy I felt interviewing the victims of state 
violence, opening ‘the memory box’1 and bringing back with just one question emotions that have 
taken a long time to die down. The woman told me that her son did not approve of her giving 
interviews because they open a wound which she could not easily close afterwards. “The interview 
finishes”, he complains, “but the sorrow remains”.  
As a result of this interview, ethical issues concerning the general relationship between the 
interviewer and the interviewee in contexts of political violence came up - I will deal with these in 
the chapter on methods - but the figure of the son as the witness to and partner of his widowed 
mother has continued to haunt me as a sociological concern. To what extent, for instance, has the 
military regime finished for Doña Agustina’s son, despite his father’s corpse never having been 
found? How does he mourn his father’s death: as an activist, as a son, as a bystander? Does being 
                                                          
1
 This is an expression first coined by Stern. In his words: ‘The metaphor I find useful – to picture memory as 
competing selective remembrances to give meaning to, and find legitimacy within, a devastating community 
experience – is that of a giant, collectively built memory box. The memory box is foundational to the 
community, not marginal; it sits in the living room, not in the attic’ (2006:xxviii). Since the publication of his 
groundbreaking three volume research the term has remained as part of the local memory lexis.  
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the descendant of a victim of state violence impose certain duties on him? And if it does, what 
kind of duties? The space in which Doña Agustina’s son can be located is uncertain: systematic 
forms of state violence have passed. Indeed, Pinochet died in 2006, but the memory of his family’s 
loss constitutes an indubitable presence for him, complicating notions such as transition or 
reconciliation traditionally used in post-conflict societies. His presence at the interview indicated a 
triangulation in the site of mourning and pointed to the concept of the post-coup second 
generation in its own right.  
The son’s presence has to do with the role of the family within the aftermath of violence and the 
role that family bonds have had in memory making in Latin American countries during the last few 
decades, specifically in Chile. The persistence of the past draw attention today to what Judith 
Butler calls ‘the tasks that follow political violence’ (Butler 2003) and which Macarena Gómez-
Barris has called the afterlife of violence: ‘the continuing and persistent symbolic and material 
effects of the original event of violence on people’s daily life, their social and psychic identities and 
their ongoing wrestling with the past in the present’ (Gómez Barris 2009,6). These concepts focus 
attention on the aftermath of political events from the perspective of everyday life and the 
intersubjective effects of state violence2. They support the critique I aim to develop in the thesis: 
that the memory crisis in Chile has been analysed mainly from an institutional perspective 
(developed in Chapter 1), on the one hand, or a clinical approach to the traumatic effects of 
violence (developed in Chapter 6), on the other. This has been very productive and has made it 
possible to talk about the regime’s abuses and human right violations in the public domain after a 
17-year long regime of fear and silence. However, this has also left to one side the dynamics of 
political memory in everyday life. Throughout the thesis I will use Cath Collins et.al definition of 
political memory: ‘constructions of fact, myth and interpretation that constitute, precisely, the 
noninstutionalized dimensions of politics’ (Collins, Hite and Joignant 2013,6). I differentiate 
between the everyday life of political memory and the politics of memory so as to shed light on 
the quotidian expressions of the memory of political violence and the ability of people to coexist 
with it and absorb it into everyday life. In the literature review I will further develop the approach 
to memories of violence and their absorption in everyday life initiated by the anthropologist 
                                                          
2 I follow Gómez Barris when she states that state violence helped to produce: ‘subjectivities, or how people 
identify in the social world, and intersubjectivities, or the way people identify in the social world with each 
other’ (2009:10).  
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Veena Das. By the politics of memory, by contrast, I refer to those institutional mechanisms which 
deal with memory (Collins et al. 2013).   
The figure of the second generation not only raises questions about the relationship between 
generations, family memory and the aftermath of political violence, but also about the 
relationship between violence and time and the scope and effects of political violence in everyday 
life. For the Argentinian Gabrielle Nouzeilles: ‘The problem of transmitting past experiences to 
younger generations and therefore the question of the meaning of memory, is central to 
understanding more recent manifestations of remembrance in post-dictatorial Argentina’ 
(Nouzeilles 2005, 265). In a similar perspective Susana Kaiser states in her book Postmemories of 
Terror:  
‘Research on societies that have recently undergone mass human rights abuses has 
disregarded the “second generation/non victim perspective”. Young people’s stories shed 
light on how the memory construction process works by revealing those who lived through 
the dictatorship were reconstructing and transmitting this experience to their 
descendants. These are key issues for assessing the legacies of terror and the role that this 
new generation of citizens might play in the consolidation of democracy’ (Kaiser 2005, 3).  
Agreeing with Nouzeilles and Kaiser but looking at Chile, my interest in this thesis is in how these 
modes of remembering3 have been entangled with the dynamics of everyday life since the coup 
and through the culture of fear imposed by the military regime, and this way are at the heart of 
broader processes of memory making. I echo the statement of Veena Das in her introduction to 
Life and Words: ‘my interest in this book is not in describing these moments of horror but rather in 
describing what happens to the subject and world when the memory of such events is folded into 
ongoing relationships’ (Das 2007, 8). It is in the double movement between the life which 
continues and the past which haunts the present that the aftermath and afterlife of violence takes 
place.  
                                                          
3 Astrid Erll and Ansgar Nünning suggest that the focus of memory studies should be with modes of 
remembering. That is, with the diverse forms of reconstructing and representing the past, with the ‘what’ of 
memory and also the ‘how’, or, in their words, with ‘the quality and meaning that the past assumes’ ((Erll 
and Nünning 2008, 7).    
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This thesis explores the aftermath and afterlife of violence in post-coup Chile from the point of 
view of one of the opposing memory traditions of the crisis of memory: that of the opposition to 
the regime during the dictatorship, specifically, of victims of symbolic and physical forms of state 
violence4. Focusing on the second generation, this research is concerned with the new dilemmas 
and perspectives that stem from the intergenerational transmission of political memories 40 years 
after the military coup, and raises the following questions: What is the role of family memories in 
the broader crisis of memory in Chile?, and in what sense may an understanding of the dynamics 
of appropriation and inhabitation of these family political memories by the second generations 
shed light on this?  
With the above questions in mind, this first chapter aims to describe the historical, theoretical and 
cultural context of the thesis and suggest that the aftermath of violence brings new challenges to 
memory-making and explore how the second generation may contribute to this debate. The 
chapter provides the reader with a historical, political and cultural panorama of what is at stake in 
the memory field in Chile, how this has been shaped within local discussions and how this thesis 
engages with these debates. In the first section I introduce the concepts of ‘memory crisis’, 
‘memory impasse’ and ‘divided memories’ as a way to set up the cultural environment of this 
thesis. Here I explain that after 1973 Chilean society developed the divided memory frames of a 
contested past: opposing pasts have been remembered and therefore opposing futures have been 
visualized. Then, I provide an historical and theoretical overview of the main discussions that the 
critics of the dictatorship have developed between the reestablishment of democracy in 1990 and 
today (2013) and also describe some of the most relevant political events. Exploring the stages of 
the memory debate in Chile, I focus particularly on the work of two scholars whose ideas are 
pivotal to the thesis: the historian Steve Stern and the psychologist Elizabeth Lira. Stern’s trilogy 
The Memory Box (2006a, 2006b, 2010) has defined the conflict around memory as ‘a matter of 
hearts and minds’, shedding light on the stubbornness of memories and the ‘material’ from which 
                                                          
4 It is interesting to note that within the local memory and human rights field the concept of state violence 
has been used by both left-wing and human rights organizations. As the Rettig Report (the first of the 
reports for reconciliation, which I will introduce soon) explains, there was a debate around whether to 
consider as human rights violations any action against human dignity, or only those actions committed by 
state agents, who are supposed to protect those guarantees. While left-wing sectors prefer to speak of state 
violence and human rights violations as being equivalent, the Rettig report speaks of political violence. It 
does so because it also considers human rights violations performed by individuals, in this case members of 
left-wing groups who promoted the armed struggle against the regime. Thus, the report also included a list 
of uniformed victims (members of the police). 
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they are made. Lira’s book chapter: Dilemmas of Memory (2011) offers a long term perspective on 
how the transmission of political memories gets solidified in ‘ghetto memories’ which are passed 
on from generation to generation. From her work, we see that there is a relationship between the 
impasse, the stubbornness of memories and their accumulation through time. In the last section, I 
introduce the second generations as producers of memory and situate them as part of new 
narratives of memories, raising questions about the dilemmas and issues that these narratives 
entail. Following this, the chapter offers a brief outline of the thesis chapters and the main 
arguments they aim to develop. Finally, I describe the main conclusions of the chapter. 
 
 
The Division Of Memory 
During the 1960s and 1970s an intense political process of social and political polarization took 
place in the Southern Cone of Latin America. In Chile this was radicalized by initiatives such as the 
nationalization of the US-owned copper industry and an agrarian reform supported by the 
Christian Democrat government of Eduardo Frei Montalva (1964-1970). The latter ‘sought to 
expropriate the inefficiently exploited landed estates of Chile’s central and southern provinces, 
and to reorganize them into agrarian cooperative settlements (…) that would transform servile 
peasant tenants into agrarian proprietors’ (Stern 2006, 13). However these redistributive 
processes were succeeded by military regimes in several countries of the region (Argentina, Chile, 
Uruguay and Brazil) which were both reactionary with respect to the social mobilizations that 
were taking place and foundational, attempting to create new kinds of  societies (Garretón 1992). 
Encouraged by the United States and the Doctrine of National Security, the militaries took a new 
role in the region. They had a messianic discourse: they were supposed to bring order to multiple 
social pressures, defined by them as social chaos and even as a ‘Marxist cancer’ which had to be 
exterminated.  (Stern 2006b; Lira 1993, 109.  According to Manuel A. Garretón:  
‘The process in the Southern Cone, however, involved more than disarming, 
disarticulating, fragmenting, or repressing the opposition. The goal of those military 
regimes, in contrast to that of more traditional dictatorships, was to transform society. 
Their plan was first to re-create the relations between the state and civil society in order 
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to institute a nonredistributive, nonparticipatory brand of capitalism, and then to reinsert 
their respective economies into the world system’ (Garretón 1993, 16).    
In Chile the military coup triggered a long term crisis of memory which has been characterized by 
the existence of opposing memory frames competing to give meaning to the events, around which 
has prevailed antagonistic interpretations (Constable and Valenzuela 1993; Lazzara 2006; Lazzara 
2007; Stern 2006). One of the boundaries between communities is the relationship that they hold 
towards state violence: whilst for supporters of Pinochet’s military regime it was a necessary 
price5, for the moral opposition to the dictatorship it inspired an ethical struggle to protect human 
rights, denounce state terror and then, not to forget. For the opposition, memory became a moral 
duty and a form of justice. For Elizabeth Jelin, an Argentinian scholar of memory, this was part of 
‘the memory work’ in the region (Jelin 2002).  
In The Memory Box (a book whose arguments I will further outline later in this chapter) Stern uses 
the concept of ‘memory impasse’ to describe those competing visions of the Pinochet years which 
seemed irreconcilable with one other (Stern 2006a). For the scholar Michael Lazzara such 
impasses refer to certain dilemmas that a divided community faces when it finds it difficult to 
create the agreements for an imagined future together after episodes of political violence:  
‘How to construct a narrative of the individual and social traumas that plagued Chile after 
September 11, 1973; how to build convivencia (the ability to live together civilly and 
peacefully, leaving aside the enmity solidified by the experience of a 17-year dictatorship); 
how to strive for justice, offer reparations to victims, and achieve some semblance of 
‘reconciliation’: in short, how to construct a ‘culture of human rights’ rooted in a genuine, 
non-evasive coming to terms with the past, have been key issues that Chilean society has 
dealt with, gradually, fitfully, painfully, since 1973’  (Lazzara 2006, 342–343). 
The above quotation shows the complexity that a ‘memory impasse’ may involve and how the 
issues that are at stake are - if expressed through memories - beyond them. The Chilean impasse 
describes the familiar scenario of that of ‘divided memories’, a concept which has been used to 
                                                          
5 In Collins’ words: At most, the vague notion that there had been ‘excesses’, particularly in the (long-ago) 
early period after the coup - when, after all, the country had been at war – entered the national psyche, and 
was used consciously or subconsciously to quiet any prickings of conscience (Collins 2013,:65). 
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understand the sort of crisis that communities have to undergo once they have divided positions 
towards episodes of violence6.  
 
 
The Moral Opposition to the Dictatorship 
In 1988, after 15 years of dictatorship the opposition to the regime succeeded in calling a 
Plebiscite in order to decide Pinochet’s continuity in the government. As well as in Chile, in other 
countries of the Southern Cone opposition ‘moral’ communities were important actors in the 
struggle against the regimes and then in the consequent struggle for justice (Lazzara 2011; Lazzara 
2006; Stern 2006a; Jelin and Candina 2002; Collins, Hite and Joignant 2013; Wilde 2013 ). This 
coincided with the broader phenomena related to the memory field called the ‘formation of 
cosmopolitan memory’ (Daniel Levy and Sznaider, 2002). Levy and Sznaider show how the 
language of victims and perpetrators which stem from the Holocaust was adopted by international 
communities and created a sort of moral voice, which was effective in creating pressure in violent 
contexts7. The language of trauma used by many of these moral agents helped to place the 
Chilean case in a universalistic context, where the experience of suffering would allow local victims 
to find an international/global lexis in common with other groups of people who had also 
experienced suffering and the effects of political violence, but in completely different contexts. 
The globalization of the memory frame is certainly problematic as it raises questions about to 
what extent political histories might be homogenized by a moral frame, and also how the language 
of memory studies may have shaped the way local communities relate to their histories of struggle 
and or suffering. I further explore these tensions in the literature review.  
The ‘internationalization’ of the Chilean case, according to Stern, started with the work of exiled 
communities, whose public denunciations of the regime contributed to creating pressure within 
                                                          
6 Dramatic events resulting from World War II have inspired multiple discussions in such kind of dilemmas 
(Portelli 1991; Cappelletto 2005; Suleiman 2012) To give an example from another historical context, after 
the fall of Mussolini the members of some Italian villages collaborated with the Nazi occupation while others 
joined the political opposition and became members of the resistance. Commenting on this, the scholar 
Michael Lambeck suggests: ‘Here the usual dualistic categories of friends and enemies, victims and 
perpetrators, are much more ambiguous but the violence even more insufferable and far less easily resolved 
that when it is understood to come from outside’ (2005: xiii). 
7 Levy and Sznaider call this ‘transnational solidarities’ (2002). 
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Chile (Stern 2006a). The Aggrupation of Relatives of the Disappeared8 (Agrupación de Familiares 
de Detenidos Desaparecidos, AFDD), the Catholic Church (through the Vicaría de la Solidaridad9) 
and the communities of exile10 outside the country had all contributed - together with the political 
opposition which organized the work and the protests of the social movements - to the fall of the 
regime and the conquest of the moral space in the late 80s. They had their main triumph when in 
1988 the No campaign won the election and therefore in 1990 the democratic system was re-
established. 
 
 
The Recovery of Democracy 
Since the end of the dictatorship, one of the main questions that has haunted Chilean society is 
what kind of justice the state would seek and, therefore, what the real meaning of the political 
project of reconciliation would be. The scholar María Angélica Cruz shows how this translated into 
an intense debate within the Catholic Church, a moral authority within Chile, about whether 
reconciliation meant the search for justice or forgetting about the past (Cruz 2004). In fact, once 
democracy was re-established, one of the first steps of the democratic government of the elected 
President Patricio Aylwin (1990-1994), supported by the Concertación coalition, was to establish 
the National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation (Comisión Nacional sobre Verdad y 
Reconciliación) which in 1991 elaborated the Rettig Report11 (1991). This report made official what 
before had been known as a secret: that in Chile there were victims of human right violations 
                                                          
8
 The relatives of detenidos desaparecidos started to gather spontaneously with the support of the Vicaría 
and then became active participants in the search for relatives and the demand for justice and memory.  
9
 Started first as the Pro Peace Commitee, this was an organization promoted by the Catholic Church to 
support the victims of the dictatorship, who brought legal and humanitarian advice to the victims and their 
relatives.  
10
 According to Stern the number of exiles increased to about 200,000 (2006). In the book Exiliados, 
Emigrados y Retornados Loreto Rebolledo mentions the statistics of the Liga Chilena de Derechos del 
Hombre which state a total of 400,000 and the Vicaria de la Solidaridad’s statistics which suggests a total of 
260,000 people (Rebolledo 2006). . 
11 It was known as the Rettig Report, after Raul Rettig, the commission’s chairman. The commission’s 
mandate was to acknowledge and document individual deaths and disappearances under the dictatorship. 
They gathered information (documentation and also investigative work done by human rights organizations) 
and heard testimony from witnesses and relatives. 
 
21 
 
carried out by agents of the state (Perotin-Dummon 2005). For the first time it systematized a list 
of dead and desaparecidos, as well as the circumstances in which these actions occurred12. 
However, at the same time as the report considered the victims of the regime, it also listed ‘the 
victims on the regime’s side, of unknown or leftist political origin’13 (Collins , Hite and Joignant 
2013). Although Aylwin exhorted the militaries to cooperate voluntarily with the search for further 
information, the report was dismissed by the armed forces who denied its legal or historical 
validity.   
In that context, Aylwin’s democratic government gave birth to the philosophy of en la medida de 
lo posible (as best as possible) which marked a decade of a vulnerable democracy and the 
deepening of the free-market economy, but also of social disenchantment regarding social 
expectations with respect to the meaning and pace of democracy14. As the armed forces still had 
power, every decision was made by consensus, and Pinochet, rather than being judged for his 
political responsibility, stood as the Army commander until 1998 (when he resigned), and then 
became a Senator for life. This figure became the phantom for the ex-opposition and was at the 
centre of a critique of the Chilean transition which began to take shape. As a consequence, in the 
late 90s and in the face of new scenarios during the so called ‘transitional process’, social 
researchers began to focus critically on the concept of ‘reconciliation’. This concern was the result 
of the marginalization of human rights violations as a political priority in the first stage of the post-
dictatorship, in order to not affect the stability of the new democracy (Wilde 2013). In the 
prologue of Todo es Según el Dolor con que se Mira, Ignacio Martín-Baró stated a thesis which 
embodies the critique of the period: ‘This formulation (reconciliation) impedes and complicates 
reparation, because it transforms the consequences of human rights violations into private issues 
for the victims and into a topic of interest for specialists, denying their social and public origins, 
evading their latent and evident effects, either at a psychological or political level’15 (Becker and 
Lira 1989, 7). In this quotation, the main tensions of the following decades are articulated: the 
                                                          
12	The initial number of victims listed was 2000, while a subsequent investigation recognized a total of 3,216 
in August 2011 (Collins, 2013). 
13	In the report they formed 11 per cent of final victims. However Hite et al. note that today this number has 
fallen ‘since no judicial case has to date found any other than state actors responsible’ (Hite 2013 28).	
14	 According to Collins: ’Specific threats, civilian-military standoffs, and the negative example of 
neighbouring Argentina finally convinced president Patricio Aylwin (1990-1994) that limited truth, together 
with some reparations measures, was the most that could be achieved or should be attempted’ (Collins  
2013, 65).	
15
 My translation. 
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privatization of memory, the frustration with respect to the institutional work of justice16 and the 
demand to develop an official discourse about the past.  
 
 
1990-1998  A decade of Social Disenchantment 
As part of a sense of general disenchantment during the first decade of the post-dictatorship, the 
democratic character of Chilean political system was questioned by several scholars. Within 
Chilean historiography - and the way Chileans have shaped their identity - the idea that the 
country has had a democratic tradition which differentiates it from other Latin American countries 
has had pride of place (Stern 2006a; Lazzara 2011). However, in La Vía Chilena a la Transición 
Política Lira and Brian Loveman argued that the Salvationist character of the Army during the 
military coup, which allowed intervention by military means in the political life, was not unique to 
the 70s. They observed how the Chilean Army had already intervened in the three constitutions17 
of the 20th century (Loveman and Lira 1999). They stated that the local political system has always 
found it very difficult to articulate social pressures and that a pattern can be seen: after social 
conflicts, episodes of social violence and polarization took place and were followed by amnesties. 
Conflicts ‘disappear’ from the public sphere and become concealed or contained by amnesties. 
Years later, however, these conflicts would come back. This insight invites the reader to wonder 
about the ‘afterlife’ of conflicts, of their transmission and aftermath, and the conditions under 
which they become a presence after being absent. What happens to the conflict, to the injuries 
provoked by the conflict and by what means are these memories stored and transmitted? This 
thesis engages with these questions, particularly in Chapter 6 (Family Memories and 
Intergenerational Remembering of Political Violence).  
                                                          
16 Until that date the work of justice was slow. However, Collins notes ‘Indeed, in spite of successive centre-
left Concertación collation governments between 1990 and 2010 proving to be particularly wary of decisive 
action on issues of justice, by 2012 Chile had compiled one of the most active and complete records of 
judicial accountability anywhere on the continent, and perhaps in the world. Despite the continued 
existence of a 1978 amnesty law which effectively granted impunity to former agents of the regime, and 
notwithstanding 2010’s political shift to the right, in mid-2012 64 former members of the security forces 
were completing prison sentences for their role in the dictatorship era crimes. These formed part of a total 
of 800 agents actively investigated or charged over such crimes since 200’ (2013: 61).   
17 They show how at the beginning of the 20th century the army was established under Prussian influence 
and that they wanted to professionalize themselves ‘against’ the politicians. 
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The critique of ‘individualization’ was another pivotal element in the diagnostics of the Chilean 
transition and was entangled with the economic transformation undergone by the country 
through the implementation of neoliberalism (Lazzara 2009a). In fact, the analyses of transition 
were tied to the neoliberalization of economy and were somehow two faces of the same coin. 
Influenced by the language of psychoanalysis, the theory of the collective denial of mourning was 
taken up by the sociologist Tomás Moulian in order to think about Chilean society. In his widely-
read Anatomía de Un Mito he describes how neoliberal ideology succeeded in defining Chilean 
subjectivity in terms of materialistic concerns and individualistic desires (Moulian 2002). His thesis 
is that the Chilean democratic transition was characterized by a forgetting about the past, a 
collective amnesia provoked by the neoliberal dynamic and the disciplining of Chileans as ‘credit 
cards citizens’. In a similar analytical perspective, the cultural theorist Idelber Avelar states: ‘The 
Chilean dictatorial state operated culturally through the imposition of a veritable passion for 
consumerism, the absolute privatization of public life, the obsession with individual success and 
aversion to politics and collective initiatives’18 (Avelar 1999, 66). Describing the transformations 
that followed the military coup, she shows the extent to which they surpassed the economic field 
and entered into of culture and into the making of selves.  
While some authors emphasized the privatization of politics and economy, others focused on the 
(displaced) experience of loss. For example, the documentary maker Carmen Velasco, widow of 
Miguel Enríquez19, represented this bitter feeling of uneasiness with the political establishment in 
a documentary (Calle Santa Fe 2007). This film was made on her return to Chile after almost 30 
years of exile in Paris, and she reads a voiceover while the camera travels around Santiago, saying 
that for her post-dictatorial Chile “is no more than a group of traitors”. She never came back to 
live in Chile, due to the depth of her feeling of loss (political and private) that the bombing of La 
Moneda represented. But what she could not really stand was the fact that life continued and 
people adapted to a (neoliberal) future, which appeared to her as aberrant. In the documentary, 
she only returned to finally meet the anonymous person who saved her on the day on which 
Enríquez and she were shot. In all other respects, the country seemed for her a different place; 
apart from losing her partner, she lost her idea of home. 
                                                          
18 My translation. 
19 Miguel Enríquez was the leader of a leftist group, MIR (Revolutionary Left Group), inspired by the Cuban 
guerrillas and advocating violent social transformation. Enríquez was shot by state agents while he was in 
hiding with his pregnant wife, Carmen Castillo, and their son. 
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These works made concepts such as privatization, amnesia, loss and denial of state violence 
seething presences in the critiques of the Chilean transition to democracy. They have been part of 
an ‘influential criticism of the post-dictatorship society of the 1990s’ which ‘has invoked the 
dichotomy of remembering against forgetting to characterize Chile as a culture of oblivion, marked 
by a tremendous compulsion to forget the past and the uncomfortable’  (Stern 2006b, xvii). Stern 
adds: ‘The dialectic of memory versus forgetting is an inescapable dynamic, perceived as such by 
social actors in the heat of their struggles. In regimes of secrecy and misinformation, the sense of 
fighting oblivion, especially in the human rights community, is powerful and legitimate’  (Stern 
2006b, xviii). In the years to come, Stern would contribute to understanding such dynamics of 
memory by exploring the competing narratives that were simultaneously at stake. 
 
 
Beyond memory and forgetting   
Although observers of the period have tended to see in the constraint imposed by the 1980 
Constitution the reasons for silence about the past (Wilde), a third position has started to emerge. 
This position would begin to destabilize the dualistic tendency of Chilean memory crisis (ie: friends 
or enemies, memory or forgetting) and, I argue, enriches the debate about the past and the 
elements involved in the memory-making of the past. Complicating the diagnostics, but also 
criticizing the Chilean transition and pointing to the transformations triggered by Pinochet’s 
regime in Chile, Marco Antonio de la Parra wrote La Mala Memoria  (1998). The book was a 
memoir, a personal story of contemporary Chile which explores the transitional process from 
within. He reminds us how in the 90s Ariel Dorfman’s Death and Maiden  was staged in Chile, but 
failed to gain any public attention, even from the press. For De la Parra, the striking lack of 
response to an internationally recognized work - considered by the Nobel Prize-winning writer 
Harold Pinter as a masterpiece - is because it portrayed characters such as the victim and the 
prosecutor, while Dorfman’s empathy was clearly with the victim20. For De la Parra, Dorfman’s 
work is ‘… biased, too clean, it leaves outside the whole complexity of the Chilean phenomenon. It 
portrays a history which may be real, exact, but which is too accurate to give an account of the 
                                                          
20 See also Steven Waine’s analyisis of The Dead and the Maiden in his book Testimony After Catastrophe 
(Waine, 2006) 
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terrible character of the national metamorphosis’21. When he says that the story is ’too clean’, he 
is referring to the moral distinction between characters, where the woman is the tortured subject 
and has to do the memory work. To De la Parra, Dorfman did not represent the identification of 
Chilean society, which he claims is with the doctor (the torturer). For him, the Chilean story would 
start when Dorfman’s work finishes: ‘For me the best scene of the play is the last scene, when the 
couple meets the doctor during a concert, and they are all dressed up for the occasion. Maybe it is 
then that those who stayed in Chile would have started the play script. But I am not sure whether 
we could have tolerated this’ (De la Parra 1998, 219)22. In fact, De la Parra’s work shifts the debate 
from the questions of amnesia, loss or repression to those of identification with perpetrators, the 
issue of complicity and the relationship with the past through the writing of history. He basically 
brings a psychoanalytical insight to his cultural critique, and shows how identification matters 
when we remember or write history. Here he is close to Dominique LaCapra’s position when he 
criticizes the Historians dispute23, arguing that a reflexive relationship to traumatic history can only 
emerge after acknowledging the observer’s mechanisms of identification with the past (Booth 
2006; LaCapra 2001). De La Parra took up Theodor W. Adorno’s thesis, developed in the context of 
his discussion of Alexander and Margarette Mischerlich’s The Inability to mourn, that after the 
Holocaust there was no observable melancholia in post-war Germany (as the psychologists had 
previously stated). This was because the collective identification with the Fuhrer continued, 
secretly, to exist (Santner 1993)24.   
                                                          
21 My translation. 
22 My translation. 
23 The Historiskerstreit or historians dispute deals with the normalization of the Holocaust, its relation to 
other historical events and the moral dilemmas of writing history. It was triggered after the 40th anniversary 
of Hitler’s defeat, when Kohl invited Reagan to a commemoration of the 40th anniversary of the Holocaust 
in a site where victims of the SS were buried together with victims of the World War II. A public debate was 
triggered after this and Jürgen Habermas’ response to Ernst Nolte received particular attention. The latter 
had argued that the past should be allowed to die and that Hitler should be contextualized so as to enable 
understanding of his motivations and fears. For Habermas, Nazi crimes were not comparable to any other 
crime, and what was at stake was the public use of history. He argued that the historian’s objectivity was an 
illusion, but was always traversed by a moral duty. This debate has been commentated on in various works, 
among which I highlight Dominique LaCapra’s and James Booth’s comments on it (quote).  
24 In the 60s, Alexander and Margarette Mischerlich applied Freud’s theory of the psyche to the mourning of 
collective losses in their groundbreaking study The Inability to Mourn. They were struck by the rapidity with 
which the Führer was renounced and by the lack of signs of a psychological reaction to the event, which 
according to them was at least a ‘prerequisite for a melancholic reaction’. In their book they suggested that 
Germans had not been able to mourn their Nazi past and the loss of the figure of the Führer, and instead 
had continued in the narcissistic way of love. For them, the Germans would have had to work through the 
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 For her part, referring to the social psychology of the first years of the post-dictatorship, Lira 
observes that there cannot be processes of mourning in contexts in which society defines the 
meaning of the trauma differently to the way in which the mourner does (Lira and Castillo 1993) 
She challenges the main strategy of the official project of reconciliation: that it would be reached 
through a personal process of forgiveness. According to her argument, mourning episodes of state 
violence cannot be worked through as private experiences, because their origin is not private. How 
could any reconciliation be possible if Chileans never agreed on the interpretation of the past?  
How can someone forgive someone else if there is no justice in-between? And moreover, how can 
social and state violence be redeemed by individual forgiveness? Lira argues that in Chile there 
was a lack of basic collective agreements about social life which impeded a healthy response to 
human rights violations.   
In an insightful later study, the scholar Katherine Hite also provided an alternative to the 
dichotomist approach to the crisis of memory, and complicated the conception of political agency, 
by suggesting that the extent of the traumatization of political actors has not been taken into 
account in attempts to understand the way the democracy was managed after the dictatorship.  
Destabilizing the idea of rational political agents, and concerned with understanding the other 
reasons for official silence, she asks: ‘Why was there this official silence about the recent past, 
when this very past was the topic of various publications and it was present in popular memory?’ 
For her, the traumatic experience of loss and failure in the 70s left deep marks within the political 
class and determined their way of negotiating the transition. Her thesis was that: ‘the effects of 
trauma have been underestimated as an explanation of the silence of the political elite during the 
90s, with respect to the last three decades and half’25 (Hite 2007). 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
relationship of identification they had maintained with the Führer, particularly the embodiment in his figure 
of the ego-ideal). According to Santner ‘This remarkable diagnosis offered a new framework of 
interpretation, one that promised to extend the reach of the analysis and moral evaluation of social and 
political behaviour in postwar Germany’ (Santner 1993, 2). For Adorno, instead, there was another 
conclusion to be reached after such lack of melancholic reaction: ‘secretly, unconsciously smouldering and 
therefore especially powerful these identifications as well as group narcissism were not destroyed but 
continued to exist’ (Santner 1993, 5). 
25
 My translation. 
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1998- 2003: The memory boom  
In 1998, after recently having become a Senator for life, Pinochet was detained in London26. He 
had travelled to the UK for health reasons and the Spanish judge Baltazar Garzón took advantage 
of this trip to demand his extradition to Spain in order to try him for crimes against humanity. 
According to Ximena Tocornal: ‘many scholars have suggested that these years [1996 and 1997) 
are a prelude to, if not the start of, an open public debate about the past…’ (Tocornal 2008,30)27.  
Collins et. al. describe the climate during the period: 
‘(..) Pinochet’s arrest ‘fronted’ the past to the present, sending ardent supporters and 
opponents into the streets to rally his defence or to celebrate his detention. Emotions 
initially ran high, with pro- and anti- Pinochet ralliers confronting one another in high 
political drama. Pinochet’s arrest demanded a response, a public debate. His arrest forced 
conversations and arguments among political and not so political citizens, between 
parents and children, in public and in private’ (Collins, Hite and Joignant 2013, 19). 
For Wilde, Pinochet’s detention abroad: ‘encouraged incipient efforts under way in Chileans court 
to investigate and prosecute the dictator and his associates for human right crimes’ (Wilde 2013, 
34). This was later called ‘the Pinochet effect’ (Collins, Hite and Joignant 2013). In fact, the same 
year the Human Rights Roundtable (Mesa de Diálogo) was inaugurated, and for first time the 
armed forces cooperated with the government concerning the fate of the desaparecidos. The 
initiative included militaries, human rights lawyers and civilians and was triggered by the 
government’s attempts to negotiate Pinochet’s return to Chile, arguing that he should be tried in 
the country. The Mesa was a way to ‘show’ that there were the conditions for that within the 
country. In 2001 it produced a document with information about 200 cases of death and 
disappearance, and gave details of the destination of the remains (Wilde 2013).  
After the London impasse (which lasted a year) and once back in Chile, Pinochet also faced other 
problems with justice and at the end of 2005 he faced several trials linked to human rights 
violations; the assassination of Allende’s army commander, Carlos Prats and his wife in Buenos 
                                                          
26 This happened during Eduardo Frei’s government – the second government of the Concertación in this 
period -. 
27
 Wilde notes that the number of publications increased between 1996 and 1997/8, as the 25th anniversary 
of the coup approached (Wilde 2013). 
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Aires in 1974 and the discovery of his secret account at the Riggs bank in Washington (Perotin 
Dumont 2005). This last aspect meant a political isolation for the dictator which no human rights 
case had succeeded in doing before. For Wilde, all these events were ‘irruptions of memory’: 
‘unbidden intrusions of past conflicts into public life that raised symbolic and moral issues that 
troubled its transition’ (Wilde 2013,33). He describes these irruptions as ‘external to those 
institutional aspects well analysed by political scientists’ (Wilde 1997). By pointing to what he calls 
‘intrusions’ he is referring to that stubbornness of memory that my thesis also aims to explore: in 
what conditions may the past be present, in what conditions and how past events may haunt.   
 
 
Stern’s ‘battle for hearts and minds’ 
In this context, Stern’s work made a significant contribution to the way the memory impasse was 
being framed in Chile. In his trilogy The memory box he argues against a dichotomist idea of 
memory versus forgetting, which had assumed that struggles in the memory field are against 
social oblivion (Stern 2006a; Stern 2006b; Stern 2010). He also argues against the idea - 
widespread within human rights movements - that it is only the moral complacency of middle and 
wealthy classes that has legitimated political violence in the Southern Cone military regimes. For 
Stern, these two conceptions (social oblivion and moral complacency) are insufficient and 
misleading when analysing memory because they conceptualize the field as one where social 
actors are aligned on one side or the other. By contrast, he understands memory struggles and 
frameworks ‘as a set of relationships, conflicts, motivations and ideas that shaped history’ (Stern 
2006b, x).  
Concerning the Chilean case, Stern suggests that it was not a struggle between memory or 
forgetting, but among different memory frameworks instead. In fact, he identifies four memory 
frameworks which have the role of giving meaning to the coup, and differentiates them depending 
on where they locate the ‘traumatic’ event. Each of the four memory narratives starts from a 
traumatic event which caused suffering and resentment to an opposing community of memory. 
Stern’s book points at the negotiation of meaning underlying memory struggles, and how the 
meaning of each memory frame depends on the definition of the traumatic. Thus, the traumatic 
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provides the analytic lens of the events in which the victims, the guilty party, the heroes and the 
perpetrators are identified. Stern’s work shows how the memory framework of the supporters of 
Pinochet would always consider the 1960s Land reform process as the traumatic event and see the 
coup as the salvation which ended the chaos engendered by the agrarian reform. On the other 
hand, the opposition to the coup and supporters of the UP would see the coup itself as the 
traumatic event which gave birth to other traumatic situations: torture, imprisonment, exile, 
persecution, etc.  
Stern’s work resonates with Francesca Cappelletto’s findings in her work on Italian communities 
which suffered the effects of the World War II where she states that the memory of the traumatic 
past is the fabric that holds together a community of memory  (Cappelletto 2005). The community 
is not defined by spatial boundaries only but through narratives of the past. But by exploring the 
memory impasse as a ‘matter of hearts and minds’ Stern goes further and sheds light on the 
problem of legitimacy. For him ‘contentious memory’ is: ‘… a process of competing selective 
remembrances, ways of giving meaning to and drawing legitimacy from human experience’ (Stern 
2006b, xxvii). At the same time he shows how important is to take into account not only the 
culture in which memory impasses are inserted but the affects and identifications that these 
memories carries with them. Memory struggles have been built over embodied experiences in the 
social world. As it can be seen in the life stories narrated in his book, at the heart of the Chilean 
impasse there was a struggle in which individual, family, class and social identities were 
intertwined with individual and collective narratives of the past, the present and the desired 
future. Stern’s influence is evident in the mode in which I will present my interviews in this thesis, 
so that my interviewees’ family histories (and stories) are made visible and become an important 
aspect of the way that each interview demands to be listened to.  
 
 
2003 up today: Forging Memorias militantes  
After Pinochet’s detention in London and the irruption of the recent past into open debate, the 
crisis of memory would reach a different stage more favourable towards the (ex) opposition 
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memory framework28. In 2003, during the government of the Socialist President Ricardo Lagos 
(2000-2006), the 30th anniversary of the military coup obliged Chileans to face the past. According 
to Peter Winn the date made Chileans:  ‘confront a history that many would have preferred to 
forget or ignore’ (Winn 2007). A commemorative boom started in memory of that date and 
‘plaques and monuments were erected throughout the country, and initiatives were launched by 
many of the victims associations in order to conserve the most emblematic sites of torture’ 
(Perotin-Dummon 2005). The following year, 2004, the Valech report was issued by the National 
Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture (Comisión Nacional Sobre Prisión Política y 
Tortura)29 and President Lagos, on behalf of the state, asked the victims of the regime for 
forgiveness. Perotin speaks about a process of recognition triggered by the two reports (Rettig and 
Valech). For her, recognition meant that what had previously been rendered unspeakable, started 
to gain public space and legitimation. This was also given representation through a new symbolic 
act performed by the President in 2003. After 30 years, Lagos opened a door from La Moneda 
which had remained closed since the coup: the door through which Allende’s corpse left the 
palace (Perotin-Dummon 2005). Collins et. al observes how during Lagos’ government: ‘[He] began 
publicly to cast, even to embrace, Allende as a fallen democrat committed to his country’ (Collins, 
Hite and Joignant 2013, 12). After this period, a change within public opinion was noted by Wilde: 
‘Public opinion, shaped by the revelations from judicial investigations and prosecutions of 
Pinochet-era officials, rapidly became more supportive of establishing the truth about the 
practices of the dictatorship, even such topics as torture that had been taboo earlier during the 
transition’ (Wilde  2013, 34). As Collins et.al observes, by 2003 ‘the testimonies of relatives of the 
dead and desaparecidos meanwhile began to gain new visibility, particularly in the television 
media…. Human rights associations found new space for their accounts and demands and, 
crucially, survivors began to become publicly and judicially visible for almost the first time’ (Collins, 
Hyte and Joignant 2013, 18).  
In 2006 the fourth Concertación government was elected and Michelle Bachelet assumed the 
presidency (2006-2010). This marked a milestone in the struggle for justice. Being a member of the 
                                                          
28 I say ex- opposition to the military regime considering that democracy was already established. But 
throughout the thesis I will show that the group identity forged in this period would have long term effects. 
29 The report has been updated between 2003 and the present and has recognized a total number of 38,254 
victims of torture or political imprisonment in hands of state agents between 1973 and 1990.  Source: Rettig 
Report. 
31 
 
Socialist Party, she was the daughter of a victim killed by the regime, and she and her mother were 
tortured during the dictatorship30. During her government a new Museum of Memory and Human 
Rights was inaugurated in 2010 and the memory boom continued: everywhere sites of memory 
and memorials were inaugurated.  
 
 
Towards a Memoria Militante  
From 2003 onwards the image of the victim of state violence which prevailed the decade before 
has been replaced by the martyr or the hero, and narratives of suffering began to be reframed as 
narratives of resistance. In this period, for instance, works such as Memorias en Rojo y Negro were 
published (Vidaurrázaga 2005). This is the oral memory of three left-wing women activists, which 
expands the image of the imprisoned victim to that of a combatant (combatiente). They recount 
how women not only fought against social injustice but also against social stereotypes in Latin 
American culture, such as the meaning of being a ‘good mother’, a ‘good women’ and a ‘good 
militant’. 
This phenomenon might help to explain the quiet/cold response that Dorfman’s work had in Chile, 
but from a different perspective to that of De la Parra. It might also be possible that activists did 
not want to remember the ‘dead’ as victims but as heroes or militants. In fact, Lira describes how 
during the therapeutic work she did with victims of the dictatorship, the main adaptation she 
made to the Freudian theory of trauma was to replace the role of the sexual for that of the 
political (Lira 2007). She realized early on how important it was for her patients to articulate their 
lives in terms of political life stories and place their injuries in the contexts of political activism: 
‘The suffering of ex-prisoners to whom we were trying to bring relief had, therefore, an eminently 
political dimension… They demanded to be recognized as protagonists and militants of a project of 
social change, which was politically legitimate, and not as promoters of a criminal project’ (Lira 
2007)31. Lira’s argument shows how storytelling played a central role in the post-dictatorship, 
                                                          
30 In addition, it was the first time a woman had been the Chilean President. This year, 2013, she is 
campaigning for reelection, and her principal right-wing contendor is also a woman, Evelyn Matthei, the 
daughter of Fernando Matthei, an Army official, former member of the military junta and ex-Health Minister 
of Pinochet. 
31 My translation. 
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because it gave people the chance to tell the story of what happened through their own voice and 
through a different narrative to that of the regime.  
In this context, Lira’s article: Dilemmas of Memory (2011) sheds light on the current situation, 
where in spite of a favourable institutional context and an important change in terms of public 
opinion about the condemnation of human right violations, this does not translate into a memory 
closure32. For the scholar, the memory question in Chile is related to (but not caused by) the form 
in which political memories have been transmitted and how they have created a political culture 
over historical generations. If in her previously quoted work with Loveman, they stated that the 
recurrence of social polarization and amnesties has been a pattern within Chilean political history 
rather than an isolated event, it is in Lira´s Dilemmas of memory that the role of memories as 
solidified affects starts taking shape. For her, the memory impasse is not anchored in the 1970-
1973 and the dictatorial regime; instead it stems from a long term history preceding the UP which 
was already built upon divided political memories and their ritual remembering in political rituals, 
popular music, poetry, etc. In her account, the memory of state violence and its ritualistic 
transmission has been at the heart of left-wing political communities and rather than meaning the 
privatization of grief, it has constituted a long term historical memory (she contextualizes its 
origins in the early 20th century). In her words: ‘During the twentieth century, social memory was 
the memory of tragedies associated with social struggles in northern and southern Chile (…) The 
commemoration of these tragedies has become a ritual of unions and parties of the political Left 
ever since the events occurred, with greater social and public interest during certain periods of 
national history’ (Lira 2011,109). Suffering political violence, then, triggers a political memory, 
which unites a community who remembers together and at the same time this puts it into 
opposition to others33.  
For Lira, political organizations held a memory of the past which may inspire struggles of the 
present; however, they tend to remain strictly ‘political’ and ‘meaningful’ only to specific groups 
                                                          
32
 The opposition was constituted mainly by left wing parties and groups and the Christian Democrat Party. 
However, the ghettoization of memory is particularly relevant for more left wing affiliations, such as 
Communist Parties, Socialist Party, Party for the Democracy, Radical Party and other left-wing groups. This 
has been observed in a radicalization of the last Presidential campaign, radicalization which involves Right-
wing parties and Left-wing parties, which follows years of social mobilization which has increased these last 
years, particularly 2011 and 2012.  
33 In this, Lira’s work echoes Butler’s recent work on the ethics of responsibility, in which she sees in the 
feeling of being injured a political potential. I develop this in Chapter 2. 
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and therefore will not be shared by other members of society because of the specific past they 
commemorate. She states: ‘Yet, in general, it had meaning only within the context of such 
organizations’. In other words, Lira emphasizes the fact that political memories have both a 
potentiality and a limitation at the same time: they are ritually transmitted within political 
communities but their scope of meaning outside these groups is limited. For Emilio Crenzel: ‘Lira 
analyses the emergence of an activist memory and claims that it is part of a historical practice of 
remembrance marked by tragedy and willingness to redeem. In this way, the author historicizes 
the memory of the dictatorship in Chile and the difficulties for collective ownership faced by the 
accounts circulating in the public sphere’ (Crenzel 2011, 8). For every memory researcher in Chile 
this is a well-known fact and the starting point of the field: memories are divided and easily find 
themselves in an impasse. But the strength of Lira’s theory is that it suggests a socio-historical 
perspective in which to understand how memories have been compartmentalized and transmitted 
in the form of ghettos, reproducing deeply divided accounts of the past. For her this is not a 
product of Pinochet’s regime, but is previous to it. Underpinning these ghetto memories are 
opposing and conflicting interests in society. As Crenzel points out, this would carry with it a new 
dilemma: the fact that memories are not representative of society, but they work as ghettos 
instead. By exploring this, Lira is touching on an important aspect of the division of memory in 
Chile: the ghettoization of memory is not the monopoly of a specific memory impasse but 
according to Lira it is embedded in Chilean political culture itself.  
 
 
The Manicheism of Memory 
Challenging the memoria militante trend, Lazzara has shifted the debate from a focus on the 
categories of victims or heroes to the greys of memory. According to his argument, a contrast of 
black and white has dominated the process of looking at the past in Chilean political culture. For 
him the official discourses about memory – no matter what their political adscription is - are 
Manichean (Lazzara 2011). In his book Luz Arce, he interviews an emblematic collaborator with the 
regime who in the beginning was a leftist activist but finishes giving her comrades away. Here, 
Lazzara is interested in the greys of memory such as: ‘mutated, destroyed, traitorous or shamed 
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bodies’. Referring to the protagonist, he states: ‘she obliges us to confront our own human frailty 
as well as ethical (and political) gray zones generated by torture, state violence and neoliberal 
hegemony’ (Lazzara 2011, 9). For him, the figure of the traitor is a product of Pinochet’s neoliberal 
project in Chile, whose implementation required that bodies were broken down and made 
complicit with his project.  
Resembling the work of De la Parra, Lazzara states that the grey zone is one of the most 
intolerable features of Chilean collective memory:  
 ‘The Chilean post-dictatorship period is full of mutilated biographies that have been 
silenced or not have fit into the Manichean lexicon of official discourse (betrayal and 
heroism, left and right)... Within the human rights community, and more broadly within 
Chilean society, the official story has tended to reify the martyred militant, rendering him 
or her untouchable, while the traitor figure has remained stigmatized, hidden from view, 
muzzled, a taboo subject for former militant reticent to admit ‘defeat’, as well for a nation 
reluctant to face the ethical quagmire of complicity on which Pinochet dictatorship forged 
its economic miracle’ (Lazzara 2011, 1). 
Lazzara’s explanation points to the current blind spot in the Chilean case, which I suggest  is 
related to Lira’s phenomenon of the ghettoization of memories. By opposing the figure of the 
traitor and the figure of the martyr, Lazzara shows how the narrative structure of memories is 
Manichean. At the same time, it resonates with Andreas Huyssen’s warning against the 
mythologization34 of the past which may stem from a memory culture: ‘… the fault line between 
mythic past and real past is not always easy to draw – which is one of the conundrums of any 
politics of memory anywhere -. The real can be mythologized, just as the mythic may engender 
some strong reality effects’ (Huyssen 2003, 15-16). Just as Huyssen argues, a culture which lies too 
much on memory accounts, will be vulnerable to the works of remembering and the effects that 
narratives have over the past, when they pretend to be even more real than reality.  
 
 
                                                          
34 Andreas Huyssen’s argument resembles Barbara Misztal work on the sacralization of memories. For 
Huyssen it is ‘the excess’ of memory-based accounts which is problematic, while for Mistzal it is the 
influence of trauma which leads to the sacralization of experiences (Misztal 2004). 
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Second Generations: Beyond the dichotomist memory impasse? 
As I mentioned in the beginning of the chapter, in addition to the dualistic tension between 
enemies and friends, and left and right, some new forms of memories have arisen in recent years, 
making the panorama of memory more complicated. Although today the ‘memory taboo’ has 
rendered the memory of the victims and the resistance of the dictatorship visible and what was 
previously the opposition memory has become an official memory (in other words, the memory 
promoted by the state), it seems that the memory impasse has entered into a new stage.  
In 2010, after four consecutive governments of the Concertación Coalition, the right-wing - 
represented by the Alianza coalition - won the presidential elections for the first time in almost 50 
years in Chile and the millionaire Sebastián Piñera took office as President (2010-2014). During his 
government there has been a certain amount of concern that historical revisionism may cause 
regression in the struggle for a culture of human rights but this has not in fact been the case. For 
example, the Institute for Human Rights conceived during the Lagos’ government was finally 
established as part of the state apparatus and amnesty for military personnel in prison was 
rejected by the President in 2011. 
However, the crisis of memory persists at the same time as it has been problematized. Emotions 
like violence, anger and pain and sets of contradictions still come to the fore, even 40 years later 
and even though Pinochet has been discredited. These conditions make the very act of speaking in 
the context of this research potentially problematic. Just 2 years ago, for instance, the BBC 
interviewed President Piñera, and when at the end of the interview he was asked if public pro-
Pinochet acts were allowed in Chile, the interview was suddenly interrupted by his advisers. Later, 
the local TV commentators dismissed the impasse and described it as a “communicational 
mistake”35. However, it was not only a mistake; it was a symptom of a long-standing taboo about 
the 1973 coup, which makes it a critical issue, even when it has become apparently ‘past’. For 
instance, we will see in chapter 6 on Family Memories an extreme example of this; just a couple of 
years ago, a third generation descendant of a desaparecido experienced the denial by some of his 
classmates of his grandfather’s death. After getting involved in a passionate debate he learned 
that the practice of forced disappearance during the dictatorship was still considered an 
                                                          
35	TV program: Tolerancia Cero, June-July 2013. 
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‘invention’ by a group. Although there is a general feeling that the ‘truth’ has finally triumphed, 
there are still serious doubts about the extent of this triumph. There have been greater and lesser 
resistances to this historical memory, even though it has been proved to be ‘true’. Collins el al 
note: ‘However, memory-related politics and policies seem to have failed to enter the majority 
public imagination in any sustained way´ (Collins, Hite and Joignant 2013, 14). 
In this new stage, rather than taking a too optimistic approach I rather see new dilemmas but also 
forms of continuation with the memory impasse. There is a re-politization of the narratives of 
victimhood (as Lira’s work on ghetto memories have attempted to explain In a long term 
perspective); although there is increasing consensus on the reproach of the military coup and 
especially of state violence, there persist similar mechanisms of denial in some (emblematic) 
political actors and finally, the emergence of new forms of memory making such as Lazzara’s 
interview to Luz Arze or the recently published account of the collaborator, in a book recently 
launched (El Mocito) by the journalist Javier Rebolledo (2012). One of these new narratives, and 
the one which is at the centre of this thesis, is the experience of the second generation, for and its 
mode of remembering, not from the zone of combat but from the experience of family life and the 
coming to terms with a culture of fear in the past.  
In fact, in the last few years, several filmmakers from the second generation have voiced their 
perspective as ‘the children of the dictatorship’ in Chile, focusing on their personal relationship 
with the past which is at the same time political and familial. In 2010 the question became even 
more topical, and films such as Mi vida con Carlos (Germán Berger, 2009), Abuelos (Carla Valencia 
Dávila; 2010), El Edificio de los Chilenos (Macarena Aguiló; 2010), and El Eco de las Canciones 
(Antonia Rossi; 2010) were released. In all these films the film director tells a family story which is 
entangled with local history, in such a way that a personal drama follows a historical drama. 
Through these films the concept of the second generation has been recently articulated within 
Chilean society as a site of multiple losses thus giving an account of the presence of the past. The 
interrelation between personal and social search and the process of memory recovery is used as a 
resource by the directors in all four documentaries. Thus, these films are classically a second 
generation memory exploration as all of them deploy the practice of unearthing hidden family 
stories. In these accounts, memory is also a form of relatedness to a family legacy. But while the 
second generation category (a concept which I will further explore in the literature review) has 
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been often used to explore cultural or artistic categories, in this thesis my aim is to explore the 
memories (understood as embodied knowledge, narratives and silences) of sons and daughters of 
victims of the military regime. 
 
 
Chapter Conclusions 
This chapter has offered an overview of the main debates and milestones of the crisis of memory 
in Chile during the last decades. Examining its different periods, I have shown how memory has 
attained different levels of presence in the public sphere. In this sense, the chapter is aligned with 
Collins’s et al. assertion that: ‘Human rights issues narrowly defined have, perhaps deliberately, 
not been central to the national political agenda over the course of the Concertacion’s twenty year 
rule and the centre-right Alianza’s interregnum to date. Nonetheless (…) the overarching memory 
‘tropes’ involved have been central to political thinking, instincts, and action over the same period’ 
(Collins, Hite and Joignant 2013,23).  
By exploring the principal political events, topics of debate and tensions, in this chapter we have 
seen that what comes to be considered as ‘memory’ in contemporary Chile surpasses the limits 
and boundaries of the politics of memory (in Collins’ sense). I have also shown how memory is the 
lens through which we gain access to complex elements of the building of convivencia (Lazzara, 
2006). From the revision of periods we see that although reparation is a fundamental demand of 
the politics of memory, it seems that the memory question in Chile goes beyond the politics of 
reparation. However, as new actors and positions become part of the ‘polyphony of memories’ in 
Lazzara’s terms, the field become more complex. Drawing on this complexity, this thesis explores 
the voice of the second generation in a context in which it has recently become part of cultural 
memory and in which individual stories have started to frame this generational narrative. 
Considering Lazzara’s critique of the Manicheism of memory, it is interesting to see whether the 
second generation may open new forms of thinking about the past, and what new questions they 
will posit in the memory field. 
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Finally, it is important to highlight that Stern’s and Lira’s insights (described in the chapter) have 
inspired my enquiries throughout this research through basically two main points: that memory is 
stubborn because it is rooted in our basic but most fundamental sense of ‘how things are’ (and the 
belief of how they should be) and that in the course of its very transmission, the affects that 
compose memory get solidified and become ‘fixed’ to certain ways of remembering the past. I will 
come back to this in the course of the following chapters of the thesis. However, I disagree with 
Lira in that she does not consider the role of family transmission within the ghettoization of 
memories. Throughout the following chapters, in turn, I will explore family transmission to the 
second generation to show how this gives us new clues which help us to make sense of the crisis 
of memories and also to understand the afterlife of violence forty years after a traumatic event. 
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Chapter 2: The legacies of the Holocaust and the status of family memory 
 
 Our first consciousness of the Shoah was transmitted to us through  
the immediacies and intimacies of family life and through means that  
were bodily, palpable, densely affective.  
(Hoffman 2004, 33) 
 
 
 
Introduction 
In Chapter 1 I described the local context of the division of memory in Chile, focusing on how it has 
been framed and entangled with local political, academic and cultural debates of recent decades. 
However, as Stern notes, the struggle of the opposition against the dictatorship during the 70s and 
80s took place in an international context of human rights sensitization, which contributed to the 
pressure of the international community on the local political scenario (Stern 2006b). This 
influence did not circumscribe only the political contingency within Chile but coincided with a 
global cultural process which, for some authors, has been considered as a ‘memory boom’ on one 
hand and the ‘era of trauma’ on the other (Huyssen 1995; Jelin 2002; Argenti and Schramm 2010; 
Olick and Levy 2011). Among other things, this has meant that the literature of the Holocaust has 
been an unavoidable referent in thinking about the aftermath of violence among populations. Its 
corpus has surpassed the geographical, historical and cultural boundaries of the event, triggering a 
dialogue with other histories placed in different times and contexts. In fact, in this thesis I use the 
concept of the second generation to speak of the descendants of the victims of state violence in 
Chile, who grew up within opposition families. However, the genealogy of the concept ‘second 
generation’ shows that it was shaped during the post Holocaust years.  
Arguing that these analytical concepts (i.e: trauma and second generation) cannot simply be 
translated without a critical awareness of their cultural histories, this chapter aims to problematize 
the influence of the literature of the Holocaust on the memory field and particularly, on the 
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aftermath of violence in Chile and the context of memory division, which is one of its main 
features. Theoretically, the chapter focuses on three significant debates: 1) the influence of the 
now universalized memory of the Holocaust in local memories of political violence; 2) the extent 
to which deterritorialized memories can be appropriated by others than the immediate victims; 
and 3) the role of embodied transmissions of memory within the broader context of public 
memory. 
In the first section I focus on what has been called ‘the trauma paradigm’, exploring its influence 
and also considering two of its main critiques. The first of these concerns the extent to which the 
trauma paradigm might conceal local responses to violence, specifically in the context of divided 
memories when it is the very status of the traumatic that is being contested; the second concerns 
the extent to which it might depoliticize suffering. For the first of these I draw on Das’ critique of 
the ‘trauma bias’ and the ‘Holocaust template’ and agree with her insight that political violence is 
woven into everyday life and adjusts itself to the patterns of each social context. In this thesis, it is 
precisely the interweaving of the culture of fear, the imaginary of the military regime and also the 
important role of family which gives family transmission of political memory to the second 
generation its character. In relation to the second of the critiques, I explore here some of Butler’s 
ideas concerning - amongst others - the status of suffering and mourning in the making of political 
communities (Butler 2003). I also mention Das’ definition of ‘critical events’ as a counterbalance to 
those negative effects which traditionally have been related to the post-traumatic (Das 1995) 
In the second section I focus on debates concerning the transmission of memory, particularly 
those around the second generation and postmemory. These discussions deal with the questions 
of the means by which memories circulate and of who is entitled to bear these memories. It is in 
this intersection that some of the most interesting debates have taken place and I describe their 
principal implications. Here I will develop the work of two of my referents: Eva Hoffman’s work on 
the memory of the second generations and Marianne Hirsch’s development of the postmemory 
concept.  
In the last section I explore the critiques to the family bias which is present in Hirsch’s work but 
also in scholars from the Southern Cone military regimes. Agreeing with the importance of 
denaturalizing the family, I also defend the focus on the family as a site for memory production 
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which is characterized by ‘relatedness’ (Carsten 2007) and which also bridge various forms of 
private and public memory and identity constructions (Carsten 2007; Smart, . 
 
 
The Trauma Paradigm: A debate 
As I have already mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the language of memory studies - 
which has usually focused on processes of commemoration and ritualization of the past - has been 
deeply influenced by the reference to World War II and specifically, the Holocaust. For Susan 
Rubin Suleiman: ‘If Word War II was arguably the central event of the twentieth century, whose 
aftereffects and afterimages are still firmly lodged in public consciousness, it is in large because 
the Holocaust was part of it’ (Suleiman 2012, 3). The shocking knowledge of what happened in the 
concentration camps, which emerged after the German defeat, has circulated in compelling forms 
such as photographs and testimonies which have told the world stories beyond the imaginable.  
Underpinning the imaginary of the Holocaust, and also of other episodes such as the military 
regimes in the Southern Cone, the bombing of Hiroshima and the Vietnam War, is the concept of 
trauma, which has shown how the effects of shocking events continue to be felt and disturb their 
witnesses for a long time after they had taken place. Although the concept of trauma was initially 
mainly used to classify an individual state of mind, during the twentieth century it has evolved to 
also allow understanding of the psychosocial effects of violence among populations and its 
transmission. The scholar Ruth Leys describes what she considers ‘… the absolute indispensability 
of the concept for understanding the psychic harms associated with certain experiences of the 
twentieth century…’ (Leys 2000, 2). From a similar perspective, Dominique LaCapra states:  
‘Trauma studies have arisen as one of the most significant and at times controversial areas 
in psychoanalytic thought with significant implications for history and critical theory. And it 
has played a key part in the analysis of testimonies of survivors, notably Holocaust 
survivors but also victims of other genocides and extreme events such as rape and assault 
as well as longer-term processes( such as domestic violence’ (LaCapra 2009, 60).  
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As we see, according to LaCapra one of the results of the proliferation of the imaginary of the 
traumatic is that different experiences are conceived within the same field. Without reducing the 
Holocaust to trauma studies, he implies that a significant amount of Holocaust research has been 
shaped around the concept of trauma and has constituted a field characterized by experiences of 
victimhood, witnessing and testimony. For his part, Huyssen notes how the notion of trauma has 
acted as a countermemory to the optimism of globalization and served as an idiom which speaks 
of transnational modes of suffering and exploitation. As the author puts it: 
‘If 1980s were the decade of a happy postmodern pluralism, the 1990s seemed to be 
haunted by trauma as the dark underside of neoliberal triumphalism. The concern with 
trauma radiated out from a multinational, ever more ubiquitous Holocaust discourse. It 
was energized in the United States as well as in Latin America or South Africa after 
apartheid, by the intense interest in witness and survivor testimonies, and it merged with 
the discourses about AIDS, slavery, family violence, child abuse, recovered memory 
syndrome, and so on’ (Huyssen 2003,8)  
Huyssen sees the proliferation of different modes of traumatization as a feature of the 90s36. As a 
result, different histories of suffering which had been caused by distinct sources of violence came 
to be recognized as being traumatic. For some, this has created the basis for new forms of 
solidarity (Huyssen 2003; Stern 2006a; Langenhol 2011; Craps 2013), whilst for others it engenders 
two risks: it might conceal local forms of dealing with political violence and depoliticize the 
historical features of various forms of suffering37 (Antze 1996; Misztal 2004). In the next section I 
will further explore these two critiques of the trauma paradigm. 
                                                          
36 Alan Young offers a different genealogy of trauma. His work complements Huyssen’s by arguing that its 
history can be traced back to the 19th century and has been shaped by the idea of intimacy. Young’s 
argument is that memory is connected to our sense of self, providing the body with a subjectivity consisting 
of the connection between the past and our self-awareness. In this context, the emergence of a traumatic 
memory would reveal something of the manner in which we have framed personhood since the 19th 
century onwards (Young 1997).  
37
 Antze and Lambeck remark that: ‘the current politics of memory and its associated culture of victimhood 
draws attention away from collective forces and issues, and produces a shift from collective obligations and 
modes of accountability to narratives of individual suffering and accusations of individual blame’ (Radstone 
2010, 34). 
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Local responses to political violence and the divided memories context 
The question of the homogenizing effect that the concept of trauma may have on distant realities 
has been taken up by Lucy Burke et al. They state: ‘Focusing on academic discourse, we want to 
argue that the ways in which trauma is engaged with runs the risk of homogenizing different kinds 
of events and forms of violence, subsuming the contingencies of their historical production under 
a single concept’ (Burke, Faulkner and Aulich 2010). The authors point to the need to take into 
account the specificities of local histories, how the concept of trauma is first produced and then 
embodied and what struggles it might conceal and, in particular, distinguish the different kinds of 
violence behind different forms of social suffering.  
This discussion is particularly relevant for the Chilean case. As I noted in Chapter 1, according to 
Stern, among the characteristics of the memory impasse were precisely the difficulties in finding 
an agreement on the very meaning of the traumatic. In his work, he illustrates how within post-
coup Chile contending narratives of victimhood have reclaimed legitimacy for their ‘suffering’. For 
example, two distant experiences become homogenized, such as being the victim of land 
expropriations in the 60s on the one hand and the victim of state violence in the 70s or 80s on the 
other. Although both experiences have been narrated as forms of victimhood, which from a 
narrative perspective may be ‘comparable’, from an ethical and political perspective they are very 
different. This contrast shows how problematic is the status of the traumatic for societies with 
deeply divided memory frames, where the very definition of the traumatic implies a political and 
moral struggle38. In fact, in Chapter 1 I referred to how, particularly in the 80s and 90s, an activist 
community of memory and public opinion came together around the concept of trauma and the 
moral distinction between victims and perpetrators. Although this moral distinction was crucial, it 
was also problematic because its sharp distinction concealed its weakness in the local debate. In 
fact, from its weakness stem questions such as social complicity with state violence, which is an 
issue in the Chilean case (Lira and Castillo 1993). What was the role in state violence of the 
supporters of the regime and of the bystanders? Thinking in terms of social responsibility in 
episodes of violence and the complex forms in which violence might be legitimized - as Hannah 
                                                          
38 Aware of this, I have focused on one side of the Chilean memory tradition, that is to say, the opposition to 
the dictatorship lineage, which is defined by their experience of state violence. However, as we will see in 
chapter 7, even within this community of memories there is no absolute consensus either, and generational 
appropriation of familial political memories might be complicated. 
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Arendt did in her book Eichmann in Jerusalem: A report on the Banality of Evil- makes violence 
something much more familiar and quotidian than implied by accounts of the traumatic (where 
there are clear distinction between victims and perpetrators). 
Das also warns about the way the model of the Holocaust has become a template through which 
we think and speak of the traumatic as if it were the only form of experience after episodes of 
violence: ‘I would submit that the model of trauma and witnessing that has been bequeathed to us 
from the Holocaust studies cannot be simply transported to other contexts in which violence is 
embedded into different patterns of sociality’ (Das 2007,103). She states that, in order to give an 
account of collective traumas, we would need to look at specific socio-historical backgrounds 
instead. The anthropologist’s concern with the ‘attention to the local patterns of memory’ is taken 
up in, for example, Jennifer Cole’s research. Her book, Forget Colonialism, is a good example of 
what it means to take into account local patterns of memory and why this is important. She 
explores how inhabitants of a small village in Madagascar remember the colonial violence in their 
daily lives, and how its past is woven together and continually remade (Cole 2001). During the first 
months of her fieldwork, the past seemed an issue completely irrelevant to local people. Cole 
found a local community where practices seemed to be unquestionably local, while the colonial 
influence seemed to be absent. In her own words: ‘Elders would politely tell me about the colonial 
period when I asked, but for the most part I had to elicit the information; it did not appear to have 
any life of its own’ (Cole 2001, 4). However, the longer she stayed in the village, the more she 
started to perceive the hybrid nature of the place and the strong French influence on people’s life. 
She felt the need to go beyond people’s manifested concerns to find a selective process of social 
memory working in creating an indigenous sense of locality. Cole’s work shows how traces of past 
violence are not homogeneous and they might not be evident at first sight, but need to be 
elucidated in each particular context. For her, memory did not have ‘verbal’ expressions but was 
embodied in practices and rituals.  
During my fieldwork I had a similar experience to that of Cole: after several attempts at speaking 
about what I described as a traumatic experience, my interviewees were not really prompted to 
answer. By contrast, when in later attempts I asked about ‘growing up during the dictatorship’, 
they turned to their experiences which were based on their family histories and in narratives that 
circulated within their families. These stories were not organized around the template of the 
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traumatic, despite the fact that the question is organized thus within academic work or even in 
colloquial language. This draws attention to the multiple forms taken by experiences and 
narratives of the aftermath of violence.  
 
2) Depolitizing suffering 
A second critique of the use of the concept of trauma as a metaphor for the aftermath of violence 
is that this might pathologize social experiences of suffering which are the product of social 
relationships and forms of abuse, exploitation, domination, etc. In Suffering Violence, for example, 
Arthur Kleinman and Das also challenge the unreflexive use of the category of the traumatic and 
its ‘pathological’ connotations. They state in their introduction: ‘our notions of normality and 
pathology seem to be at stake as we explore the connections between the different forms of 
violence which pervade our contemporary world’ (Kleinman, Das, and Lock 1997, 2). In fact, the 
preponderance of this essentially clinical perspective applied to the studies of social violence has 
its critics, who are not satisfied with the notion of trauma when it is used to refer to episodes of 
social and political violence. Commenting on this, Stevan Weine also states that traumatic stress 
theory has been criticized for taking historical crimes and making them into a clinical disorder 
(Weine 2006). For Das, similarly, the psychological symptomatology of trauma makes it difficult to 
simply transport it and think unproblematically about cultural traumas (Das 2007). She criticizes a 
tendency of among authors like Cathy Caruth (considered as one of the most influential trauma 
scholars) to make a ‘too quick transition between individual and collective symptoms’. In 
particular, Das casts doubt on whether repetition – one of the symptoms of trauma - is to be 
considered as the traumatic in the social sphere, displacing the local manifestations that the 
aftermath of violence may have. She states: ‘... the idea of the re-enactment of the past at the 
collective level is a compulsion to repeat seems to short-circuit the complex ways in which we 
might understand how particular regions of the past are actualized through mediums of rumour, 
or in the singularity of individual lives as they knit together relations that have become frayed’  
(Das 2007, 102). Das’ point is crucial as she pushes the concept of the traumatic to see how it is 
embodied in local histories. 
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As I have shown, Das, Kleinman, and Weine - among others - all note that traumatic 
symptomatology has a specific clinical history in Europe and therefore all are especially cautious 
with respect to the universalization of the concept. But Rebecca Saunders and Kamran Scot Aghaie 
go even further in their critique; for them the concept of trauma is a Western artefact, ‘a specific 
socio-political and clinical genealogy which emerges with late modernity and is assembled out of 
Euro-American experiences of industrialization and warfare, its gender relations, and its 
conceptions of normalcy and deviance’ (Saunders and Aghaie 2005, 18). For these authors, the 
trauma paradigm would universalize a diagnostic which emerged within particular historical 
conditions and which also may serve ideological purposes. 
Among trauma critiques there is also the concern that the concept may not grasp what 
remembering the past actually means in terms of political agency. Burke et.al for example, state 
that the concept of trauma is not what should be central for sociologists when they look at 
episodes of social violence and the role of commemoration in them. Commenting on rituals of 
remembering of the French Communist Party (PCF) in the research of the historian Robert Gildea, 
they state:  
‘What we are suggesting is that the concept of trauma alone cannot help us to make sense 
of an emotional connection with the sacrifices of those of the past as a facet of group 
identity. The members of the PCF are not traumatized by the historical fact of the bloody 
suppression of the Commune but they are deliberately recalling the event in order to 
enact an emotional and political relationship to this moment in the past’ (Burke, Faulkner, 
and Aulich 2010, 10). 
The critique is directed at the core of clinical trauma theory: the scholars see in repetition not a 
form of identity fragmentation or pathological melancholy39 but a way of strengthening group 
identity.  
Butler’s Precarious Life gives a different twist to the debate, when she articulates the expression of 
‘the tasks of mourning that follow political violence’ which I used in Chapter 1 (Butler 2003). There 
she explores the grounds of political responsibility and envisions the possibility of mutual 
                                                          
39 David Eng and Judith Butler argue for a new interpretation of melancholy which would see in it, rather 
than a form of pathological mourning, a form of resistance (Eng 2003). 
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acknowledgment in the aftermath of violence, stressing the political impact that this may have. 
For Butler, the memory of political violence is not an ‘unspeakable’ individual memory which 
isolates the person from the world40. Rather, she develops a frame within which suffering and 
vulnerability may work as the basis of communities: ‘I propose to consider a dimension of political 
life that has to do with our exposure to violence and our complicity in it, with our vulnerability to 
loss and the task of mourning that follows, and with finding a basis for community in these 
conditions’ (Butler 2003, 19). With Butler’s assertion the question about the bonds that bring 
together a group of people is reinstalled within cultural and political debates. In Butler’s account 
we see a turn to the embodied dimension of community life, one which is born out of a concrete 
experience of grief and where a scar may act as a source of enduring mutual recognition. She 
adds: ‘Many people think that grief is privatizing, that it returns us to a solitary situation and is, in 
that sense, depoliticizing. But I think it furnishes a sense of political community (…) by bringing to 
the fore the relational ties that have implications for theorizing fundamental dependency and 
ethical responsibility’ (Butler 2003, 22–23).  Butler’s argument may seem counterintuitive, for we 
usually hear that exposure to violence and its traumatic effects provokes the malfunctioning of 
families and communities. Despite the fact that in so-called ‘cultures of victimhood’, the focus on 
suffering and the proliferation of testimonies among memory studies have been criticized for their 
depoliticizing effects (Sarlo 2005; Misztal 2004), Butler envisions the possibility of mutual 
acknowledgment in the aftermath of violence and stresses the political impact that this may have.  
 
 
Inhabiting the aftermath of Political Violence 
My findings are in tune with Butler’s appreciation of the role that suffering may have in long term 
forms of remembering. As we will see in my interviews, remembering state violence acquires an 
affective meaning within the family. It also becomes an impulse towards finding answers and 
reconstructing lost histories in the family genealogy, in which suffering bridges individual and 
social histories. In this sense, Das’ understanding of political violence as a ‘critical event’ 
counteracts the bias that trauma theory may have: rather than focusing only on the negative 
                                                          
40
 Discussions of trauma tend to go back to the idea of the ‘impossible’. Caruth has labelled trauma as ‘the 
impossibility of experience’ (Caruth 1995). 
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effects of violence, she also explores the actions and relationships that stem from it and which 
invest the past as a matter for the future. Janet Carsten explains how: ‘Das has characterized 
critical events as moments when everyday life is disrupted and local worlds are shattered. But 
more than this, they bring new modes of action, which in turn change the categories within which 
people operate. People learn to relate to each other in new ways’ (Carsten 2007, 4). In this sense, 
rather than being conceived only as forms of  disruption and fragmentation, Das sees ‘critical 
events’ as being also a form through which new forms of life and relationships are created.  
For her, the way people articulate political violence in its aftermath is: ‘as a gesture of inhabiting a 
violated world’ (Das 2007). Das’ focus in inhabiting is in tune with Victor J. Seidler’s critique of the 
way the social sciences have disembodied the subject: ‘A notion of the disembodied rational self 
has informed these rationalist traditions of social theory that have tended to discount the 
significance of bodies and emotional life in the creation of identities’ (Seidler 2010, 184). Thus, for 
Seidler, we need languages which connect the sense of self with its affective and cultural legacies: 
he does not speak from the standpoint of an idealist voluntarism but from a point of view which 
takes into account the weight of affective, family, and cultural histories in forming who we are.  
 
 
The intergenerational transmission of memories 
‘The traumatic’ has not been the only legacy of Holocaust studies; one of its other legacies is its 
corpus on transmission. With the passing of time after the fall of the Nazi regime, it became 
clearer that the effects of the disaster were not only felt by the immediate protagonists, witnesses 
or survivors, but also by their offspring and the following generations (Argenti and Schramm 2010; 
Rosenthal 1998; Epstein 1988). Despite the pioneering work of Halbwachs, who located the first 
level of memory transmission in the social institution of family (Halbwachs 1992, Erll 2011), it was 
after the Holocaust that family transmission became a focus of research on the memory of 
violence As Eva Hoffman puts it:  
‘Loss leaves a long trail in its wake. Sometimes if the loss is large enough, the trail seeps 
and winds like invisible psychic ink through individual lives, decades and generations. 
When the losses are as enormous as those that followed from the Holocaust ─when what 
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was lost was not only individuals but a world, the disappearances and the absences may 
haunt us unto the third generation; and they may inform our very vision of the world’  
(Hoffman 2010, 405).  
As we can see, entangled with the idea of transmission is that of family generations. Most of the 
academic work dealing with this topic was done under the umbrella of memory and trauma 
studies and was focused on the question about what it meant, first, for the offspring of victims -
and later those of the perpetrators- to be born in dysfunctional families and with such heavy 
cultural legacies. Hence the modes of transmission, that is to say, how this trauma can be passed 
on to other generations, became the pivotal concept. From these studies arose the idea that the 
effects of trauma would reach the offspring of affected families and, therefore, that the effects of 
catastrophic violence are intergenerational and even transgenerational (Hohenlohe 2011; Hirsch 
2001,2008; Rosenthal 1998).  
The psychoanalytical paradigm offered a language with which to speak of forms of unconscious 
transmission between family generations; however, it remained the domain of psychoanalytic 
oriented researchers and was rarely considered by sociologists. Freud’s Moses and Monotheism, 
for example, has been read as a reflection on intergenerational transmission (Caruth 1996), while 
Nicolas Abraham’s and Mária Torok’s work ’rediscovered’ the psychoanalytical tradition and 
employed it so as to study the passing on of secrets between generations (Abraham, Torok, and 
Rand 1994). Although these theories provide a basis for speaking about the intergenerational 
transmission and memory bonds, some of them also tend to psychologize the analysis and 
overlook how other elements intersect in the transmission of political memories within the family. 
They tend to sideline broader cultural, political and social contexts which are also significant in the 
transmission of memory (Hohenlohe 2011). I will develop this point later, when I will argue that 
the focus on family enables us to see the site where the private and the public are entangled and 
the boundaries between them are blurred.  
Among the works on intergenerational studies, Harald Welzer’s investigation of mechanisms of 
memory transmission within families stands out. In his book Grandpa Wasn’t a Nazi he explores 
‘how memory of the Nazi past is shaped by family dynamics, finding that even when particular 
pasts are explicitly acknowledged by grandparents, grandchildren do not always assimilate that 
knowledge into their conception of history or into their familial identity’ (Olick and Levy 2011, 
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343). Thus, as Olick puts it, Welzer shows that memory is a complex process of construction and 
reconstruction. Discussing how historical knowledge is transmitted within families, Welzer studied 
conversations with families, in group and individual interviews. He observed that official memory 
is one thing: he observed how memorials and schools have educated society in a narrative about 
the past. However, he observes that within families the situation is different: grandchildren for 
instance, cannot accept that their grandparents had committed atrocities during the Nazi period. 
This raises interesting questions about the various layers of memories which circulate and the 
relationship between family and the other memory-makers at different levels. Cristian Gudehus 
also reflects on this gap (in the case of Welzer’s study, between family memories and official 
memories) but from a different perspective: he demystifies the idea of a European memory and he 
shows how instead of national or transnational memories, specific narrative modes dominate 
political discussions. In this context (and it is here when he is in agreement with Welzer), he points 
to the necessity of understanding the private adaptation of history, which for him is often shaped 
by the family, and which according to him has not been fully researched (Gudehus 2013).     
 
 
The second generation 
In the introduction to my thesis I described an encounter with a widow of one of the regime’s 
desaparecidos and her son. In that context, I suggested using the concept of the second 
generation as a means of speaking about such a memory position. What interests me here is what 
such a category means and what implications it carries with it. As an analytical category, the 
concept of the second generation emerged as part of the cultural memory of the Holocaust 
(Assmann 2006, Hohenlohe 2011). The concept is an extension of the idea of victimhood and what 
it means to be traumatized, or from a different perspective –which I prefer-, of what is the scope 
of violence. More concretely, in the beginning it referred to the sons and daughters of 
concentration camps survivors, but since then its use has been expanded to cover other forms of 
survival, such as the experience of being a refugee after the Nazi regime. The publication of 
Children of the Holocaust  by the writer Helen Epstein has been described as a key moment in the 
articulation of the second generation as a form of both experience and memory (Grimwood 2007). 
The second generation on the victim’s side was conceived of as the generation of absence, 
because they grew up with a reference to a traumatic event that was fundamental to the 
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biographies of their parents. Even though they grew up in the shadow of its memory, this event 
was alien to them; they could never represent it because its nature was beyond any possibility of 
imagination. For some, they were ‘the wall generation’: they were separated from their parents by 
the impossibility of experiencing the event (Grimwood, 2007). Dan Bar On put it simply: ‘My 
parent’s generation grew up in a world without a Holocaust’ - he writes - ‘but for us there could be 
no such world’ (Hoffman 2010, 406).  
Concerned with postwar literature in Germany, which deals with the experience of being second 
generation, Assmann suggests that it is an experience: ‘defined by their direct contact with their 
parents, who were exposed to the cataclysmic events of the Holocaust and who survived the 
trauma under different circumstances’ (Assmann 2006) . This made them inheritors of a shared 
legacy and points at the family as a space of memory transmission which is differentiated from 
institutional and state led initiatives of memory. For Assmann, family memory differs from other 
forms of memory transmission in the basis that it is based on experiences which are recorded on 
the body. Distinguishing between communicative memory and cultural memory41, for her family 
memory belong to the first form of memory transmission, characterized by proximity and face to 
face relationships.  
Assmann’s distinction between the family transmission of memory and other forms of memory 
circulation comes from her work, together with Jan Assmann, where they distinguish two basic 
kinds of memory: cultural memory and communicative memory. The first corresponds to ‘images 
of the past negotiated and handed down within groups from grandparents to grandchildren and in 
everyday communication, with limited time horizons, and thus malleable and changing’, while the 
latter are ‘accumulated residues of often distant pasts that constitute ‘the store of knowledge 
from which a group derives awareness of its units and peculiarity’ (Olick 2011, 207). For Assmann: 
‘Just as the communicative memory is characterized by its proximity to the everyday, cultural 
memory is characterized by its distance from everyday’ (J. Assmann, 213, Olick, 2011). Welzer 
makes a crucial point for the discussion:  
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“Cultural” and “communicative memory” can only be strictly separated in a theoretical 
context; in the actual memory practice of individuals and social groups, their forms and 
methods are linked together. This also explains why the shape of “cultural memory”—at 
least when observed over a longer period of time—can also be seen to change: 
Communicative memory devalues certain aspects while placing more value on others, and 
also adds new elements. (Welzer 2008, 285) 
As we can see in the above quotation, the second generation concept points at two elements: 
first, that of family position (being the son or the daughter of someone who underwent a 
traumatic experience), and second, the fact of reworking an experience which, although ‘indirect’, 
is nevertheless crucial to their identity and which nevertheless still reclaims the status of 
‘experience’. After this, memory is no longer a ‘direct’ form of contact with the past, but rather a 
form of mediation. Assmann destabilizes the idea that a second generation memory might be a 
passive legacy: she emphasizes the active search of the family history.  
Eva Hoffman writes: 
‘It is for these literal descendants that the legacy of the Holocaust is felt in its most 
intimate form; and it is here that the delicate issues of transferred trauma and deferred 
mourning are felt most poignantly. In a sense, the elusive, deeply subjective experience  of 
the Shoah’s heirs is also an acute example of a broader phenomenon: the bequest of 
historical experience from one generation to the next; and the attendant passage of that 
inevitable knowledge of loss and death that are the constants of the human condition, and 
sometimes, of wisdom’ (Hoffmann 2010,406). 
In the above quotation, Hoffman attempts to understand what is constitutive of the experience of 
being second generation. For her this corresponds to the transmission of historical experience 
between generations and therefore the merging of history and memory and the role of family in 
this entanglement. If we examine her words, we will find that she envisions a double perspective 
on the legacies of the Holocaust for the first generation. She says that if forms of loss and death 
can be passed on as knowledge, wisdom can be also the result of this transmission. Hoffman’s 
reading of this double legacy has been important in shaping my understanding of the second 
generations in Chile: a political memory was transmitted as family legacy, a point I will develop in 
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the following chapters. Whilst this consisted of narratives of violence and fear, it was also a 
political memory which mobilized senses of solidarity, empathy, acknowledgment and political 
belonging. I am in debt to Hoffman’s sense of complexity in her understanding of the various 
forms of legacies that horror may have, something which is consistent with other perspectives I 
have been exploring in this chapter and the thesis. 
In her book, After Such Knowledge, Hoffman provides new insight, suggesting that it is not only 
undergoing an experience which matters or what is transmitted, but that knowing about an 
experience also has several effects. In The Long Afterlife of Loss she writes about what it means to 
be born after an event which completely transformed the life of previous generations and those 
who were born afterwards: ‘…for many of us, as we were growing up in the proximity of an awful 
knowledge, the Holocaust constituted both the most frightening kind of family fable and a sort of 
awful normalcy. The knowledge of great loss and destruction was for us the first knowledge’ 
(Hoffman 2010, 407). It is of interest that ‘knowing’ in Hoffman’s account is close to the 
production of myths (fables) within family stories, highlighting the importance that this sort of 
fables has in the generations who ‘listen’ to them. Here, she also deals with the epistemological 
effects of belonging to the second generation: the problem of knowing about death and loss 
through familial memories. As this is also relevant to the second generations of the post-coup 
Chile, who were close witnesses of the victims of state violence, I touch on this in chapter 4, the 
Culture of Fear, where I use the insights of Hoffman and Das into what it means to ‘know’ about 
experiences of violence from very early in life. I also develop this in Chapter 6, when I describe 
how this knowledge is transmitted between generations.  
Another element which stands out in Hoffman’s last quotation is the double bonding that the 
Holocaust represented for the second generation: how at the same time that these stories 
constituted a terrifying narrative of extraordinary events, they were also normalized in what 
constituted their family memories. Hoffman’s description of the ambivalence towards violence in 
the post Holocaust generations, which means that the abnormal is inhabited as a fact of everyday 
life, will be found in the Chilean post-coup second generation too. This is something I will explore 
in several chapters of the thesis, especially in Chapter 4 (the culture of fear) and 5 
(intergenerational stigmas). This double bonding is in tune with Das’ notion of violence and its 
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folding into everyday life. Das argues against the view of violence as something ‘other’ to social life 
and urges researchers to find it embedded in forms of the social (Das 2007; Das 1995).  
 
 
Postmemory 
The ‘second generation’ is not the only concept which has been used to refer to the 
intergenerational transmission of memories. In fact, the ‘postmemory’ framework has been 
increasingly used by researchers to speak not only of the Holocaust case, but the military regimes 
of the Southern Cone (Serpente 2011, Jara 2012, Lazzara 2009, Kaiser 2005). The postmemory 
debate is not merely a replacement for the concept of second generation. It responds, rather, to 
broader tensions that stem from memory transmission and the distinctions between family 
transmission and the global circulation of memories, and between communicative and cultural 
memories. It emerged when people started thinking about the transmission of traumatic 
memories and, therefore, about who is entitled to ‘inherit’ or bear them. For Marianne Hirsch, 
Assmann’s distinction between cultural memory and communicative memory cannot explain the 
transmission of traumatic memories when memory has been interrupted, for instance, through 
the destruction of archives and also in those cases in which these two forms of memory overlap 
(Hirsch 2008). Differing from Assmann, but still using the terms second generations or third 
generation in her work, she wants to give space to the affective attachment of memories even 
though they have not been transmitted exclusively within the family domain. She wants to explain 
how traumatic experiences may be deterritorialized, drawing on ideas such as the globalization of 
the Holocaust. How can a local experience be universalized? How can empathy work 
transnationally? 42  
                                                          
42 Another example of the concerns raised in these debates was Landsberg’s book on the US-American mass 
culture of memory (2013). Therein she developed the concept of ‘prosthetic memory’. Like Hirsch’s, her 
theory is ‘based upon the idea that our individual and social memories are increasingly “indirect” 
experiences, construed through medialization and dislocation’ (Hohenlohe 2011). In Landsberg’s words: 
‘…modernity makes necessary and possible a new form of public cultural memory. This new form of memory 
(…) emerges at the interface between a person and a historical narrative about the past, at an experiential 
site such as movie theater or a museum (….) In the process I am describing the person does not simply 
apprehend a historical narrative but takes on a more personal, deeply felt memory of a past event through 
which  he or she did not lived  ’ (Landsberg 2013, 2)  
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Struck by the intervention of a photograph, Hirsch observed how traumatic events are received, 
internalized, reinterpreted and recreated by a second or third generation, leaving traces of 
different sorts of mediations and reappropriations throughout the process of memory 
transmission. In her research, attention travels from the event represented in the photo to the 
effect that the photo and its history/memory have had on the family and how it becomes part of a 
legacy. Her work is also a reflection on how we are surrounded by objects that ‘speak’, that is to 
say, carry a memory with them.43 The concept of postmemory emphasizes the hypermediation of 
memory, its openness to being shaped (for instance by the media) and therefore its failure to 
capture a ‘true past’. Like Assmann’s concept of the second generation, that of postmemory 
questions the idea of memory transmission as a natural process with an authorized voice (there is 
no longer an authorized testimony and witness); rather, the recollection of a ‘true past’ is shown 
to be an impossible project that highlights the gaps of representation (Lazzara 2009b). Hirsch 
states:  
‘The term ‘postmemory’ is meant to convey its temporal and qualitative difference from 
survivor memory, its secondary or second-generation memory quality, its basis in 
displacement, its vicariousness and belatedness. Postmemory is a powerful form of 
memory precisely because its connection to its object or source is mediated not through 
recollection but through representation, projection, and creation —often based on silence 
rather than speech, on the invisible rather than the visible—. That is not, of course, to say 
that survivor memory itself is unmediated, but that it is more directly —chronologically—
connected to the past’ (Hirsch 2001,  9) . 
In her research into the Argentinian second generations who grew up after the diaspora of their 
parent, Alejandra Serpente takes from Hirsch the idea that there is no longer a privileged site for 
the transmission of a true memory and is optimistic about the experience captured within the 
concept:  
‘As a concept it seemed to offer a new perspective that allowed for the possibility of 
transcending this issue of representing the impossible aspects of traumatic situations, by 
                                                          
43
Referring to the objects as ‘carrier of memories’, J. Assmann states: Things do not “have”a memory of their 
own, but they may remind us, may trigger our memory, because they carry memories which we have 
invested into them, things such as dishes, feasts, rites, images, stories and other texts, landscapes, and other 
“lieux de mémoire.” (Assmann 2011, 111) 
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dealing with the traces of traumatic memories as they unfolded in the act of 
transgenerational witnessing (…). What became important for academics was not the 
accuracy of the testimonial account but the significance of what was being transmitted 
(…)’ (Serpente 2011, 138). 
For Serpente, postmemory redirects the researcher’s attention to the intergenerational 
relationship it engenders, rather than the content of the transmission. According Serpente, it ‘is 
the significance’ of the transmission that it matters. For Susana Kaiser, instead, what postmemory 
draws attention to is the issue of mediation. In her research into the Argentinian generation of 
postmemory, she defines the concept as: 
… ‘intergenerational interconnections by which people adopt their elders’s memories by 
their own. It is the process of reconstruction of memories by the descendants of the 
witness generation. We are talking ‘of memories of memories’ to borrow an expression 
from Luisa Passerini who also talks of layers of memories, of a chain of representations by 
which you receive a representation and you create new ones. Although more mediated 
and less connected to the past, postmemory is in itself a highly significant form of memory 
(Kaiser 2005, 3).  
In Postmemories of Terror Kaiser focuses on the sources through which the postdictatorship 
generation reconstructs the recent past, and identifies three sources: intergenerational dialogue, 
education and the communication media (Kaiser 2005).  
 Another element of Hirsch’s theory is that it expands the idea of second generation beyond the 
family sphere. Distancing herself from Assmann’s work, Hirsch states that postmemory is not 
restricted only to the family or even to a nation, and that it can also convey forms of transmission 
of cultural memory44. This, to my view, is the main difference between these concepts: 
                                                          
44 Hirsch’s understanding of cultural memory is different from the one accepted by the Assmanns. Hirsch´s 
and Valerie Smith’s cultural memory is, in her words, indebted to Paul Connerton’s ‘act of transfer’: ‘an act 
in the present by which individuals and groups constitute their identities by recalling a shared past on a basis 
of common, and therefore often contested, norms, conventions, and practices’ (Hirsch and Smith 2002, 5). 
And they add: ‘always mediated, cultural memory is the product of fragmentary personal and collective 
experiences articulated through technologies and media that shape even as they transmit memory’ (Hirsch 
and Smith 2002,5). 
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‘Thus, although familial inheritance offers the clearest model for it, postmemory need not 
be strictly an identity position. Instead, I prefer to see it as an intersubjective 
transgenerational space of remembrance, linked specifically to cultural or collective 
trauma. It is defined through an identification with the victim or witness of trauma, 
modulated by the unbridgeable distance that separates the participant from the one born 
after’ (Hirsch 2001, 10).  
As we see, through the notion of postmemory Hirsch ‘renounces’ seeing in embodied forms of 
transmission any specific difference in relation to other mediatized forms, as her emphasis is on 
showing how embodied and globalized contents of memory are entangled.  
Despite postmemory’s contribution to thinking through mechanisms of intergenerational memory 
transmission, the Argentinean Beatriz Sarlo has questioned the usefulness of the concept of 
postmemory (Sarlo 2005). She argues that it might indeed be part of a postmodern tendency to 
create new concepts that often are empty. She argues that in the nineteenth century one could 
already find family biographies, where second generations wrote about the experience of the first 
generation. ‘Is not memory always built on absences?’ she asks. However, she does not consider 
that the contribution of Hirsch’s category is precisely to problematize ‘private legacies’ and show 
how they are mediated by cultural memory –now defined in different terms—.  
Sarlo criticizes efforts to give an accounts of private memory in the work of Annete Kuhn , Hirsch 
and in Albertina Carri’s Los rubios (The Blondes –see Chapter 7: Family countermemories), 
suggesting that the focus should instead be on the politics of memory at the institutional level. For 
her, what this concept really does is to detach memory from public process of memory 
construction. Sarlo refers to the importance of highlighting the effects that ideology and politics of 
dictatorship have on the construction of public memory. By doing this, the author opposes public 
to private memory, and states that public memory is more relevant than private memory45. 
Through her critique, Sarlo dismisses private life and affects as irrelevant to understanding social 
processes. It is precisely this sharp distinction between what is rendered private memory or family 
memory and what is considered public, official or collective memory that my thesis aims to 
destabilize. I criticize Sarlo’s rigid distinctions, as they bypass important interrogations raised by 
                                                          
45
 For a defense of the sociological importance of ‘the personal’, see Carol Smart’s: Personal Life (2007). 
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the relationship between collective and individual memory frames, as well as the politics of 
memory and memory in everyday life. The assumption that individual memory frames are shaped 
exclusively by the work of social and collective memory frameworks transforms the individual in 
an automaton (Cappelletto 2005; Stern 2006b) and does not give an account of the complex 
relationship between various levels and forms of memory.  
 
 
Family Memory in the aftermath of violence  
Despite Sarlo’s critique of postmemory, there is something on which she agrees with Hirsch: the 
critique of ‘the family bias’. Both authors are concerned with thinking about the ‘representativity’ 
of memories: who is entitled to have a memory and whose memories are worthy of being voiced? 
They both contend that memories are not only a result of affiliation but also of adscription (Hirsch 
2008) Hirsch aims to explore the ways in which second generations can manifest solidarity with 
the experiences of the first generation through their own reappropriation of memories, not on the 
basis of familial bonds but of political (or aesthetical) adscription. For Sarlo, the problem instead is 
in the appropriation that both the left and the victims themselves have made of the legitimacy of 
testimony, which lies in the fact of being there or its proximity.   
Hirsch’s and Sarlo’s arguments are in tune with Southern Cone scholars who also have accounted 
for a ‘beyond the family approach’ (Sosa 2011, Serpente 2011 Sarlo 2005) and have criticized the 
reliance on family bonds that have predominated in the debates on human rights in the Southern 
Cone. This is related to the fact that human rights discourses have relied on family relationships: 
the legitimation of demands for justice and knowing came from their role as mothers or wives. In 
Chapter 7 (Family Countermemories) I further develop this point. For Sarlo, this could be 
dangerous in terms of democracy and create a conflict in terms of ‘public’ interest. Cecilia Sosa has 
taken up these discussions and also has argued for a non-familial perspective on the 
understanding of loss and mourning in post-dictatorial Argentina (Sosa 2011).  
In this context, I think it is necessary to clarify the purposes and aims of this thesis with respect to 
the question of the role of family and its status in the memory field. My thesis is not an argument 
in favour of the politics of memory based on family ties. I am not arguing for the monopoly of the 
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idea of victimhood based on direct experience and ‘blood’; I am rather exploring its boundaries. 
My thesis examines a memory tradition, that of the left-wing community of memory, and sees 
how forms of relatedness (specifically, familial) are part of the memory making of political 
opposition memory.  However, I do argue that the embodied and affectively invested site of the 
family, in any of its forms and styles, do have an influence in the way the second generation listens 
to the first generation, particularly in the Chilean local patterns of family life. Here I follow Kuhn 
when she states:  
‘Disputing the givenness of social categories like class, race, gender identity and sexual 
preference confers no exemption from the necessity of negotiating their social meanings 
in daily life. While fully aware that femininity is a fabrication, for example, as far as the 
world is concerned – and indeed as far as I too, am concerned – I am still a woman, and 
live with the very real consequences of a particular gender label. So it is with the identity 
conferred by family (Kuhn 2002, 1).   
Focusing on family transmission does not mean that that is the only way of transmitting memory, 
but that it deserves to be explored on its own right. As described in the introductory chapter, from 
the coup onwards most scholars of the Chilean case have drawn attention to symbolic memories 
(in Gómez-Barris’ sense), focusing either on state or official memories or on public negotiations 
between political groups or organizations and the state. However, if we agree with the statement 
of Barbara Mistzal that ‘Families, it may be said, are as much collections of memories as they are 
of actual related people and kin’ (Misztal 2003, 82), another question arises. How can family 
memory dynamics and its focus on relatedness shed light on the broader dynamics of public and 
political memory in the aftermath of violence in Chile? What and whose memories are rendered as 
family memories? Very few studies of family memory and memory transmission to the second 
generations in Chile have been carried out, but in the last two years the topic has started to be 
dealt with in various narrative forms: TV series, films, books, panels in conferences, etc. This is a 
field which is likely to continue growing in the coming years. In chapter 5 I will refer to pioneering 
work on topics such as exile and traumatic transmission.   
Although the family bond became a crucial moral resource in publicly legitimizing the opposition’s 
struggle against the dictatorship, family transmission of state violence has been overlooked in 
Chile. Memory scholars have tended to take for granted the role of the family, either because it is 
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considered as subordinate to other dynamics or spaces for memory making or transparent, 
natural, predictable, in other words: irrelevant. The focus has been on how political parties, social 
organizations, social movements and institutions have framed/shaped the process of coming to 
terms with the past in Chile. I echo Collins et al. remark concerning the bias of political science: 
‘despite these biases against the study of memory as a lens on politics, some political scientists 
have come to appreciate how a range of historical memories that powerfully influence politics in 
observable ways fall outside the rubric of institutional analysis’ (Collins, Hite and Joignant 2013, 6). 
Addressing this gap, but in the domain of the Chilean memory field, this thesis deals with two 
main issues: on the one hand, with the ways in which family memories of political violence acquire 
meaning or ‘weight’, so that they mobilize a sense of duty and inheritance across generations; on 
the other, with the ways in which family memories are rendered as such. According to the 
sociologist Carol Smart: 
‘The study of family secrets can be seen as an investigative approach which troubles the 
smooth facade of ordinary family life –not in order to decry family life as if some other 
form would be above such practices– but in order to demonstrate how complex family 
practices can be and how entangled they are with matters as conceptually distinct as 
public values and the personal construction of the self. Tracking family secrets 
sociologically is a method of linking the personal and the cultural, the historical, and the 
social’ (Smart 2011, 551). 
In the quotation above, Smart describes the site of family as the entanglement between the 
private and public. Similarly, for Carsten ‘The history of kinship is always, among other things, a 
political history’ (Carsten 2007,22)46. Describing her book, she says:  
‘The idea of autonomous personal, collective, or familial memory is (…) a chimera that only 
occasionally seems to correspond to actual processes. More usually, these memories 
merge into and out of each other as they are continuously created and reconstituted. The 
state may co-opt the language of kinship, constrain the forms of familial life, and shape 
                                                          
46 See also David Eng in The Feeling of Kinship, where he questions the liberal distinction between the 
private and the public, between a space of intimacy and a space of public concern. Rephrasing Cathy 
Davidson’s memorable phrase: ‘no more separate spheres’, he conceives his book as an exploration of a 
critical vocabulary: ‘for examining the political, economic, and cultural processes by which race and racial 
difference continue to saturate our material and psychic lives, all the while denaturalizing liberal distinctions 
between the public and the private domains by challenging its false divisions’ (Eng 2010, 8).  
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possible dispositions to the past, present and future, but the accumulations, losses and 
restorations of memories of relatedness are part of the very fabric of national identity-
making as much as they constitute more intimate narratives of personal or familial history’ 
(Carsten 2007, 26). 
As we see in this quotation, Carsten argues against too rigid distinctions between family memory 
and forms of public memory circulation, and advocates instead a focus on the way that they 
interact and affect each other. I would like to highlight from Carsten’s quotation the fact that she 
mentions the concept of ‘relatedness’ and draws attention to the role of relationships 
(relatedness) within the family. To illustrate –by contrast– Smart’s and Carsten’s point, I describe 
Gomez-Barris’ analysis of the circulation of memory in Chile during the dictatorship and its 
aftermath.  Although she too focuses on the family, she develops a contrasting perspective to that 
of Smart and Carten’s in which she suggests that private memories (ie: family memories) were 
independent of and almost parallel to public forms of memory (ie: the official regime of censorship 
and denial of state violence).    
Studying the cultural arena as the site where subjectivities perform, Gómez-Barris describes the 
reception that the film Fernando Ha Vuelto (Fernando is Back, 1998) by Silvio Caiozzi received 
when it was released in Chile in 2000. Dramatically real, the documentary shows the moment 
when Fernando, a former left-wing activist who has been disappeared for 30 years, returns home 
and is ‘reencountered’ by his wife and family. In fact, it is his bones that come home, being 
displayed on a table to be recognized by his beloved ones. Gómez-Barris observes that when this 
film was presented at a local festival, it triggered a cathartic experience for viewers. As Caiozzi (the 
director) recalls, many people approached him to share their own experiences of violence during 
the dictatorship. In this respect, Gómez-Barris thoughtfully argues that this reveals that it is in the 
public realm that the circulation of memory has been limited and silenced and that memories 
continue to be repressed and elided. However, in her view, this is not what happened in the 
private worlds and within families. She focuses on the scene in the film in which the family comes 
together with the encounter of their disappearance, something which she considers to be a 
metaphor of the dynamics of memory in Chilean society, where family is isolated from the public 
space (Gómez-Barris 2009).  
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Gómez-Barris does not question the impact this may have on our understanding of the role of 
family memory in the transmission of political memory in authoritarian contexts, for instance, and 
seems to be interested only in visualizing official and family memory as two separated fields. This 
is important, as she attempts to show that not all memories are malleable by official memories. 
However, as Huyssen points out, family memories are not the only forms of pure memories 
‘decontaminated’ by cultural memories, challenging too rigid distinctions among them (Huyssen 
1995). In fact, if we go back to Assmann’s understanding of the second generation, we see the role 
that she gives to ‘bridge objects’, which are imbrications of family and cultural memory at the 
same time. This mutual relationship has been widely acknowledged in memory studies, with an 
emphasis on how cultural and the politics of memories shape family memories. However, 
throughout the thesis I emphasize also the influence that local family dynamics (communicative 
memory) has on cultural forms of memory circulation. I will refer to this in Chapter 6 Family 
Memory and Chapter 7 Countermemories.  
Gabriela Fried, in turn, has explored the role of family in a different way. In Private Transmissions 
she focuses on family modes of memory transmission and the intergenerational relationship 
between members of the family but she also situates them in broader contexts. She writes about 
intergenerational transmission within families of desaparecidos in Uruguay and shows how family 
dynamics are related to the politics of memory: ‘The relatives of the disappeared ones go through 
a unique kind of mourning process and a transformation of identity. They are at loss for words, or 
facts, to process and discuss what happened and cannot mourn their loss as one may do with an 
ordinary death. They cannot put the past behind them because it is not past’ (pg 138).  Thus, she 
problematizes the relationship between family practices, mourning and the politics of memory 
and explores in what sense they are related and to what extent they shape each other.  Focusing 
on the intergenerational transmission of memory within Uruguay, she explores the forms of 
mourning that disappearance may throw up, and how this unresolved mourning demands at the 
same time justice (Fried 2009, 2011). She states:  
‘my study suggests that members of the subsequent generations, far from forgetting or 
healing, are struggling with an inheritance of an unresolved injustice. They are also starting 
to express ambivalence about the inheritance that has impacted their life. They may follow 
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or avoid those transmitted and felt obligations. It appears that subsequent generations are 
links in a long-term process of multigenerational behavior’ (Fried, 2011).  
It is interesting to see how Fried links the idea of intergenerational witnessing to that of 
responsibility. She talks about ‘obligations’ which appear to be passed on when new generations 
inherit a common history of political violence.  
 
 
Chapter Conclusions 
In this chapter I have argued that the universalization of the Holocaust demands a critical 
awareness of its influence and also of the differences between the local (in the case of this thesis, 
the South American military regimes, in particular in Chile) and the Holocaust context, which has 
become the universal. As various authors have observed, although the concept of trauma has 
become part of the imaginary of the aftermath of violence, it is important to see what is ’helped 
and hindered’ by this concept (Huyssen 2003), rather than either simply dismissing it on behalf of 
‘the local’ or applying it automatically. Taking an intermediate position, which takes into account 
not only the global character of the Holocaust but also the critiques of its flattening effects with 
respect to local manifestations of episodes of violence, Huyssen notes: ‘At the same time it is 
important to recognize that although memory discourses appear to be global in one register, at 
their core they remain tied to the histories of specific nations and state’ (Huyssen 2003, 16). And 
he adds: ‘Although the Holocaust as a universal trope of a traumatic history has migrated into 
other, nonrelated contexts, one must always ask whether and how the trope enhances or hinders 
local memory practices and struggles, or whether and how it may help and hinder at the same 
time’ (pg 16). Thus, exploring what the universal might conceal in the local, I have also argued for 
not reducing the aftermath of violence to the pathology of trauma. In Chile political violence and 
its memory have also engendered forms of mutual acknowledgment, solidarity, and identity 
making. In fact, this last point will be illuminated in chapters 4 and 6 when I deal with how 
violence, at the same time that it provokes injuries, also creates a sense of identity within family 
transmission.  
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In the case of this research, the Holocaust corpus has illuminated my exploration of individual and 
family stories by situating my interviewees’ direct or mediated experiences of state violence within 
a corpus which has recognized that violence has effects beyond the event itself, can reach 
different generations and may create different forms of suffering and victimhood. In fact, 
throughout this chapter I have explored the debates which are at the core of thinking about the 
intergenerational transmission of the memory of political violence and which have been 
developed in the context of the Holocaust. I have shown how the works of Assmann, Hoffman and 
Hirsch have provided the basis for thinking about the intergenerational transmission of political 
violence, and even about cultural traumas. All three authors reject the idea of ‘direct experience’ 
and therefore of ‘true memory’ in favour of emphasizing the second  generation’s appropriation of 
their legacy. The authors contribute to explaining new forms of social affiliation and ethical 
responsibility stemming from the transmission of traumatic experience beyond its immediate 
victims, making it possible to move forward from the authority of the first person and/or 
generation (I was there). The contribution of these scholars to the field is important as their work 
makes it possible to see the impact that events have on populations without their needing to have 
experienced them directly.  
This thesis starts from the standpoint of family transmission and A. Assman’s concern with the 
difference between embodied and other forms of transmission is therefore relevant to my work. 
However, I do take into account Hirsch’s insight that family memory is not conceived as a ‘pure 
memory’, isolated from other forms of memory transmission. At the same time, drawing on 
Smart’s contribution, I suggest that the family blurs the limits between levels of memory (for 
instance between private and public memory) and instead provides of a space in which the 
personal, the familial and the cultural are entangled with and shape each other. 
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Chapter 3 
Researching Chilean Memory Across Generations 
 
‘Following the ghosts is about making a contact that changes you and refashions  
the social relationships in which you are located. It is about putting life back in where  
only a vague memory or a bare trace was visible to those who bothered to look.  
It is sometimes about writing ghost stories that not only repair representational  
mistakes, but also strive to understand the conditions under which memory  
was produced in the first place, toward a countermemory, for the future’ 
( Avery Gordon 2008,22)  
‘Identities are malleable and multidimensional (…). And yet, we do not only define ourselves; we 
are also defined by our circumstances, culture, the perceptions of others and –perhaps most of 
all– the force of an internalized past. However much I wanted to keep the Holocaust history in the 
shadows, there was no countenancing its presence in my life’ 
(Eva Hoffman, 2004 27) 
 
 
Introduction 
In 2008, before I started my PhD, I conducted interviews throughout the country to understand 
the apprehensions that human rights communities, such as the AFDD, activists, members of 
various churches, etc. may have had concerning the representation of trauma and about the role 
of an official and state sponsored museum of memory47. Among these encounters, I was 
particularly struck by the response of the son of Doña Agustina to the interview setting –as 
discussed in Chapter 1–. The son’s gaze, anticipating the various forms of haunting that this thesis 
would encounter, was my first step towards the questions regarding what it means to be the post-
coup second generation. His gaze problematized the relationship that as an interviewer I would 
                                                          
47
 I was invited to participate in this research by the Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences (FLACSO).  
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have with my research and whether I was going to become affectively involved with my 
interviewees or would continue performing as the neutral observer I had been used to being for 
years.  
At the same time –and this is the main aspect developed in this thesis–, his presence points to 
what Gómez Barris defined as the afterlife of violence: the personal or private struggles that may 
follow state violence. My assumption has been that methodologically, one way to have access to 
these struggles is through memory: not only how the past is represented in a narrative form but 
also how the past haunts the present. I maintain this as an analytical distinction which will also 
give access to two forms of thinking and complementing the methods. The first of these 
corresponds to the qualitative tradition –specifically, biographical narratives– and which Ken 
Plummer has called ‘documents of life’. The other is concerned with modes of haunting, even 
beyond representation, which is developed in the work of Gordon’s.  I will develop these two lines 
of enquiry later. 
In this chapter I focus the reader’s attention on the methodological question of how to approach a 
generation born to families with histories of political opposition, which has grown up under a 
culture of fear and during a ‘memory impasse’. Thus, this methodological chapter describes the 
sociological practice and delineates the process which concluded in the interviews I conducted. It 
is about something which is not visible in the ‘final product’ but which determines it or, in other 
words, what I learned and how I learned it during this process. In the first section, I introduce the 
origins of the project. I describe an initial observation phase where, through interviews and 
biographical writing, I obtained valuable insights which would later help me in the fieldwork. I 
explain how after this initial phase I defined the main elements of my methods: that the interviews 
were to be framed under the umbrella of family stories and the interview questions would deal 
with issues of everyday life during the dictatorship.   
Then, I proceed to set the terms for defining the second generation category, the sample and a 
way of approaching my interviewees. I identify a set of criteria for establishing my cohort: the 
interviewees were born between 1968 and 1980, were the children of people who suffered a wide 
range of forms of state violence and grew up during the military regime. Although this generation 
did not really have a personal memory of the coup (and if they have, it takes the form of childhood 
memory fragments), they had to go to school during the decades of fear and socialize within this 
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context. Many of them witnessed their parents’ suffering, the fracturing of their personal lives, 
feelings of loss, etc. I explain how the concept of the second generation draws on the relationship 
between one generation (the first), their offspring and an event.   
After this, I describe my fieldwork context in 2010 and how the fact that it took place immediately 
after an earthquake affected the interview contents by arousing fears of death and vulnerability. I 
give details of the sample I interviewed, describe modes of recruitment and also describe and 
explain complementary interviews conducted during the same period of time. I then describe how 
I conducted the interviews and suggest that reflexivity was crucial, on the one hand, to shaping 
the concept of the second generation during the encounter itself, and on the other, creating the 
conditions in which political memory can be remembered safely. 
In the next section, I discuss the methods which were at the basis of the techniques I used during 
the fieldwork and its mode of analysis. I explain Plummer’s concept of documents of life and 
Gabriele Rosenthal’s approach to thematic analysis. I also reflect on some limitations that I found 
concerning this project and how I turned to Avery Gordon’s idea of haunting, which for her will 
mean an ethnographic ‘hospitality’ to the ghost. In other words, to forms of presence which 
demand of the sociologist an imagination capable of seeing and listening beyond positivistic terms.  
Finally, I deal with some ethical issues involved in the way we frame interviewees, and in this case, 
how we avoid creating a simple subject of victimhood. In this respect I argue for Gordon’s concept 
of ‘complexity’. Then I describe the main chapter conclusions. 
 
 
The origins of the Project 
In 2009 I conducted preliminary observations so as to inform my research questions in the first 
year of the project. As I was living in London I started an exploration of my personal experience of 
being part of the second generation - which I initially defined vaguely as being the children of the 
opposition to the coup, in a broader sense - and how it affected the way I was conducting the 
interviews. Inspired by feminist methods, I spent time practicing a way of speaking about the past 
which was both quotidian and had a reflective attitude by observing precisely the opacities of 
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these acts of speech. I knew by experience that the memory impasse might trigger debates, 
confrontations and also resentments. Based  in London, my possibilities for finding interviewees 
were quite limited, so I told some Chilean friends what I was doing and some of them agreed to 
have a chat about “the impact of being born after a traumatic event, in post-coup Chile and 
inheriting the coup memory”. I did four interviews in total, with two men and two women, all of 
whom were doing postgraduate studies in London. I knew how biased a sample of postgraduate 
students in a foreign country would be, but although aware of its limitations, I nevertheless 
decided to go ahead with the interviews. I saw them as an exercise and a way of exploring the 
scene of speaking about what I assumed to be a ‘traumatic memory’ – which was how I framed my 
project then.  
I asked them what they knew about the coup. Influenced and inspired by the Holocaust literature 
on memory and trauma transmission  between generations, I suggested the topic of conversation 
as follows: “What has it mean for you to be born after a traumatic event such as the 1973 coup?”. 
However, I had the impression that the question about being second generation of ‘a traumatic 
past’ was operating as an empty initial question. Alessandro Portelli shows how every interviewer 
will create a narrative which does not exist outside of the interview and which will be shaped by 
the interaction between interviewer and interviewee, (Portelli 1991). However it is not that 
narratives can be instilled as a form of voluntary idealism; the problem is, rather, one of how to 
speak in the aftermath of violence and how creating the conditions for that speaking. This would 
become increasingly important for my work. I follow Rosenthal when, in her work about Holocaust 
three generations of victims and perpetrators, she states:  
We can thus assume that the process of selection being carried out by the biographer 
whilst presenting his or her life story is not haphazard or arbitrary, merely reflecting 
possible interactive influences of the interview situation or a passing mood. A life story 
does not consist of an atomistic chain of experiences, whose meaning is created at the 
moment of their articulation, but is rather a process taking place simultaneously against 
the backdrop of a biographical structure of meaning, which determines the selection of 
the individual episodes presented, and within the context of the interaction with a listener 
or imaginary audience. This texture of meaning is constantly reaffirmed and transformed 
in the ‘flux of life’. (Rosenthal 1993, 61) 
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Rosenthal’s quotation sheds light in the various elements that interact in a life-story or 
biographical interview. I agree with the emphasis that she gives to the interviewee’s intentionality 
of speaking, in the light of his/her lived experience. Just a few years ago, in 2009, speaking about 
the second generation was still unusual in Chile. The drama of the Chilean first generation (marked 
by the UP and the events that followed: state violence, diaspora, fear or repression) has been the 
subject of many representations within political discourses and in the cultural sphere. 
Nevertheless, the almost saturated first generation practice of testimony/witness accounts has 
been strongly contrasted with the second generation’s silence and its difficulty in ‘finding words’.  
So when in these initial interviews I suggested to my interviewees a relationship between the 
dictatorship, the traumatic and ‘normal people’, it was unusual. I was dismantling a wide-spread 
belief that the effects of state violence only affected their direct victims. For me as a researcher, it 
constituted my first insight into the field: that at that time the legacies of the past were not only 
invisible in everyday life, but also at the moment of narration. On the other hand, I also saw it as a 
way to resist universalized portraits of suffering. 
During one of these interviews, the child of a left-wing activist family told me that during her 
childhood the fact that Pinochet represented “all the evil in the world” was terribly shocking for 
her. She prayed at night “asking God how He could let someone be that bad”. I asked her if she 
believed that the dictatorial experience was important to her in the present. She said not at all. At 
the end of the interview, she told me that she was now working as a forensic psychologist with the 
aim of understanding criminal behaviour. I asked her if she could make any connection between 
her work and her childhood experience and her (a) moral image of Pinochet. She said that she 
never thought of it before.  
These interviews were crucial in helping me to see that I wanted to speak of something which did 
not have a language, which did not have a social frame yet, but which was there48. In the four 
interviews I asked about memories of the coup itself, and there was not in fact an answer to a 
question which itself caused confusion: what had their parents have told them? What had they 
learned at school? What do they think about the coup? What did they think years ago? The issue 
of disconnection between the present and the afterlife of violence was also symptomatic: what 
                                                          
48 Raymond William’s definition of structures of feelings as ‘social experiences in solution’ might illuminate 
this fieldwork ‘intuition’. (Williams 2009) 
70 
 
does it mean that a bright woman with psychological training had never found any meaningful 
connection between her childhood anxieties and her later decision to become a criminologist? It 
were not only narratives which showed themselves to be relevant but those zones which 
remained unexplored, most likely due to cultural forms of rejection and silencing. Referring to the 
relationship between silence, family and the cultural context in her research among German 
families with ethnic German members from the former Soviet Union, Rosenthal argues in the 
prologue to Ethnicity, Belonging and Biography: ‘That which is effective in terms of family history 
and family dynamic is always dependant on other social units and vice versa. For example, the 
social silence in the public discourse of the Soviet Union supported the silence within the families, 
and the silence in the families supported the silence in other social contexts’ (Rosenthal and 
Bogner 2009, 13). It is here that Gordon’s assertion about invisibility can offer insights if we 
expand it to cover the idea of speaking and silencing: “To impute a kind of objectivity to ghosts 
implies that, from a certain standpoint, the dialectics of visibility and invisibility involve a constant 
negotiation between what can be seen and what is in the shadows” (Gordon 2008, 17)   
During these initial and unstructured interviews49, I was not sure how to approach the afterlife of a 
past which to a significant extent has been normalized and which has become, overall, inhabitable 
and rendered invisible. The concept of the traumatic was not helpful, because it raised the link 
with direct forms of violence and the imaginary that the AFDD and other human right 
organizations already represented. But I continued to explore the idea of being the second 
generation of the military coup. Neither my interviewees nor I understood fully what it was to be a 
second generation. Of what? Of the coup? Of family life? I agree with Steinar Kvale and Svend 
Brinckmann when they state: ‘The skills of interviewing are learned through the practice of 
interviewing’ (Kvale and Brinkmann 2009, 17) I felt confronted then with an ‘experience in the 
shadows’ or an experience without a testimony – this also emphasizes the social character of a 
testimony or a narrative, problematizing the relationship between narrative and experience in the 
research context. How could I expect to deal with experiences and memories if people (including 
me) could not talk about them, or when there might not be anything to talk about? I began to 
                                                          
49
 Sharlene Hagy Nesse Biber defines unstructured interviews as those in which  ‘(…) I have a basic interview 
plan in mind, but I have a minimum of control over how the respondent should answer the question’ (Hesse 
Biber 2006,105) 
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suspect that, as I too am part of that generation, perhaps I did not know how to talk about it 
either. The evidence was that for the second generations finding the narrative of their lived 
experience in front of an interviewer proved difficult – if not impossible.  
 
 
Framing the post-coup second generation category 
I have been fortunate enough to see both a cultural change in this initial silence in the course of 
this investigation, and also how what was silent when I did my interviews has slowly begun to 
obtain a narrative form, in documentaries, books and theatre, for example, in what still is an 
incipient process. One of the issues here is how we think about the moment in which experiences 
that did not have a social label, or a shared name, suddenly obtain one. This is particularly relevant 
when we speak of the second generation. It also raises the question of the relation between 
memory and time: memories are not fixed but are transformed in a permanent dialogue of ‘the 
memory work’ (Jelin, 2002), which operates in a complex overlapping between individual and 
social experiences.  
The juncture in which this thesis has been written is interesting: it is the moment of transit, in 
which a social category started to obtain social meaning, and media, particularly filmography and 
documentaries, were part of this shaping. But this is not a feature exclusive to the Chilean case: in 
fact, that is why the postmemory category has been productive in exploring the kind of experience 
which is shaped through a mediated and mediatized access to the past (Hirsch 2008).In this sense, 
the category of the second generation sheds light on family histories and affective legacies, and 
defines them as a point of access to a position from which to remember the past. Since 2010, a 
number of art and media works have begun to install a new narrative within cultural memory. 
These have contributed, on the one hand, to rethinking what it means to suffer violence in what 
has been rendered as the aftermath of violence. However, it is not merely that these forms of 
representation created the category of ‘the second generation’, for the number of people who in 
fact attended to these exhibitions is not significant. In fact, none of my interviewees did so. On the 
other hand, these narratives of the second generation bring the issue of the role of intimacy and 
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subjectivity to a local debate which has traditionally preferred areas such as modernization, 
institutional parties, social movements, debates concerning models of development, etc. In 
chapter 5 and 7 I analyse documentaries produced by and / or about the second generation in so 
far as they raise issues of inheriting the legacies of the dictatorship. 
In a different context - that of the post Holocaust - Hoffman sheds light on this moment of 
transition, which is not a case of a new language creating something entirely new, but rather one 
in which something that is already there is brought into a form of consciousness; in other words, 
when what has remained invisible is rendered visible. In After Such Knowledge she reflects on the 
impact it had on her the first time she heard of the concept of second generation; she describes a 
process of newness but also of recognition, both involved in the moment when she first heard of 
the concept of ‘the Holocaust second generation’: 
How did we, the comfortable children of those who lived through the horror, suddenly 
become a sociological phenomenon? Was this just another American affectation, a group 
“identity” conveniently invented at the very moment when everybody was beginning to 
insist on having one? At the same time, I could not deny that I felt a surge of recognition, 
curiosity, even excitement. I had mostly thought about the post Holocaust strand of my 
biography in solitude, and as something purely private, or at least personal (…) But now 
that it had been so identified, I could quickly see that it could constitute an element of 
commonality with others (Hoffman 2004, 27).  
And she adds: ‘The phrase [second generation] suggested that there were others for whom a 
Holocaust inheritance was both meaningful and problematic; that living with it was a palpable 
enough experience to be overtly recognizable; that it was in fact an experience; and in some way, 
it counted’ (Hoffman 2004, 27). It is this sense of ‘truthfulness’ or ‘correspondence’ between 
speaker and speech which I found particularly interesting: that which will make something 
‘recognizable’ or which will trigger ‘acknowledgment’. Hoffman’s articulation of the idea of 
inheritance was insightful and also raised a new issue: that violence is normalized and transformed 
in everyday life. I develop this chapters 1 and 2, where I further develop this fieldwork insight: that 
the traumatic is not the best frame within which to think of the post-coup Chilean second 
generation, but rather, the forms of life that follow violence and its inhabitation in everyday life.  
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The opposition’s second generation 
The concept of second generation and the assertion of a certain experience which stems from a 
family position may provoke resistance in a reader suspicious of too solid forms of identity and the 
danger of essentialism. I follow Seidler when reflecting on the insights that the critique of identity 
has offered within sociology; he also mentions what it conceals: 
There is a tendency within postmodern writing to resist notions of identity as somehow 
essentially fixed, and so to prefer talking in terms of processes of identification (…) [But] 
This can also work to make identities too provisional and at the same time can render 
invisible the emotional pain and suffering, as well as traumatic histories and memories, 
that can come with the fragmentation of identities and can be passed on 
transgenerationally. (Seidler 2010, 45)  
In this sense, the category of the second generation sheds light on family histories and affective 
legacies, and defines them as a point of access to a position to remember the past. For Robert 
Miller: ‘The term ”generation” has multiple meanings and needs to be clarified into (i) generations 
in the sense of parent/children family generations and (ii) periods of significant social experience – 
cohort generations’. (Miller 2007, ix).  In fact, in this thesis both forms correspond to my use of the 
category. It refers to family generations, to the children of parents who were in the opposition to 
Pinochet’s regime, the majority of whom experienced various forms of state violence or 
authoritarianism. It also refers to a cohort generation, as they were born in a particular context: 
they inherit a memory which was not their own. This led me to define my focus on people born 
between 1968 and 1980. Thus, the concept of the second generation draws on the relationship 
between one generation (the first), their offspring and an event. Identifying the coup and the 
dictatorship as the event (or rather, a process), I refer to them as the children of those people who 
themselves suffered or witnessed forms of state violence during their childhood and who grew up 
during the regime of fear. Many of them were children of parents who suffered various forms of 
state violence, from ostracism to execution or disappearance. 
The project is about the mnemonic tradition, which during Pinochet’s regime was united around 
the concept of ‘opposition’. Although the opposition memory I frame in this thesis resembles Lira’s 
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study of the left-wing tradition of memories, it also differs from it in terms of its political 
composition. The opposition’s post-coup identity came to conceal an intense process of upheaval 
and tension which the left in Chile had previously undergone and which was also part of the crisis 
of the UP, when the left was torn between guerrilla inspired groups and a more institutional kind 
of support for the government of Allende. However, after the coup, these tensions were displaced 
from the political juncture and all these groups united and became the opposition to Pinochet, 
until 1988. During those 17 years there were ruptures and differences within the opposition, and 
different movements, alliances and strategies were followed. However, the identity of being part 
of the opposition to the dictatorship was still strongly felt. It united a wide range of political 
identifications: it brought together the Communists, the Socialists, human rights communities, 
sectors of the Church and, in the late 70s, the Christian Democrats – who in the beginning had 
supported the coup. Together, they were united under the umbrella of the opposition and the 
recovery of democracy.  
One of my concerns throughout this research is whether I am able to transmit to a non Chilean 
reader the extent of the affective investment in the UP and the magnitude of loss that the coup 
triggered on part of the Chilean population. This topic has been widely researched and although I 
have read dozens of books and more papers on the matter, still nothing illustrates better the 
feeling than what a first generation victim once told me: “They [the military regime] chose the 
best of us, and they killed all of them. They killed a generation of political activists”. Thus, the 
intergenerational transmission of memory and the second generation’s inhabitation of that 
memory to which I refer needs to be contextualized in the climate of the international 
disappointment which followed 1968 and locally, the military coup, the massive exile of UP 
supporters and the suicide of Allende. Whilst the post-coup second generation saw (or heard 
about, in the ‘language of the family’) the fall of the UP, they witnessed the defeat of their 
parents’ ideals and of the very possibility of transforming the world through politics. This is related 
to the loss of the left in a more global context:  
Certainly the losses, accountable and unaccountable, of the left are many in our time. The 
literal disintegration of socialist regimes and the legitimacy of Marxism may be well the 
least of it. We are awash in the loss of a unified movement, in the loss of labor and class as 
inviolable predicates of political analysis and mobilization, in the loss of an inexorable and 
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scientific forward movement of history, and in the loss of a viable alternative to the 
political economy of capitalism“. (Brown 2003, 460)).  
As Wendy Brown suggests, loss is expressed together with a kind of longing for something, 
although at the same time this involves a distance from what has been lost. So how may one 
mourn for the loss inflicted by state violence and at the same time the loss of visions of a collective 
future? The second generations are in a position in which they have to learn how to inherit a 
memory which is both a family memory and a social memory. Following Seidler, the second 
generation’s relationship to family and history enables us to make visible those stories that are 
inherited but were not chosen. Throughout the thesis I emphasize not only the inheritance, but 
also the inhabitation of those legacies and its tensions. I recall here Sarlo’s critique of Los Rubios, a 
discussion I will further  develop in Chapter 7, when she suggests that there is not one 
intergenerational approach to memory, but various modes for doing so. Rosenthal’s insight into 
how to think about the relationship between generations is helpful: ‘[their research suggests an] 
interactive-intergenerational concept which does not view the second and third generations as 
passive recipients of the past, but rather as active agents in the way they deal with their parents 
and their pasts’ (Rosenthal2010, 7). 
 
 
Breaking the silence: the biographical interview and the children’s gaze 
Encouraged by my supervisor, I started writing my biography50 as a methodological approach and 
preparation for the task of interviewing. I had planned to do fieldwork in the coming year, but I did 
not feel prepared to interview people about this topic. Reflexivity has been considered as a tool 
which allows the researcher to understand how their own position affects their research (Plummer 
2001, Hertz 1997)). Thus, through the exercise of biographical writing I realized, for instance, that I 
rarely talked with my peers about my family experiences, that I would become angry at people 
when they showed support for the dictatorship and that I felt really uncomfortable when telling 
                                                          
50 I follow Gabriel Rosenthal’s preference of the term biographer rather than autobiographer, as she 
considers that the latter does not account sufficiently for the social constitution of the subject (Rosenthal, 
1993). 
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people (even friends) that my grandfather was imprisoned and tortured by the military. Although 
the dictatorship was part of my everyday life during my childhood, I had never talked about it 
personally. In some ways, my parents’ generation’s experience of the coup was a taboo for me:  it 
belonged to them, not to me. I realized how a political fact which was a family secret affected my 
way of doing interviews and listening to the second generation.  
Writing about the second generation’s appropriation of the memory of the coup, I changed the 
initial focus from  memories of the coup event to the context in which that memory was produced 
and invested with meaning: the dictatorship. I explored this with other people of my cohort. Still in 
England, I continued the exploration by speaking with my peers and I asked – now through an 
email invitation - a number of Chileans who were born between 1968 and 1980 and who grew up 
during the dictatorship, to write their biographies and describe how they experienced growing up 
during Pinochet’s regime within their particular families and political legacies. This step lacked any 
clear methodological design but still I consider it as an essential part of the observation of the 
fieldwork and a process which led me to frame my research questions. 
In the email I told people that I was doing research into the ‘post-coup second generation’. I did 
not select participants according to their political party affiliation, social class or gender; I just 
spoke to people who were part of my personal contacts. Ten people agreed to participate, which 
for my expectations was a high number; seven women and three men, all of whom had completed 
their undergraduate students in the social sciences, arts or humanities: they were people who 
were sensitised to the idea of writing a memoir. The process of writing took a month. Six 
volunteers finally handed in their writings to me (five women and one man); three had grown up 
within opposition families and three within families which supported Pinochet’s regime. They 
were born between 1975 and 1978 in Santiago (the capital city).  
The amount of writing varied from case to case, from one page to five. Although I did not use the 
biographies in the later analysis which structures the chapters of the thesis, they were crucial to 
learning a way of listening and preparing a set of interview questions for the fieldwork of the 
second stage. They were, like my own biographical writing, memories of everyday life. They told a 
story with no heroic deeds: the story of growing up under the dictatorship and being the inheritors 
of a past. For these voluntary writers, family histories were the context in which the stories took 
place: the meaning of the dictatorship would be related to the family position towards it. This does 
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not mean that they will be a reflex or lineal continuation of their parent’s options or views, but 
rather would be in dialogue with them. Thus, one of the volunteers disapproved of their family 
position and their role in the past, and she explained how it would mean for her a sense of anger 
and reproach with respect to her family, while for another the contrast between her family 
political memory and school was crucial to her childhood and adolescence. I learned that it was  
through the process of remembering childhood and the political context in which the interviewees 
grew up, that I would elicit a narrative about modes of remembering (family histories and stories, 
political events, personal experiences, etc.) which would reveal crucial aspects of recent Chilean 
history. 
The second generation’s memories of the coup or the dictatorship, depended on their family 
histories. Memories of this past (the one which led us to the memory impasse) were familial and 
were told through a family genealogy. It was not the story of the ‘I’ but of a legacy. I learned that 
‘remembering the coup has a family history’, and I put it into practice:  being second generation in 
post-coup Chile had as one of its main tropes family genealogy and family life. Family genealogies 
were a way of de-individualizing testimonies and putting them in their social and historical context 
from an everyday life point of view. 
Carlos, for instance, a right-wing ‘biographer’, studied in an upper class school. He does not 
remember the coup so much as the Land Reform because for his family the dictatorship brought 
things “back to order”. He recounted a story from his childhood which reveals much. One of his 
classmates was the grandson of Pinochet, a middle class military man. The grandson did not have 
friends in this high-class school, and Carlos tells how once in an argument with him, he shouted 
Pinochet’s grandson: “milico de mierda!”. Milico is a colloquial and derogatory way to name the 
military in Chile (and also in Argentina and Uruguay). With this he showed how, although a child, 
he knew a lot about social class and political memory and thus was able to reveal the instrumental 
alliance between the military and the upper class in Chile. Carlos reflects “I knew he wasn’t one of 
us” (because of Pinochet’s grandson’s middle class social origins).  
His story problematized my definition of second generation: is he a second generation although he 
belongs to a family which supported the regime and for which the coup was lived as salvation? 
Although I felt that was a challenging question, I also felt that the sort of questions that including 
him as second generation would raise would led me to a different project, and encouraged by my 
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supervisor, I focused on one tradition of memory, which I defined earlier. However, stories like his 
were told in the biographies and showed how the child’s gaze (or memories) in the voice of an 
adult might be a precious sociological tool. Works such as “Berlin Childhood” by Walter Benjamin, 
Eva Hoffman’s After Such Knowledge; Victor Seidler’s Shadows of the Shoah, Ingeborg Hecht’s 
“Invisible Walls” are examples of this. They weave a world of silence, scared teachers, dangerous 
words, spontaneous solidarities, urban symbols and myths. However, they are not memories of 
childhood, but about childhood (Freud).   
As a result, with the narration of everyday life the non-extraordinariness of the second 
generation’s memory came into focus. The losses of the past or any experience of mourning would 
not be found only in spectacular forms of horror: it would be found in the extremely rich and 
complex experience of growing up during the dictatorship. I returned to doing interviews because I 
felt there was a bias in the biography: it would limit my sample to people with technological and 
writing skills.  
 
Landing in the Fieldwork: Life Stories Interviews 
My field research took place in Chile after the earthquake of 2010, and this event deeply affected 
both the way people spoke to me and the way I spoke to them. Any qualitative (and quantitative) 
analysis needs to pay tribute to the way data was produced - ‘uttered’, in Catherine Kohler  
Riesmann’s terms (2003) - and the special social, political, and psychological circumstances of its 
production. As she indicates: ‘… any speech act is embedded in a specific social context; rather, as 
a historically specific and contested concept, authenticity itself is an object of sociological and 
anthropological research’ (2003, 95).  
In fact, March 2010 was a particularly unsettling moment in Chile, because the 27th February 
tsunami had just destroyed part of the Southern coast of the country and various stories of 
personal and collective drama were told in the media every day. In one of the cities most affected 
by the earthquake, Concepción, social chaos reached the point at which law and order temporally 
broke down and looters took over the streets, which was unusual in Chile. There was an intense 
debate whether to call in the Army, but the then President, Michelle Bachelet hesitated to do so 
on the grounds that it would arouse memories of the military coup. However, it was the 
earthquake itself, not only the presence of the Army in the street, which opened the ‘memory 
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box’: there was no electricity, people had to use candles and reestablishing normal life took a long 
time. People felt vulnerable. I remember spending time listening to casual chats in public spaces or 
even in the hairdresser and they all consisted of describing in detail their memories of 27th 
February, a practice which echoes the sharing of memories of the coup. Everybody remembered 
what they were doing on 11 September 1973, as they now remember the day of the tsunami. This 
was the context of my interviews. In many of them, a parallel between the coup and the aftermath 
of the earthquake was drawn literally by the interviewees. People experienced fear and had 
confused feelings towards authority. There was a sense of emergency, while everyday life was 
interrupted. Fear, the presence of the Army, the sense of danger, and blackouts all echoed the 
experience of the dictatorship. Despite the fact that it took place about 30 or 40 years ago, it was 
fresh as a cultural memory among most of my interviewees.  
The magnitude of the earthquake shocked the population, bringing the experience of death and 
vulnerability to the surface and situating them at the centre of social life. The context in which I 
did my fieldwork brought to the surface memories which resonated with the coup and the almost 
two decades of curfews. The earthquake was followed by a sense of a ‘catastrophe’. Furthermore 
its memory has provoked a strong need for justice among the family of the victims which 
continues today. In fact, the expression “never again” (also used to demand recognition about the 
abuse of force by the state during the 80s and 90s) has been used to speak of the earthquake’s 
victims, while the President and other authorities have had to respond in front of courts and 
public opinion about their responsibility for the late response to the tsunami. There was a 
generalized feeling of danger everywhere, echoing the opposition’s experience of the dictatorship. 
Despite the fact that the regime ended about 25 years ago, it was a “fresh” cultural memory 
among most of my interviewees.  
 
 
Recruiting Interviewees 
I identified a set of criteria for establishing my cohort and conducting interviews: first, they were 
born between 1968 and 1980. As I mentioned before, this generation barely had a personal 
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memory of the regime, had been to school in the decades of fear and many of them witnessed 
their parent’s suffering or fracture of their personal lives. Considering the time constraints, I chose 
to carry out interviews in a limited number of zones of the country: Santiago (the capital city) and 
Regions:  Valparaiso, Valdivia, Puerto Montt,  Río Bueno and Lago Ranco. The first four were urban 
cities, while the last two were villages within semi- rural areas. 
I contacted members of social and political organizations and also recurred to my personal 
contacts to finally get in touch with my interviewees by snowball method. Except in bigger cities 
like Santiago, and Valparaiso for instance I did not contact all of them in advance. In some cases, I 
just turned up and visited in situ the local organizations and local governments. In small places, I 
even just rang the bell or knocked on the door without previous arrangement in much more 
informal modes of interaction. 
I conducted twenty eight individual interviews, of which twenty five were with men and women 
who were born between 1968 and 1980, either in Chile or abroad within left-wing families, and 
who grew up in the country during the regime. I will introduce the three pendant in the next 
section, for they were considered as complementary to my main focus. I also carried out two 
group interviews.  
Among my individual interviewees were children of executed prisoners, guerrilleros, people who 
supported the left, tortured people, activists, politically disappeared and exiled families. I wanted 
to bring together different voices, and included the children of peasants, trade unionists, 
Mapuches, as well as of the political elite. At the moment when I did interviews they were adults, 
between 28 and 40 years old. The sample explores a range of social positions considering different 
socio-demographical variables: rural, urban, middle class, lower class, intellectuals, and illiterate 
people. 
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Table 1: Individual Interviews 
Year of Birth Gender Description Place
51
 Undergraduate 
studies 
1968 
 
M Active opposition Region No 
W Desaparecido 
Father  
Region, rural 
area 
No 
M Opposition Region No 
W Ostracism Region, semi-
rural and 
indigenous area 
No 
M Silent opposition Region, rural 
area 
No 
M Silent opposition Region No 
1969 M Ostracism Region, rural 
area 
Yes 
1970 M Father’s execution Region Yes 
W Father political 
prisoner 
Region No 
M Political 
persecution 
Region No 
1972 W Exiled family Santiago Yes 
W Exiled family Santiago Yes 
M Exiled family, 
internacionalist 
Santiago Yes 
                                                          
51 Chile is divided into 15 regions, of which the capital city is Santiago. Because the country is centralized 
such that almost half of the population is concentrated in Santiago (about 6 million inhabitants), I 
differentiate in the table between interviews done in Santiago and those done in the “regions”. I think that 
for a foreigner reader this is clearer than listing the names of the villages or cities. 
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father 
W Strong moral 
opposition 
Santiago Yes 
1973 W Executed father Santiago Yes 
M Exiled family Santiago Yes 
1974 M Active opposition Santiago Yes 
M Father involved in 
armed struggle 
and family exile 
Region Yes 
M Politically divided 
family, mother 
active 
oppositionist 
Santiago Yes 
M Political 
persecution and 
father´s 
imprisonment  
Region No 
1976 M Moral opposition Santiago Yes 
1977 M Active opposition Region Yes 
 
1978 M Father’s political 
imprisonment 
Region No 
W Ostracism Region, rural 
area 
No 
1980 W Political 
persecution 
Region Yes 
 
I also conducted two focus groups among second generations, with five and six participants each, 
taking place in the city of Santiago. In chapter 4 and chapter 7 I describe these interviews. 
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Table 2: Group interviews 
Group Interviews Women Participants Men Participants Total 
Focus 1 1 4 5 
Focus 2 3 3 6 
 
Complementary interviews: 
During the period in which I was contacting people and interviewing, I also got in touch with 
people who were not part of my sample, but whose points of view I thought were complementary 
to my work. I finally included them in the presentation of the cases I selected for the thesis.  I 
included two grandchildren of executed prisoners, born in the late 80s, who currently work as 
memory activists and a member of a right-wing family, the son of a Secretary of Pinochet’s regime. 
I used this interviewee as a counter-voice to my interviewees and something which also highlights 
the specificity of my research.  
 
Table 3: Complementary interviewees 
Gender Year of Birth Description Place Undergraduate 
studies 
M 1977 Right-wing family Santiago Yes 
M 1986 Desaparecido 
Grandfather 
Semi-Rural area in 
Santiago 
Yes 
W 1988 Desaparecido 
Grandfather  
Semi- Rural area in 
Santiago 
No 
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More importantly, the inclusion of a right-wing interviewee in Chapter 6 reinforces one of the 
assumptions of my thesis, namely, that the second generation from opposition families would be 
different to those of supporters’ families. The event they considered as traumatic was inconsistent 
with that reported by opposition families, and therefore the meaning they gave to the life under 
the dictatorship. For their families, the coup was the story of a triumph. I recall here Rosenthal’s 
results of her interviews with three generations of victims and perpetrators of the Holocaust, 
when she argues that their experiences would vary according their position before the end of the 
war: it was the pre-1945 position which would be determinant for the experiences that families 
would undergo later (Rosenthal 2010). She explains:  
‘In survivor families, the silence of grandparents about their experiences is connected to 
completely different problems and motives than the silence of grandparents who were 
implicated in Nazi crimes. A grandmother who survived the ghetto and the death camp is 
not denying persecution in her past if she does not speak about it, whereas this certainly is 
the case when Nazi perpetrators or accomplices remain silent’ (Rosenthal 1998, 13). 
The same is true of the Chilean case, as it was the position during the UP and the decade before, 
and especially during the agrarian reform, which would determine the subsequent memory of the 
events: in other words, family memories would vary according to family histories. 
 
 
Conducting interviews 
Interviews were conducted between March and May 2010. They were done in local cafes or at 
interviewees’ homes, depending on their preference, and each took about 1.30 and 2 hours. I did 
only one interview per person: for a limited period, I opted for including more interviewees and a 
greater diversity of experiences. Although I made this decision, it was something which I have 
returned to and which I would review if I could, because after reading some of the interviews, I 
would have appreciated the chance to counter-ask some questions.  However, having ‘more’ 
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interviews allowed me to the identification of certain patterns and tensions, around which I 
organized the chapters. 
I conducted interviews which were strongly based on biographical methods, where ‘the past and 
people’s experience of the past takes on a much more central significance than usual…’ (Miller 
2007, 2). I conducted the interviews in an active way, in contrast to the prescriptions of post-
positivistic approaches to social interview, which attempt to minimize the role of the researcher 
(Miller 2007; Rosenthal 1997). During my initial explorations I realized that the second generation 
position was something that needed to be ‘produced’ in the interview setting. This does not mean 
that we were ‘inventing’ life stories, but rather that we were in the process of giving meaning to 
personal life through an active remembering, through the lens of the legacies of the past.  I often 
heard the expression: “I have not spoken of this before”. I followed Miller when he states: 
‘The narrative approach  (…) is seen to be situational and fluid – jointly constructed by the 
Interview partnership during the conduct of the interview. The personal characteristics of 
the interviewer can constitute one of the main stimuli to the interviewee and there is no 
blanket prohibition against the interviewer either reacting openly to the statements of the 
interviewee and/or revealing personal details of their own. In fact, the 
ethnomethodological question of ‘how the interview is constituted’ (Silverman and 
Gubrium, 1994, Holstein and Gubrium, 1995) is central to the narrative approach’  (Miller 
2007, 14). 
There was a second reason for being an active interviewer, which I would understand and also 
reinforce during the interview process: I was asking once forbidden questions, and the very 
encounter conjured up the landscapes of fear around which memories of the past were produced. 
I will further develop this in Chapter 4. For now, it is important to highlight the crucial role that 
confidence between interviewer and interviewee plays here. I learned that I needed to go beyond 
the barriers that the dictatorial speaking had imposed, and that I needed to show my position and 
create a safe territory. I will develop this in chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 because is at the core of the 
second generation’s experience: the fact of inhabiting a landscape of fear which controlled the 
speaking.  I needed to create a safe space first and show my interviewees that I was one of them; I 
was part of the sample and I was asking those questions I have first asked myself.  Rosenthal has 
reflected on the role that researchers have in the interviews:  
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‘The narrator does not simply reproduce pre-fabricated stories from her or his life 
regardless of the interactional situation, but rather creates his or her story within the 
social process of mutual orientation according to his or her definition of the interview 
situation. The neopositivist research tradition would regard this aspect as an irritant which 
must be eliminated, reduced or at least controlled. In our view, trying to eliminate a 
’problem’ such as this amounts to a quixotic fight against imagined giants, giants which in 
the final analysis are revealed to be not even windmills but rather the ’winds’ of the 
everyday world. The ’wind’ driving the mill that is creating biographical constructs cannot 
be eliminated without eliminating the constructs themselves, since this wind is in fact the 
ongoing interaction between the biographer and his or her social world. Life stories, taken 
as constructs, are inseparable from these interactional processes; they themselves evolve 
out of the genetic process of interaction, just as their presentation in the biographical 
research interviews a product of the interaction between narrator and listener’.  
I initiated the interviews by asking for people’s family story, understood as the narrative 
construction of the family history (Rosenthal 2010).  This was highly positive for the development 
of the interview because interviewees were situated in a genealogical perspective, and developed 
a narrative of themselves as part of such lineage.  
During the interviews I was an active listener, and I asked directive questions, and often told 
episodes of my own life. It often happened that when I asked about the effects of the dictatorship 
my interviewees did not understand or felt that they themselves were not victims of torture, for 
instance. So I started speaking or sharing my personal experiences and episodes such as carrying a 
secret, simulating at school, knowing of left-wing and forbidden symbols, etc. which were all 
raised in the opposition’s second generations’ biographies. So I used them as a way of illustrating 
what it means to be second generation. It was a way to create a category, to explain the newness 
of the concept, but it was also something which would be transformed into a recognition process 
during the interview (in Hoffman’s sense).  
As already mentioned, I started the interviews by asking about the family story. I initially explained 
that I wanted to understand the experience of being the second generation of the coup, and being 
born within opposition families. I started the interview asking: ‘”tell me about your family story, 
who were your parents, or your grandparents”. Inscribing my interviewees in a genealogy was a 
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way to link them to their family trajectories and speak of the idea of inheritance, and 
appropriation of or relationship to that legacy. After that initial family story, I asked about the 
interviewee experience of bearing that family memory, which became a family political memory 
when it intersected with political events. 
 
 
Discussing Methods: the Narrative Approach and its limitations 
My thesis is based on individual and collective interviews with the second generations, and in 
chapters 4, 5 and 7 I also refer to the narratives of documentaries, most of which deal with the 
issue of being the second generation. I consider them in terms of what Plummer calls a human 
document: ‘... an account of individual experience which reveals the individual's actions as a 
human agent and as a participant in social life' (Plummer 2001, 29). With respect to what can be 
considered as ‘documents of life’, Plummer describes a wide range of potential sources which he 
relates to a long tradition within humanities and part of social sciences:  
This particular methodological style has gone by various names: personal documents, the 
documentary tradition, oral history; and it connects to an array of different styles of 
qualitative talk that have been developing over the past century. (…) These accounts 
embrace a wide range of forms (…): letters and diaries, biographies and life histories, 
dreams and self-observation, essays and notes, photographs and film. (Plummer 2001, 3)  
Plummer’s understanding of multiple accounts of human experience gives the researcher a wide 
range of sources to explore in order to elicit a narrative, which would be the element all these 
‘documents’ have in common. There will be a narrative present in every document of life and 
every life story. Although there is no agreement on what a narrative is, Plummer states that 
‘narrative structures enable us to speak, and the multitude of fragmenting experiences that 
constitute our lives come to be patterned into some seeming sense of order’  (Plummer 2001, 
185). This way, though narratives aim to give an account of experience, they are not experience, 
and therefore their analysis must start from this insight. In Rosenthal’s words: ‘How does one 
proceed from a given autobiographical text to life itself? To what extent is one receiving an 
account of an actual life history and to what extent is one being presented with the 
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autobiographer’s present construction of his or her past, present and future life?’  (Rosenthal 
1997, 1). On this basis, she suggests that is important to make the distinction between the 
narrative that tells the story of a life, and the lived experience which is being narrated: ‘By life 
story we mean narrated personal life as related to another in conversation or written down in the 
present-day; by life-history we mean the experiences that a person has lived through (Rosenthal 
2010, 10). 
As a mean of representation, narrative analysis starts from the opacity of experience and 
therefore does not aim to make legible experience itself but rather the pattern through which it is 
narrativized and the form in which it is given meaning –or how. The researcher focuses on what is 
said during the interview, and specifically on the meaning that the teller finds in his/her story 
(Riessman 2005). For qualitative analysis, the main element of interest within narratives is the 
‘frame’: this is to say: ‘an issue wider than the subject in hand (…), `a basic structural unit onto 
which or into which other constituents of a whole are fitted, with which they attach or with which 
they are integrated’ (Plummer 2001, 185). In this view, different instances of life stories will always 
be located within some wider ‘frames’ and can be interpreted through them (Riessman 2005). 
Rosenthal calls this ´the thematic field’. She states: 
The intersubjective meaning of individual stories cannot be reconstructed by subsuming 
the stories presented by the narrator under the categories set up by the interviewer nor 
by interpreting single text passages independently from the narrative context. 
Hermeneutic analysis requires that contextual interpretation take into account the entire 
interview; in the case of biographical analysis this means that each narrated experience 
must be identified and localized within the framework of the biographers overall 
construction, as defined through the biographical strands and thematic field presented in 
the interview.  
Thus, in this thesis I identify the frames and tensions which would organize the narratives, and 
accordingly organize them into different chapters. Although some experiences are transversal to 
every chapter, I identified frames which organized the different forms of giving meaning to 
experience and also give space to different mechanisms to deal with them.  
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Letting the Ghost In 
At an early stage of this investigation, however, I realized that relying on narrative analysis of 
documents of life was not sufficient to give an account of the subject of this thesis. Often, what 
was silenced within the interview, or what happened after or before the interview, imposed itself 
on my attention. For this reason, the idea of the ‘afterlife’ has been crucial to the methods of this 
thesis: because early on I found that the narrativization of the past was traversed by other forms 
of struggles.  
Gómez-Barris notion of the ‘afterlife of violence’ allows her to engage with other phenomena 
beyond the problem of memory and forgetting. I have argued, following Stern, that neither the 
emphasis on memory or forgetting provides an explanation of the presence of the coup in the 
present. For this reason, we need a language with which haunting, and paradoxically, objective 
violence (according to Gordon: repressed violence) can be apprehended. This is my main critique 
of many of the narrative-based approaches: the way they emphasize cognitive or narrative frames 
and overlook other forms of memory transmission (or irruption). As Gordon states:  
“If haunting describes how that which appears to be not there is often a seething 
presence, acting on and often meddling with taken-for-granted realities, the ghost is just 
the sign, or the empirical evidence if you like, that tells you a haunting is taking place. The 
ghost is not simply a dead or a missing person, but a social figure, and investigating it can 
lead to that dense site where history and subjectivity make social life” (Gordon 1997,8).   
In 2008, before starting this thesis on the second generation, I visited an erudite academic and 
family man in the north of Chile to ask him about his memories of the military coup. From the start 
of the interview he affirmed that he probably would not have anything to say because in the early 
70’s he was still too young to be politically engaged. After twenty minutes of conversation about 
his memories, however, what at first did not seem to mean anything special to him became a 
source of deep grief. He talked about how the experience of a social euphoria (the UP and its 
social revolution) and its dramatic failure (the bombing of La Moneda) had been profoundly 
disturbing for him. He believed he has carried with him a silent depression which has its source in 
that experience, in the feeling of loss and failure. 
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From this interview onwards the problem of unearthing experiences of loss which have then 
become displaced, silenced or discredited became recurrent metaphors of my work for this thesis 
and I learnt that “unearthing” and “digging” are part of the afterlife of violence and how the 
interview can facilitate a process of recognition. These forms of exploration refer not only to a 
topology of the mind, but also draw attention to forms of listening to that which has not been 
named yet, and therefore remains unsaid. In Gordon’s words: 
‘What is distinctive about haunting is that is an animated state in which a repressed or 
unresolved social violence is making itself known, sometimes very directly, sometimes 
more obliquely. I used the term haunting to describe those singular yet repetitive 
instances when home becomes unfamiliar, when your bearings on the world lose 
direction, when the over-and-done-with  comes alive, when what’s been in your blind spot 
comes into view. Haunting raises specters and it alters the experience of being in time, the 
way we separate the past, the present and the future” (Gordon 1997 xvi).  
I develop this in chapter 4 when I explain how I felt haunted when I conducted focus groups in 
Santiago. As Gordon states, haunting comes from cultural forms of ‘repression’. In fact, the 
mechanism of denial was a symptomatic form of life during the dictatorship, and gave rise to 
forms of communication and to silence. Even 30 or 40 years later, this was still an issue in the 
interview encounter, and I learned at a very early stage that this would be one of my main 
methodological challenges. This, in a context in which speaking to others would not have the 
fluidity of everyday forms of speaking (if we think of them as fluid), but would become an issue in 
itself. As I have said before, even today, in Chile every time we talk about the 11 September coup 
we may feel the late effects of an atomic explosion or a volcano eruption; the event has had the 
power to explode, emanate, irradiate and persist.  
 
 
The ethical insight 
In a way, Doña Agustina’s  son did not want his mother to speak, not to not speak in general but 
not to speak to me, to the interviewer, to the eyes (and ears) of a social researcher. He 
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understood the effects that an interview may have after the interview, this is to say, how the act 
of speaking may affect the person who is speaking, how speaking and memory trigger affects. But 
he might also have known about the effects of the forms of listening (and analysing) which might 
stem from the interview: how in contexts of state violence the very interview might be producing 
a certain kind of knowledge and also a narrow form of subjectivity: victimhood.  
The son was afraid of a certain form of listening to his family story. He probably thought of the 
various social researchers, social workers, members of churches, and politicians who have asked 
Doña Agustina again and again to tell her story. Not any story, but the form of testimony which 
has been shaped by the work of humanitarian organizations and which was fundamental to 
creating a social consciousness of the human rights violations of the regime. All these practices 
need the viuda’s (widow’s) narrative memories, for the pursuit of justice, oral memory, 
reconciliation and so on. But little has been asked about the personal and social cost of the 
collection of these memories: what does the narrative do once the story is told, both to Doña 
Agustina and to our understanding of what follows political violence? 
Taking into account the critique which the son makes possible, the problem of how to listen and 
analyse remained central to the development of this thesis. How to deal ethically with this first 
encounter, which not only precedes the current research but also haunted it, was an important 
question. Further questions that become significant were: What kind of sociology could ask for 
people’s testimony? What can we, as sociologists, do with these testimonies? What can we do in 
exchange for these stories?  The questions were: how to listen and what would be voiced? Neither 
listening nor giving voice are practices which can be taken for granted. Gordon suggests that to 
avoid any reduction, reflexivity (or responsibility, I would add) alone is not sufficient; it is also 
necessary to bear in mind the statement of complexity. She challenges any short-circuit when we 
think in terms of social agents, and includes in this category any form of victimization of social 
agents. In Gordon´s words: ‘…even those who live in the most dire circumstances possess a 
complex and oftentimes contradictory humanity and subjectivity that is never adequately 
glimpsed by viewing them as victims or, on the other hand, as superhuman agents’ (Gordon, 1997, 
4). The sociologist addressing this question would need to consider as a sociological statement the 
complexity of events and agents. Gordon adds: 
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Complex personhood means that all people (albeit in specific forms whose specificity is 
sometimes everything) remember and forget, are beset by contradiction, and recognize 
and misrecognize themselves and others. (…) [it] means that the stories people tell about 
themselves, about their troubles, about their social worlds, and about their society’s 
problems are entangled and weave between what is immediately available as a story and 
what their imagination are reaching toward (…)” (Gordon 1997, 4).  
I introduced this thesis by expressing my concerns about the role of the researcher in contexts of 
state violence. This concern is multi-layered and sometimes works more as a sense of uneasiness 
which encompasses but also illuminates the thinking process rather than a clear account of 
something where we are sure of what is wrong. Through this encounter, I wanted to ask questions 
about my own practice and also take charge of them.  
 
Chapter Conclusions 
My work is based on ‘documents of life’ (Plummer), consisting principally of interviews based on 
life stories. However, I also draw on and bring into practice Gordon’s theory of haunting 
throughout the process. I have described how fieldwork consists of various stages, where 
‘everything counts’ and not only the final instrument for data collection (in this case: the 
interview). Presenting the methods I used for narrative collection, I have signalled three elements 
as relevant: framing the interviews in the light of family genealogies, taking an active role within 
the interviews and also drawing attention to the everyday life forms of violence. Thus interviewees 
will speak from the position of a second generation and narrate the everyday life conditions and 
effects of bearing a political memory, the theme around which the very experience of the 
dictatorship was framed. I also reflect in the chapter on the fact that while narrative methods can 
help the researcher to grasp the way people represent and construct a narrative (how they make 
of their life stories something narratable), Gordon suggests that this is not enough, particularly in 
contexts of social violence. Rather than opposing a clear methodological corpus, she invites us to 
move the limits of sociological exploration in the shaping of the phenomena. I take two aspects of 
Gordon’s work: “ghostly matters” and the issue of “complexity”. 
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Chapter 4: The culture of fear and its afterlife 
 
Children witnessed different forms of violence. Their parents were disappeared and executed. 
Together with their families, they underwent exile and uprooting from their homelands. Armed 
strangers entered their homes using violence. They undertook visits to relatives who had been 
imprisoned for long periods of time. Direct violence transformed them into prisoners, deaths or 
disappeared. 
(Text in the Permanent Collection, Children Area, at the Museum of Memory)   
 
 
 
Introduction 
In Chapter 2 I argued for the importance of the influence that concrete histories and patterns of 
sociability have on the aftermath of political violence and in the shaping of various forms of 
memory, in other words, the way in which memories are mediated by their social conditions of 
production. In this chapter I aim to describe those historical and social conditions in which the 
local political memories of the opposition were shaped and how political memory has been 
inherited and inhabited in specific socio-historical circumstances by the second generation. The 
chapter also problematizes linear conceptions of time, memory and violence by exploring the 
aftermath of the politics of fear during the military regime and how its inter-subjective effects 
might still haunt the present in spite of changes in the state politics of memory.  
 
Thus, the chapter starts by describing the culture of fear imposed by the military regime in Chile 
between 1973 and 1990. Although this operated through two forms: fear of the other on the one 
hand and state terror on the other, following Jacques Semelin’s contribution to understanding 
social violence I suggest that these strategies were also inseparable. In fact, I show how the politics 
of fear promoted by the regime through state terror was accompanied by an increasing fear of the 
other which permeated social life in post-coup Chile (Garretón; Lechner 1992; Lira and Castillo 
1993). Shedding light on the pervasiveness of state violence, in this section I reflect on what an 
encounter with state violence means and how it leaves traces in the landscapes of inter-subjective 
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life and the making of political memory. I present one of the several paradoxes attached to 
cultures of fear and the complexity of its experiences (and memories): at the same time as the 
culture of fear dispossess individuals of their sense of dignity, the presence of fear or the sense of 
threat is normalized and absorbed into forms of everyday life.  
Once I have described the cultural context in which political memories of the opposition circulated 
and were transmitted, in the following section I draw the reader’s attention to David, the son of an 
activist. In this section I show how these traces of violence are related not only to the culture of 
fear but also to the memory of the opposition and its performative effect, marking the boundaries 
between what can be said and when. The analysis focuses on different elements of the way David 
has inhabited his political memory, which cannot be thought of as independent of the culture of 
fear in which it was shaped. This includes the identification with his parents’ experiences, 
narratives and political identity; the distinction between the inside and the outside; the fear of 
speaking or performing the ‘true self’, among others. I show how the knowledge of the culture of 
fear, which in this case also works as the transmission of political memory, is also a rite of passage 
for David which permits him to enter into the opposition culture. It is by doing so that he acquires 
a ‘poisoned knowledge’. By exploring his interview I elucidate how the politics of fear has 
displayed a landscape based on a strong distinction between inside and outside, a distinction 
which has left its traces in the longer term, even in changing memory landscapes during the post-
dictatorship.  
Rather than focusing solely on how David has represented the coup, in the last section of the 
chapter I reflect on how the past has been embodied and the ways in which fear still has a 
presence or, better, an afterlife. I aim to show how David’s testimony enables us to grasp ‘the 
afterlife’ of fear up to now. Taking into account David’s experience of haunting during the 
interview, and referring to Gordon’s book Ghostly Matters and its sociological use of experiences 
of haunting, the last part of the chapter shows how even the research setting itself became a 
scene in which the fears described by David were elicited. For this I draw on my personal 
experience during the fieldwork. 
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The Culture Of Fear  
A central element of a culture of fear is the ‘inherent conviction that humanity continually faces 
threats, which challenge daily existence; consequently fear becomes an all-pervading force in the 
everyday life’ (Cahir; 2013). Fear may have different sources such as today’s war on terrorism, 
which affects the developed countries principally, but it also may be occasioned by the state, as 
happened in the 70s and 80s in Latin America and particularly the Southern Cone. As Norberth 
Lenchner points out: ‘Authoritarianism creates a ‘culture of fear’. The term, coined for Argentina 
by Guillermo O´Donnell, refers to the wholesale, everyday experience of human-rights abuse’ 
(Lechner 1992, 26). A description of what a culture of fear in such contexts is has been provided by 
Linda Green: ‘Rumour of death lists and denunciation, gossip, and innuendos create a climate of 
suspicion. No one can be sure who is who. The spectacle of torture and death, of massacres and 
disappearances, becomes deeply inscribed in individuals and in the collective imagination through 
a constant sense of threat’ (1995, 105). Although Green’s definition of a culture of fear was 
developed to describe life in Guatemala, at its core it illuminates the Chilean case and the almost 
two decades that followed the military coup.  
 
 
The fear tactic 
In the deeply polarized Chile of the 70s, fear had two different manifestations: fear of the Other 
and fear of the state. Despite being different in appearance, these two aspects are related. After 
the military coup, the military junta’s aim was to bring back ‘order’ to the country. In the first days 
after the coup, they called on people to denounce any behaviour that could be suspected of being 
directed against the new regime. Public meetings were forbidden, and with this, public speech. 
People could not speak in public about politics –or about any social concern– that could be 
considered as suspicious.  
The junta created a narrative for its role of salvation. For this, it was necessary to shape a powerful 
enemy: the Communists, which they called ‘the Marxist cancer’ (Stern 2006a). They created the 
fiction of a leftist plan of attack against the country which would have led to a proletarian 
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dictatorship. This was called ‘Plan Z’ and was considered as ‘evidence’ of the danger that the left-
wing groups represented for the state. The dissemination of this narrative contributed to the 
feeling of salvation that many Chileans invested in the regime. In Chapter 5 I will show how this 
aspect of the politics of fear is entangled with the intergenerational transmission of political 
stigmas. 
According to Semelin, in underlying episodes of social violence which may culminate in mass 
crimes, there is a social-affective process which transforms social anxiety into fear (Sémelin 2007). 
The latter is directed against an enemy who is imagined to be highly dangerous: ‘The aim of such 
rhetoric seems to be to make this anxiety fix on some ‘enemy’ who is then endowed with a real-
life figure denounced as being cancer within society’(Sémelin 2007, 16). To identify an enemy is 
already a way of providing an explanation of the source of the threat. After this, the new social 
construction acquires a life of its own and becomes a figure on which to project hatred: ‘This 
transmutation of insidious anxiety into a fear concentrated on a hostile figure serves as the 
foundations for hatred to develop against the evil-minded Other’ (Semelin 2007, 16). For Semelin, 
this affective process acts is a scapegoat mechanism: it helps to strengthen the afflicted 
community and reshapes it in order to enable it to emerge from its state of crisis. 
In the mid-80s Lira  and Isabel Castillo, among others, dealt with the psychosocial effects of the 
regime’s on the population. Although they use the language of psychology, they attempt to de-
individualize a symptomatology which they believe was caused by the military regime. In that 
sense, they frame the culture of fear in terms of the paradigm of trauma (see the literature review 
for more about this), but always keeping in view its political origin ((Lira and Castillo 1993; Lira 
2007). They stress that although fear is a private experience and tends to be socially invisible, 
under regimes of fear it becomes embedded in social relationships, affecting people’s 
consciousness and behaviour, dramatically transforming everyday life. The regime’s ‘planned 
arbitrariness’52 turned fear into a generalized feeling, which they call ‘chronic fear’, that is a fear 
that is no longer a response to specific situations but rather a permanent condition in everyday life 
(Lira and Castillo 1991). People became suspicious of each other, because the ‘other’ could 
potentially become an enemy and a political threat. They see in the friend/enemy dichotomy a 
                                                          
52 They used this expression to refer to the ubiquitous presence of the state in regimes of fear: it is present 
everywhere through military and paramilitary and this also means that it can ‘act’ at any moment. 
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new logic in social life stemming from the military discourses in the Southern Cone which 
emphasized the dichotomization of social life, reducing it to an affective distinction between ‘us’ 
and ‘them’ (Constable and Valenzuela 1993; Feitlowitz 1999; Stern 2006a). For Lechner, this 
created a paranoid society in which people were highly suspicious of each other and preferred to 
be very cautious when they were in the company of other people (Lechner 1992) .  
The other campaign consisted in what has been considered classically as state terrorism. Arbitrary 
detentions, mass assassinations, mutilations and disappearances were part of the aggressive first 
period of the military dictatorship, between 1973 and 1980 (Lira and Castillo 1993; Stern 2006a). 
State violence and its consequent action, the torture of the body, had the aim of reducing 
opposition attempts to reorganize after the coup. Taming and disciplining were the main goals of 
these practices which used the punishment of the body as one of their primary strategies. As 
Gómez-Barris states: ‘Torture was a means of isolating and breaking down collective identities, 
inducing pain as a fear tactic (one that had reverberations in the wider social sphere) and 
producing a traumatic rupture in victims’ (Gómez-Barris 2009, 77). Like Green, Gómez-Barris also 
emphasises the relationship that fear has with experiences of physical violence, and how these do 
not affect their victims alone, but also the rest of society. She also refers to torture as a form of 
the reduction of the other, a debasement of any sense of dignity. It is interesting to note this point 
of relationship between the physical threat and the moral domain, the understanding of which 
was developed in the late 70s by Guillermo O’Donnell and Cecilia Galli in Argentina (Robben 2011 
Corradi et.al 1992). They were the first to speak of a culture of fear in the context of the Southern 
Cone military regimes. They pointed out that it was not a black or white picture in which an evil 
state victimized society, but was rather a complex scene of legitimacy and silence. They stated that 
repression and violence had provoked a depoliticization within civil society, leading to the 
individual ‘decision to overlook the worst aspects of the repression’. For O’Donnell and Galli, 
systematic exposure to the culture of fear provoked the social dispossession of judgment, and 
eventually, complicity with horror. They saw compliancy as a result of terror, as its product, rather 
than its condition. 
The metaphor of the encapuchado (hooded man) introduced in Estadio Nacional (2001) – a 
documentary about a torture centre during the military regime – fully represents the 
institutionalization of fear and the dispossession of morality in such a context. Carmen Parot’s 
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documentary explores the contradictory meanings of the National Stadium through the uses to 
which it has been put. The National Stadium is traditionally where the most important football 
matches and large-scale meetings took place in Chile. However, immediately after the coup it was 
used as a detention and torture centre through which thousands of people passed. The 
documentary confronts this hidden and painful other meaning: although it was used  as a site of 
torture during the first months of the military junta, it has continued serving as the national 
referent for sports and cultural spectacles even up to the present period. It has only been in recent 
years that groups of organized neighbours have started to demand forms of memorialization 
within its facilities53.  
In this documentary ex-prisoners talk about their experiences in the concentration camp; they 
describe how the military would choose a politically active prisoner. This prisoner would be tied 
with rope, dragged along and obliged to identify some of his peers amongst the prisoners, and to 
hablar (denounce, grass on). If someone was recognized, they would be tortured, and maybe shot 
dead. The encapuchado was the finger of death, pointing at those he or she recognized. They were 
deprived of their moral nature and reduced to choosing between different deaths. For the other 
prisoners, he or she represented what the public arena had become in Chile. None of them 
wanted to look into the other’s eyes; distrust permeated the social arena, making the idea of 
social intercourse potentially dangerous.  
 
 
Fear and everyday life 
The description of the unmaking effect of state violence given in the paragraphs above is 
supplemented by the testimony of Luis, one of the children of the victims who I interviewed. His 
testimony adds another element to the experience of violence and the unmaking of identity: the 
                                                          
53 I remember when I was at school and practiced sport, I heard that one of my classmates would not be 
allowed to participate in the championships at the National Stadium. As we were very close friends, I asked 
her why, and she told me that her mother would never enter a torture site. It affected me in the way that 
cultures of fear and public secrets do: I had the same knowledge, and moreover, I knew that it was there 
where my grandfather had been tortured, I could even remember his stories about running over nails 
without shoes and fake shootings for the prisoners. I knew this, but I participated not once, but several 
times in championships there, without hesitating or even giving a thought to this when I was young.   
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loss of meaning; its impact is complicated when this loss is witnessed by a member of the second 
generation. For his mother, such an experience conveyed the loss of meaning of everyday life, 
giving her encounter with state violence a surrealistic aura which obliged her to suddenly redefine 
the limits of reality. In the interview Luis described his mother’s close encounter with state 
violence. By reading his account, we can see how, although his mother was not exactly a victim of 
torture, her story expands the very meaning of state violence and how we think of injuries in the 
aftermath of political violence: 
“And about a year ago I found out that in 1974 my mother was pregnant (… ) and one day 
she went out to do the shopping and they caught her and took her to a cell for 6 hours 
(….). She told me: ‘When you walked around in the garden of this house (you could see 
that), there were lots of holes in the ground; in the holes you could see 4 or 5 guys lying 
down who couldn’t stand up. As I was pregnant, they took me to a room and left me there 
for 6 hours without food, without water, anything. And that happened just because I went 
out to buy a chicken for lunch’. So, that image, my mother’s pain… I try not to touch on it 
(in any conversation), because it hurts her too much”. 
This story is particularly compelling, not only because of the dramatic events involving a pregnant 
woman, but because of her fixation on the fact that she had bought a chicken the day she was 
imprisoned: ‘that happened just because I went out to buy a chicken for lunch’, she says. This 
expression is somehow enigmatic. What is the role of something so quotidian in the description of 
the horror story? As I explained in the literature review, for Das violence is an experience of/at the 
limit, an experience which confronts the subject with his or her own limits in the world, in the very 
making of it. When Das refers to violence, she thinks of it in terms of a boundary; violence is 
experienced through an event which becomes part of our personal histories. It is something 
beyond here which becomes part of here. In her words: ‘There was, I argue, a mutual absorption 
of the violent and the ordinary so that I end up thinking of the events as always attached to the 
ordinary as if they were tentacles that reach out from the everyday and anchor the event to it in 
some specific ways’ (Das 2007, 7). For Das, the interest is in those mechanisms which allow people 
to inhabit violence and to normalize it, while at the same time they transform the sense of what 
ordinary life might be.  
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Another account of the colonization of everyday life by politics of fear, albeit in a different  
context, has been given by Marguerite Feitlowitz . In her compelling Lexicon of Terror, she draws 
our attention to how a language of violence entered into the colloquial uses of language in post-
coup Argentina, spreading the memory of violent practices and also introducing extreme fear into 
the flow of normal life (Feitlowitz 1999). She focuses on how violence has contagious effects, 
unnoticeably. To Feitlowitz, dwelling in a violent world means that the language of everyday life is 
colonized by the language of the torture chambers. And the evidence she gives is striking. She 
gathers words used in everyday language which have been transformed by the perpetrators of the 
Dirty War. She explains:  
‘Perversions of the language contribute to the sinister, indeed surreal, quality of life in 
Buenos Aires. In concentration camp slang, the metal table on which prisoners were laid 
out to be tortured was called la parrilla. Traditionally, la parrilla has referred to the classic 
horizontal grill – the centerpiece of the beloved social barbecue – and to the ubiquitous 
restaurants that serve grilled meat’ (Feitlowitz 1999, 49). 
Both, Das and Feitowitz, point out that after episodes of state violence, fear spreads within society 
and is absorbed into the practices of everyday life, and vice-versa. This process can be seen at 
work in the interview in which the quotidian (shopping for lunch) roots the whole story in 
everyday life, becoming its condition of reality. Only once horror becomes part of reality does it 
transform the horizon of what is real. Such an encounter becomes the experience of the limit of 
what has been previously known. In fact, the image of the family lunch which was impeded comes 
into mind as an impossible event. It is not part of the scene of state violence, but it shows what 
has been left out; it is an experience of loss in the place where the encounter takes place; an 
interruption of a quotidian which will never come back. But what does it mean to hear this story or 
to grow up in a society where these stories are produced or become part of what is possible? This 
is the topic I will discuss in the next section of the chapter.  
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Passing On Fear To The Second Generation: The Afterlife Of Violence 
The concern with the ‘afterlife’ of violence destabilizes traditional accounts of time and also 
undermines the idea of political reconciliation. It raises the question: to what extent are past 
harms and suffering still occurring? If they still occur although the regime which gave rise to them 
have fallen, through what mechanisms are they reproduced? While these questions involve a 
reflection on the aftermath, they are also a meditation on the very scope of violence: does state 
violence have a legacy and, if so, how? What is the meaning and the impact of state violence for 
and on the following generations? Gómez-Barris’ idea of the afterlife shows how violent events 
have an inter-subjective aftermath in the form of identity struggles or conflicts. In this section I 
show how these traces of violence are related to the culture of fear but also to the memory of the 
opposition and its performative effect.   
For one of my interviewees, the son of a desaparecido peasant, the fear of the state has a 
magnitude which can be passed on through generations:  
“Due to the fact that I have this family story, I feel something that most of my peers do not 
feel: I feel fear… I don’t know if other people feel the same, but I am afraid of the state. 
There is the threat that if something changes, if a dictatorship comes again, you could be 
subjected to human rights violations, you could be subjected to torture or you could even 
disappear… So, to be honest, you become paranoid, and that’s how difficulties are 
inherited…” 
What is striking in this quotation is that the knowledge of fear has a sort of contagious effect 
which can be passed down from one generation to another. The quotation shows that to 
experience state violence does not require physical exposure to it and that violence does not 
necessarily consist of torture. This remark shows that the culture of fear expands through indirect 
experience, but it is nevertheless internalized through a sense of threat which ‘infects’ everyday 
life. Compellingly expressed in this testimony, the fear of the state is associated with an awareness 
of the fragility of the body and the unmaking effect that the loss of ontological confidence 
provokes. But we also see that it is transmitted in the form of knowledge –“due to the fact that I 
have this family story”. This shows that it still requires forms of embodiment and embeddedness 
in the local and affective worlds –“I feel fear”.   
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In the next section, I will introduce David, the son of an activist who became involved in terrorist 
activities. The stories he heard from his father –his family political memory- were secrets that 
separated him from the outside. Rather than questioning David’s memories and whether they are 
fictional or true, I am interested in exploring what memory has done within David, how he has 
inhabited this knowledge and how a state of emergency has come to be lived as everyday life, so 
that violence is made invisible and bearable. I will also explore the effects of the memory of 
opposition, which creates an inter-subjective landscape for the second generation to live in. I will 
also explain my understanding of the concept of poisoned knowledge in the context of the 
transmission of state violence.   
 
 
David’s Life Story 
David is in his mid-thirties and works as a psychologist. I contacted him through a common 
acquaintance and told him the topic of my research and that I was planning to visit the city where 
he lives. He immediately agreed to be interviewed and we met in a coffee shop a few days later. 
As soon as we met, he told me that one of his friends had told him he could not understand why 
would he spend his time meeting a strange person to speak about his past. I felt that telling me 
this was his way of letting me know how important was for him to speak of this past, not any past, 
but a past narrated from the standpoint of a child of the dictatorship. David seemed to be ready to 
speak in front of someone else and throughout the interview I would understand the meaning of 
this, and in what sense it was also an experience of transgression for him. 
The present in David’s account is woven around episodes that his parents –principally his father– 
endured. When I asked him to tell me about his parents, he replied: “My father? hmmm… I will 
talk first about my mother, because that is simpler”. The gendered distribution of roles is common 
among my interviewees. In such an extreme context, the father took the role of the militant and 
represented a sense of altruism or idealism while the mother was the keeper of ‘the life that goes 
on’. This also structures the way stories are told, as in the case of David, whose story is structured 
around his father’s life story. I will further develop this in Chapter 7, where I will show how this 
also affected the gendered politics of mourning victims of the dictatorship in post-coup Chile. 
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After years of therapy, David learned to speak about his family story. But when he talks about this, 
he speaks in the present tense. By speaking this way, David reveals how present the past is for 
him; listening to him gave me a clue to understanding the afterlife of political violence amongst 
the second generation and its haunting presence. Being the child of a charismatic trade union 
leader during the UP, David was socialized within the opposition culture. He always knew that 
after the coup his father was dismissed from his job, their home was raided several times by the 
secret police and his family lived clandestinely for months. Blacklisted and prevented from finding 
a new job, his father had a critical encounter with the regime’s secret police, something which 
turned his life upside down. Soon after this experience, his father fell into a deep depression, the 
first of several depressions that would profoundly mark their family life. Over the years, the father 
became involved in clandestine groups; first, he bought a printing press and started producing 
pamphlets against the dictatorship. After a few years, as his anger grew, he joined in an armed 
leftist group. David has chosen to not know the full extent of his father’s involvement. 
At the end of 1970s, the opposition groups started to reorganize and differentiate themselves in 
accordance with their strategy for fighting the dictatorship. Although the majority of the 
opposition preferred a democratic path and also opted for the reorganization of the political 
system which promoted a union between the left and the centre, there was a minority which 
believed that the dictatorship could only be overthrown with violence. The most important of 
these groups was Patriotic Front Manuel Rodriguez54.  
In 1987 David’s family had to leave the country after discovering that the father had been 
blacklisted and that the intelligence services were planning to kill him. Ironically, only one year 
before the Plebiscite they fled to Switzerland. But once the family had left Chile, the father 
suffered a new deep depression, and this became worse after the 1988 Plebiscite. The fact that 
the return to democracy had been agreed between the regime and the opposition, and that the 
                                                          
54 A paramilitary Marxist inspired left wing group, promoted by the Communist Party to fight against the 
dictatorship. The armed radical wing of the left political parties has been a taboo memory and it has only 
been in the last few years that this memory has become public. In fact, in 2012 a TV series (Los 80s) had a 
member of this group as one of its protagonists. Years ago it would have been unthinkable that they could 
be represented as heroes on TV.  
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political parties had decided to negotiate with Pinochet was something that David’s father could 
not cope with. He died of cancer in exile only a couple of years later. 
 
 
The Poisoned Knowledge As A Rite Of Passage 
My interviewees have in common the experience of having been socialized since they were 
children into living within a regime of fear or of having had to learn to do so at some point of their 
childhood. Part of this socialization happened through stories told within family life, familial 
memories of political violence. When these stories are about encounters with forms of state 
violence, I call them ‘poisoned knowledge’. When David was just 6 years old, his father told him 
about his encounter with state violence. In his words: 
“In 1974 he picks up a passenger in his taxi, who says “let’s go to Playa Ancha” [a coastal 
locality in Valparaíso, over an hour away from Santiago] (…) When they have travelled 
quite far, the guy takes a gun, he places it against my father’s head, and says: “stop here, 
motherfucker”. Suddenly, two other cars surround the cab, they take him to another car, 
and say “you are a dead man“. It was the CNI55 (…) “There is no way out”, my father thinks 
to himself, so he asks them for a chance to speak. “No” they say. “Please, it is only a 
word”.  “No, no, no, no”. Finally they say: “Hey motherfucker, what do you want to say?” 
And my father says: ”I know maybe I talk too much [against the dictatorship] in the taxi 
rank, but it doesn’t mean anything. I have children, and I struggle every day to work”. And 
the motherfuckers reply: “Yes, we know that your wife is called Tatiana, and that you have 
three children, we know where you live… We know everything about you”. (…)  Then they 
are silent, they stop the car, one of them stays inside, and the other guys start to argue. 
(…) Then, they pull my father out of the car, they make him kneel down, they take out a 
gun and put it against his head: “Ask for forgiveness, motherfucker”. “But why?” says my 
father. “Ask forgiveness for what you did during the UP government. If you don’t ask for 
                                                          
55
 In the interview, David referred to the CNI (Central Nacional de Informaciones; National Information 
Centre). However he meant DINA (Dirección Nacional de Inteligencia; National Intelligence Directorate), 
which was formed immediately after the coup to coordinate the activities of the military intelligence 
services. From the beginning the DINA functioned as a secret police force in charge of repression, including 
persecution, torture, kidnapping and assassination. It was replaced years later by the CNI.  
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forgiveness we will kill Tatiana and all your children”. He asks for forgiveness and they 
release him (…). I tell you this story because it is a milestone for everything that happened 
after (…). During those years a feeling of hatred and anger against the military regime grew 
within my father”.      
Like the story of the woman who went out to buy a chicken for a family lunch and was kidnapped, 
David’s father’s story is located within everyday life. He was driving his taxi and thought he was 
taking a passenger to a remote home. These details of the stories are perhaps what make them 
horror stories: they reveal an everyday life which is not any longer guaranteed as such. Just by 
listening to this story, David was exposed to violence although only a 6 year old child. His is a 
striking case but not an isolated one. Although in some cases parents would conceal the reality of 
terror from their children in order to protect them, within several families the parents decided to 
tell their children extraordinary details of what was going on, irrespective of their age. They did so 
in order to protect them. David belongs to the latter case; he knows his father’s story in detail. 
But, what is the impact of being socialized in fear and how does one get used to thinking of what is 
really a state of emergency as being everyday life? What are the repercussions of hearing tales of 
fear from early childhood?  
The encounter with the secret police was the most destabilizing event for David’s father in the 
chain of traumatic56 happenings that followed the military coup. He was exposed to the 
imminence of death and the lack of control in front of state power. Listening to David’s testimony 
it seems that he was not only hurt by his father’s suffering but by his own encounter with state 
violence through his father’s story. In the course of several interviews I conducted with children 
(today adults) of Pinochet’s victims I asked:  “how could you bear this being only a child?”57 My 
idea of children as naïve and fragile has been challenged by listening to all these stories, which 
have helped me to make sense of the great impact on the child’s perception of the world of having 
to come to terms and work through life stories in contexts of state violence. But also how the most 
horrible events can be normalized, appropriated and inhabited. 
                                                          
56 Here I am using traumatic with its colloquial connotation.  
57
 Another example of such suffering would be a-10-year-old girl who discovered that her father had been 
kidnapped at the school gates only to learn a few days later that his throat had been cut. 
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In Life and Words Das uses the term ‘poisoned knowledge’ to describe the impact that various 
forms of witnessing violence (including the intergenerational passing on of stories) may have. The 
concept creates space for the embodied effect that witnessing –even through testimony– may 
have on people (Das 2007). Poisoned knowledge is different from trauma: although both refer to a 
terrible experience, trauma emphasizes the elements of fragmentation and irrationality58. With 
poisoned knowledge, by contrast, the focus shifts to how this knowledge is embodied and owned, 
disrupting previous understandings of social reality and how it becomes normalized. It is about 
something which, despite being terrible and having a poison-like effect, becomes coherent 
(knowledge). As it does not involve any form of dissociation, it merges the embodiment of the 
presence with forms of violence, ‘infecting’ subjectivity, or at least, transforming it.   
David: “(…) There was nothing that could have happened to my father that I didn’t know, 
because he told me everything”. 
I: “But you were a little child… Why do you think he did that?” 
D: “I will use his own words to express this; “You are my best friend, I have no one else in 
the world to trust”. Sometimes, when I wake up in the middle of the night, I feel annoyed 
with him. When I was just 6 years old, he told me that they put a gun to his head”. 
I: “What could you do with that information?” 
David: “That’s right. I felt very proud when he told this to me. But now, I look at this again, 
and I realize that it triggered many psychological problems during primary school. I felt 
scared throughout my time at primary school. I was in the classroom and then I heard a 
siren and I immediately thought that they had come for my father, that they were taking 
him to prison. I compare it to the present: let’s imagine that I tell my son that I am going to 
a social demonstration. As a child, I do not know if my father is being taken to jail, or if 
they are going to beat him up or if he is going to ‘disappear’. It was like being constantly 
terrified, all day (…)”. 
According to David’s testimony, we see how the family tale about state violence, which brings the 
poisoned knowledge into the narrative, also acts as a rite of passage. It is the transition from being 
                                                          
58 Ron Eyerman, however, has a different approach and he suggests that cultural trauma is transmitted 
through representation and a narrative articulation about the traumatic (Eyerman 2001). 
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‘neutral’ to being part of the opposition culture. It was also a form of being welcomed to a family 
legacy which will reinforce the family identity. Within opposition families, speaking at home 
became a practice of resistance to the dictatorship; through it, family political identities were 
passed on to the next generation and living under a repressive regime became bearable. When 
David says “I felt proud when he told me”, he is also showing how it makes him feel special; how 
these secrets created a bond with his father, an experience of belonging and identification, and at 
the same time they were an experience on the threshold of the world of adults. In fact, as I have 
described above, in Pinochet’s Chile parents didn’t ‘protect’ their children against the horror of the 
dictatorship but showed them the contexts in which they lived. Situations in which parents 
apparently showed too much to their children are also practices of resistance, where speaking 
acted as a practice of freedom. As Stern shows, it was in this way that the opposition created a 
culture of resistance that permeated ‘hearts and minds’ (Stern 2006a). Speaking was part of this 
very code. But as I will explain, this situation contrasted with children’s commitment to silence, 
and their role as the keepers of family secrets.  
  
 
Inhabiting landscapes of fear 
The children of the opposition inhabited an extremely tense socio-political environment in which 
violence, suspicion, mourning and fear were entangled. My interviewees usually described how 
their everyday life was at one and the same time shaped and interrupted by their parents’ protest 
against the dictatorship. They had to learn how to distinguish the landscape of fear and to 
navigate through it.    
The culture of fear created a landscape centred on the distinction between the inside and the 
outside. The opposition to the dictatorship practiced the right to speak out in the intimacy of their 
private world. Speaking within protected spaces brought with it a cathartic effect and allowed 
people to reaffirm their convictions, their emotions and their political views in a way that shaped 
their political identities. Speaking out at home or within a selected group of friends was a practice 
which attempted to assert a degree of freedom, but even this could also be contaminated by the 
108 
 
malign effects of the culture of fear. Speaking in the wrong space and to the wrong people would 
become a betrayal (like the encapuchado). In the short term, this created a new landscape, based 
on a strong distinction between inside and outside, categories which indicated when people were 
or were not allowed to speak. The ‘inside’ consisted of spaces where the true self could be 
performed, ”where one could speak” (donde uno puede hablar). The ‘outside’ consisted of spaces 
where the true self could be punished to the point of disappearance. Thus, passing and silence 
became strategies for survival.  
The landscape of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ cannot be reduced to the classical distinction between the 
private and the public. The personal or the private were not the opposite of the public. Privacy 
could be easily violated and the body could be tortured. Homes could be raided by the police and 
families could be dramatically separated by different political points of view; you could live 
underground even among one’s own family, and could have different names depending on who 
you were speaking to. But, at the same time, an unknown person could become an ally after you 
had recognized in him small signs of opposition.  
As Carina Perelli suggests in her description of social life during the military regime in Uruguay 
(1973-1985), the dissociation between self and behaviour was a survival mechanism during that 
period. She refers to a new status, ‘inxile’: ‘… an internal exile, a new way of relating to an order 
that was external but that was nonetheless legitimized by the very fact that it was being obeyed. 
The basic mechanism through which inxile operated was dissociation between the self and the 
world, between behaviour and the self’ (Perelli 1992,214). Although I do not agree with the 
parallel that Perelli sees between obeying the law (or a regime) and its legitimacy, I think that her 
concept of ‘inxile’ is very interesting. She shows how it is in this very distinction that she finds the 
grounds for a form of subversion. While the individual may obey a regime publicly, he might also 
disobey it privately: that is the undermining force of ‘inxile’. However, at the same time that this 
form of political dissociation might be the basis for subversion, it was in first place a form of 
survival. She explains: ‘Inxile was more than the privatization of activities that were previously 
regarded as being in the public sphere (…) It involved the recognition of the incriminatory 
potential  –even if unintentionally– of association with others, including all significant others’ 
(Perelli 1992, 214). Perelli shows how it might be understood as a defence mechanism against the 
effects of the politics of fear. 
109 
 
Like David, most of the second generation learned about the landscape of fear principally by 
observing their parents; living within it required the creation of filters. The distinction between the 
inside and outside was a guide to when to show or conceal from the world their sense of ‘true 
self’. David and his father created a strong ‘inside’ between themselves, and this inside was 
shaped through family stories which could only be told within the family; in David’s case, only 
between him and his father. But this inside also made David suspicious of the outside, 
experiencing the unpredictable character of society –the potential danger of social intercourse– as 
something extremely threatening for a child.   
 
 
Keeping Secrets 
The feeling of humiliation David’s father experienced is still present in his son’s detailed account of 
the event. This humiliation is rooted in the fear felt by the man when his kidnappers threatened to 
kill him. Being a child, David grew up attempting to protect his father by listening to him, being his 
partner and being silent about his activities. He had the fantasy that as his son he could somehow 
redeem his father from suffering; he felt the responsibility of bringing him redemption. 
Silence was used as a mechanism for protection, and children were often the keepers of that 
silence, even when they did not fully understand it. They had to cope with fear and silence without 
being able to rationalize their experience. As we shall see in the quotation which follows, David 
just knew that there were stories he could not tell outside home. For the children of the 
dictatorship, their parents’ act of speaking was experienced instead as listening to forbidden 
stories; these stories brought with them the responsibility of keeping a secret. At the same time as 
they ‘spoke’, the parents taught their children to not repeat outside what they had listened to at 
home.  
Interviewer: “Did you talk about your family at school?”  
David: “Never. I never talked about my family (…). I talked about history but never about 
my father, I never mentioned him to anyone”.   
Interviewer: “Would you say that there was a norm about not speaking?”  
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David: “Yes. It wasn’t like “don’t talk about this at school”, but more “don’t tell this to 
anyone, ever”. It was the feeling one should “avoid speaking about certain things” (…). As 
you said, my way of taking care of my father, was to not talk about him ever. In fact, I 
believe this is the first time that I have talked about this without being wary, without the 
fear I had then…”  
Interviewer: “I wanted to ask you about that. How did you learn to speak about this 
secret?”  
D: “Therapy, a lot of therapy. I am a therapist, so from time to time I go to 
psychotherapy”.   
The distinction between inside and outside, and the taboo of its transgression had a significant 
impact on the second generation. The most common way of talking about the distinction between 
inside and outside is to say ‘to speak or not to speak’. It was not only a matter of maintaining 
silence, but of passing and knowing the rules of the game. There were certain words, the saying, 
showing or uttering of which was forbidden outside home. These things were not written 
anywhere, but were known by the second generation: not to speak of politics, not to mention 
Allende, not to say the words ‘dictatorship’, ‘coup’ or ‘momios’59.  
Speaking in public was understood as a dangerous practice that only adults could perform; it was 
forbidden for children. In case they forgot about this, they would be reminded of it by force, as in 
the experience of the 6 year-old Juan, the child of a left-wing family who had lived in exile since 
soon after the coup. During the early 80s his family decided to return to Chile, because they felt 
very optimistic about the new social movements and protests against the regime. Juan grew up 
listening stories about Chile; he grew up within the Chilean refugee community so he was familiar 
with the practice of speaking as a ritual of belonging, and was very keen about coming back. But 
his first memories of their return concerned a winter day when he and his grandfather went to do 
some paper work at an embassy. With the innocence of a child he confused the Chilean flag with 
the Cuban flag, and he said out loud: “look, that is Cuba’s flag!”. But his grandfather beat him. 
Today, Juan is still able to transmit the shock of a grandchild who has been punished by his 
grandfather. That was the first and the only time his grandfather beat him. Shocked and scared, he 
learned immediately that there were certain words that he should never pronounce outside 
                                                          
59
 A colloquial and derogatory way to call the right-wing adherents in Chile. 
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home, never again. Juan did not know then who Fidel Castro was or what Communism meant; he 
only knew that Cuba has become a dangerous word from then on.  
For the second generation the speaking/silencing dilemma had a radically different meaning than 
for the first generation. If for the first generation speaking was a resistance practice, for the 
children of the dictatorship speaking and being became dissociated in the public sphere. Instead, 
during the decades of fear, the children of the opposition were prevented from speaking in public 
and were taught to keep their political identity as a family secret. Silence was a commitment for 
children, who became the keepers of words and this way, any utterance become potentially 
dangerous. Consequently, they learned to discern between concealing the self and showing the 
self as a pivotal mechanism for social relationships.  
For many of the children of the opposition, the tension between listening to forbidden stories and 
keeping secrets would create space for complicated productions of self and intimacy, diffuse 
feeling of guilt happening in conjunction with the splitting of the self and the constant 
differentiation between the public and the private; all of these were different process which were 
triggered and accentuated by living within a culture of fear. 
 
 
Changing landscapes and stubborn memories 
David’s family left Chile when he was a teenager, but he decided to come back only a few years 
later, once democracy was re-established. It was the beginning of the transition, and he realized 
how he had to ‘forget’ what he had learn about navigating the ‘outside’ in what seemed to be a 
new landscape: 
“… When I came back, during the first year, I was still afraid of the police, I could not walk 
in a relaxed manner if I saw a policeman in the street. Once, something curious happened. 
I was walking through Plaza Sotomayor and two policemen were walking by my side, and I 
heard that one was saying to the other: “I have to bring bread home tonight; otherwise 
the vieja [wife or mother] will scold me”. I was 19 years old and hearing that dialogue for 
me was striking: “these huevones are normal people, they have families, they have a life”. 
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David’s narrative tells how the landscape of fear was built over a simplification of people’s roles, 
through a similar mechanism to the one that Semelin observes in processes of growing fear within 
social life and its Othering effect described at the beginning of the chapter. David provides an 
everyday life example of how Manichean categories operated within Chilean memory field. He 
shows how he had to humanize the evil figures of two policemen, to de-learn or re-learn how to 
inhabit a landscape where they would not be mortal enemies. However, he also shows how 
various forms of memories and knowledges might coexist: how although he recognized the new 
politics of memory in terms of the national climate, old strategies of survival had left their traces in 
his instinctive feeling after seeing a policeman in the street. In the next section I will explore this 
point in greater depth. David’s encounter points at the way in which political memories which 
have apparently been buried, may return and haunt in the present. 
 
 
Haunting fears 
40 years after the military coup in Chile the military regime has fallen, the transition has finished, a 
Museum of Memory and Human Rights has been inaugurated and the first seminar for judges who 
investigate human right violations in Chile has been held60: only five years ago all of these would 
have been unthinkable. Although the contexts have changed, the dictatorship and the politics of 
fear have left traces of a muted past. If we agree with the initial claim of this thesis – that violence 
has an aftermath, then what is its scope and in what way is violence transmitted, passed on and/or 
reproduced? In which ways does the past haunt the present and how? Old fears remain an 
invisible presence in Chile today, the aftermath of a dramatic rupture within the social fabric. 
Examining the passing on of a culture of fear means looking at the ways in which those fears 
continue to circulate in present society. In Ross Chamber’s words: where and how are events still 
haunting us (Chambers 2002).  
At the beginning of the interview, David’s loyalty to his father was challenged when he had to deal 
with his old fear of speaking about his family in a public space with a stranger. Although his father 
is already dead and the dictatorship ended around twenty years ago, David noticed the shadows 
of old fears when we first met for our interview. Our conversation took place decades after the 
                                                          
60 The seminar took place the 8th August. 2013  
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dictatorship, but immediately David’s ghosts gave a warning. It was as if the events were still 
happening in the process of him coming to terms with his own story. During the interview, he 
reflected: 
“Now that I have started speaking about it, I am suddenly struck with the feeling of “watch 
your words”. I automatically reply to myself: hey, don’t be silly, look where you are”.  
In order to understand David’s fear, I propose examining Gordon’s definition of haunting. This 
concept also argues for giving relevance to this ‘accident’ or anecdote in the interview:  
‘Haunting raises spectres, and it alters the experience of being in time, the way we 
separate the past, the present and the future. These spectres or ghosts appear when the 
trouble they represent and symptomize is no longer being contained or repressed or 
blocked from view. The ghost, as I understand it, is not the invisible or some ineffable 
excess. The whole essence, if you can use that word, of a ghost is that it has a real 
presence and demands its due, your attention’  (Gordon 2008, xvi). 
As Gordon states, the haunting fear demands attention: but for the sociologist this is not only 
anecdotal. It is in this context that Gómez-Barris’ idea of the afterlife shows its adequacy: to see 
how after political violence there is an ‘ongoing wrestling with the past in the present’.  When I 
asked about this feeling, David associated it with one of his recurrent fears as a child of an 
opponent to the dictatorship; it operated as a catastrophic fantasy. According to Freud, these 
fantasies stem from feelings of guilt. In its origins, this feeling is the repression of a desire which is 
projected as a need for punishment (Freud and Gay 1995)). In the case of David, having 
internalized the pragmatic survival instinct developed during the culture of fear, he knew that if 
someone had heard him talking about the political identity of his family, “they could send his 
father to jail”.  
I: “What were the barriers that prevented you from speaking? What would have happened 
if you had spoken?” 
D: “Now that we are talking about this, I realize that this concern did not have to do so 
much with uncovering a secret that could jeopardize my father’s life as with uncovering 
something of mine, something which belongs to me, something I care about a lot, 
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something which despite having provoked suffering for me during my childhood, it… 
(silence)”.  
 
Forty years after the military coup, David is still struggling not only with the violence suffered by 
his father but with the politics of space generated by the culture of fear. In fact, in common with 
other children of Pinochet’s opposition, David has the experience of having dealt with a sanction 
about speaking about his political memory and, like them, the safe option has been to ‘keep 
silent’. The sanction with respect to speaking somehow reproduces the landscapes of fear and 
restores its potentially dangerous areas, splitting public life from private.  
Gordon’s insight opens up a different enquiry in relation to discovering what ‘appeared’ in front of 
David and me. After I suggested talking about the dictatorship and making the past present, he 
unwittingly projected his feeling into the interview setting. The interview consisted of speaking, 
and although David was keen to speak, he also felt the anxiety that talking could provoke, as it 
reminded him, that there might be zones of danger between us.  In the end, moreover, David also 
suggests that his fear might be something that, rather than having happened to him, was part of 
him.  
 
 
Fieldwork Catastrophic Fantasies 
When David was haunted, I recognized also my own fieldwork experience. As part of my research I 
organized several focus groups in a café in Santiago, in a middle class urban context. I invited 
groups of people to elicit memories of the past, but as I did so I started to develop a degree of 
paranoia. I conducted two focus groups in a public space. During these focus groups I was struck 
by the fact that I felt really paranoid during our conversations, I felt disturbed and had the feeling 
that something catastrophic could happen. I kept a record of these sudden fantasies that arrived 
completely out of control, to the extent that I came to understand them as something more than 
simply anecdotes, but as forms of ‘haunting’.  
I went to the café twice. After the first group, I arrived earlier because I thought that the manager 
might have wanted to have a word to me, asking me not to bring these focus groups to their 
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rooms. Every time a waitress came to our table I felt paranoid about the content of our 
conversation. I thought they waited longer than normal when they were serving our table just to 
surreptitiously listen to what we were saying. I noticed that when the conversations were loud, I 
began to sweat and wanted to ask everybody to please speak more quietly. In a sense, I felt 
responsible for making problems, for bringing violence and disruption to the otherwise calm salon. 
In one of these groups I even had the fantasy that the people sitting at the next table were part of 
the ex-CNI, the intelligence organization of the dictatorship. And I really thought they were, and I 
felt anxious. I kept observing how opening the past memory box in a public place, where those 
issues are considered to be in ‘bad taste’, touches on a taboo memory. I felt frightened and the 
subject of judgment and hostility.  
The panic reaction was not personal; it was the haunting of what constituted our experience as 
children of the opposition and hence as the keepers of familial memories. Suddenly the old 
psycho-geography of fear was revived. David and I were afraid of the harm that speaking could 
bring. The memory of everyday life was stubborn with respect to changes in the politics of 
memory and the current situation of openness. In my case, I did not feel only that words were 
dangerous, but that I was doing something reproachable. When I reflected later on what kind of 
harm I could do by speaking, I associated this with an irresoluble conflict, which is part of the 
mnemonic drama in Chile. There are divided memories of the past and no real agreement has 
been ever reached. The harm referred to brings up the fracture within society in relation to the 
past, which makes the present uninhabitable. But it also has to do with the regime’s discourse of 
the left-wing responsibility for the social polarization, and to my regret, it was the regime’s official 
memory which was speaking through this feeling. 
David’s story draws attention to how, to this day, old fears are an invisible presence in Chile; the 
aftermath of a rupture within the social fabric. Their invisible presence had been considered as an 
absence, displaced as something non-existent or dismissed as an issue that ‘belongs to the past’. 
But these fragmented scenes create space for something which would otherwise remain invisible. 
In the methods chapter I highlighted instead those perspectives which are sensitive to the subtle 
manifestations of ‘ghostly matters’ (Gordon 2008). In the context of the interview, haunting points 
not only to fear as a circulating affect but at the mechanism and the conditions that turn fear into 
a way of navigating social life.  
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Chapter Conclusions 
In this chapter I have explored, through an analysis of David’s interview, how political memory is 
shaped by local political, cultural and social contexts. The memory of the opposition to the regime 
was shaped by and within the culture of fear, a context which is crucial to grasping the meaning of 
‘stubbornness’ (or persistence) and of the quality of familial political memories in the opposition 
culture and their afterlife. Thus, throughout the chapter I have shown how the culture of fear and 
the political memory of the opposition were entangled. Political memories  were performative: at 
the same time as they mobilized narratives, stories, affects, knowledges and images united as 
‘familial memories’ by  family members, they performed and created a relationship with imaginary 
Others who were enemies and of whom should be – at least– distrusted. Here we see how what 
was initially a political community (the adherents of the UP and Allende’s government) is 
transformed into a community of memory, a form of remembering together certain pasts and how 
this is reinforced through the transmission of political memories to the second generation.  
The culture of fear and its logic of suspicion created landscapes of dissociation between the inside 
and the outside, which structured part of the experience of the second generation. This created, 
for example, a constant state of vigilance in David as well as his anxiety about exposure. We have 
also seen how political memory and its reverse side of secrecy acted as a form of initiation into 
family reciprocity and relatedness. David’s responsibility towards familial political memory was 
mediated by his relationship to a family member: his father. There is another important side to his 
story and to those of all my interviewees: within the family not all the members have the same 
status which allows them to reveal and speak about political memories. In fact, at the beginning of 
the interview he preferred to speak of his mother as it was ‘easier’ but it was evident that the 
story he wanted to tell was his father’s. He barely spoke about his mother during the interview. In 
David’s story we see that family memory is narrated by his father, it is his experience which 
acquires such status.  
I have also explored how political memories act as rites of passage within the family, initiating the 
second generation of the opposition and giving them a new status within the family. Transmitted 
as part of family life, such ‘poisoned knowledge’ was invested in the same way as goods and 
possessions that family lineages may inherit and transmit (I will further develop this aspect in 
Chapter 6). However, I have also shown how mechanisms such as forgetting, forms of secrets, 
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camouflage or dissociation are paradoxically inherent to these political memories. The 
ambivalence in these political opposition memories will also be found in other chapters: just as 
they are memories to remember they are also memories to camouflage and to hide. I will further 
develop this in Chapter 5.   
The dynamic between political violence and its normalization is at the core of forms of 
remembering the past in the aftermath. It is interesting to note that remembering is also a 
response to violence. In a sense it has a functional side, which allowed the political opposition to 
reinforce its identity. But by the end of the chapter I also have shown that memory is not just 
adaptive or functional for the second generation, but responds to other forms of relationship with 
the past –an example of what the task of mourning that follows political violence might be.  
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Chapter 5:Political stigmas and family legacies  
 
 
To be a member of a family is to share in a community stretched across generations. (…) We 
understand these family memories as at once given to us, existing independently of us, and 
revisable. They are experienced as independent in that they are, so to speak, our inheritance, 
something in which we are born, or ‘thrown’, and over which we have no further say. That our 
parents did such and such, something we are proud or ashamed of, belongs to us insofar as it is 
given in the identity of the family. Yet we also know that it can be received in narrative form, 
revisable, not infinitely so, but in the value we attach to its elements, to what we elect or 
emphasize or to leave in the shadows, choices that are themselves instructed by the habits of the 
heart already acquired in the bosom of the family. The familial framework of memory makes our 
own memory as family possible and at the same time leaves a space for us to mold and reshape 
the narrative of which we are inescapably a part.  
(Booth 2006, 22) 
 
Introduction 
In Chapter 4 I explored how the culture of fear shaped family political memory among opposition 
communities. These memories were shaped in sociocultural landscapes which triggered forms of 
inhabiting the culture of fear, distinguishing between inside or outside as well as between friends 
or enemies and of knowing when to keep secrets or making revelations in everyday life. In this 
chapter I will show some of the costs and legacies of inheriting these family political memories and 
the dilemmas of inhabiting them.  
The chapter is framed around the politics of stigmatization of the left-wing militant or political 
activist during the dictatorship and its effects on the second generation. The aim is to explore the 
way that second generations have appropriated their family histories and political memories, 
asking for example: how have these stigmatized political memories been embodied in the 
aftermath of violence and what happens when these histories carry with them a polluted name 
which it is necessary to inhabit? The chapter problematizes Ervin Goffman’s theory of stigma by 
introducing a destabilizing insight: that the stigma is something to pass from at the same time it is 
something to inhabit. 
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In the first part of the chapter I describe briefly how ‘intergenerationality’ has been framed within 
post-coup Chile, from the 90s onwards in particular. I argue that although some academic and 
clinical work has been done around the transmission of trauma, particularly amongst victims of 
torture, it is within the cultural sphere that the concept has been most insightfully explored, for 
instance in the second generation film ‘boom’ over the last few years. As well as looking at the 
films of the second generation, I will also consider a first generation film, Patricio Guzmán’s 
Nostalgia de la Luz (Nostalgia for the Light, 2011), in which he interviews the daughter of 
desaparecidos who feels she has a ‘production flaw’. I highlight the embodied political memory 
that Guzman’s interviewee frames when she speaks of her family inheritance and suggest that 
rather than dealing with a stigma, Guzman’s interviewee is dealing with a stain: an internalized 
and naturalized mark. I will come back to this metaphor in my analysis of the interviews presented 
later in the chapter. 
Then I describe how the politics of fear of the other has resulted in a stigmatization of the left-
wing activist, whose ‘marks’ were transmitted within family and whose legacies were inhabited by 
the second generation. I describe how the military regimes used a language of salvation, 
circulating within public opinion the image of the ‘Marxist cancer’ which they have to eradicate. I 
show how they created an imaginary of pollution which demarcated clean from dirty zones. 
Through one of my interviews, I explore the metaphor of being marked and also suggest a 
connection between the practice of stigmatizing social others during the regime and the Christian 
concept of having a stain. Both cultural discourses meet and resound in experiences of being 
marked, potentially dangerous and subjects of correction. Making this connection sheds light on 
the way institutional discourses (i.e.: religion and politics) become entangled and woven together 
in everyday life.  
In the subsequent section, I introduce Marcela, who has moved on from family experiences of 
state violence consisting of social ostracism and social exclusion. I describe the context in which 
Marcela grew up. Being the child of a marked family, she inherited a form of pollution which was 
neither physical nor psychical, neither political nor moral, but both. Arguing against Goffman's 
interactionist conception of ‘passing’ as a defence mechanism against stigmatization, I suggest 
that the relationship to the family name is not something to avoid, clean or conceal, but to inhabit, 
embody and appropriate. I also draw on the experiences of other interviewees to illustrate the 
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points I am making in the chapter. I rethink passing, not as a strategy ‘of not being who they are’ 
or ‘being someone else’, but as a form of staying safe within the culture of fear. I also contend that 
‘passing’ overlooks that which does not want to pass in family political memories within 
opposition. The latter, I argue, points instead at the dilemmas of dealing with family legacies, 
involving affects, feelings of belonging and forms of relatedness between generations  
 
 
The Intergenerational Effects of the Dictatorship 
Although the question about the legacies of the dictatorships has been a matter of concern in the 
Southern Cone (Constable and Valenzuela 1993; Corradi and Garretón Merino 1992; 
Feitlowitz 1999; Lessa and Druliolle 2011), the intergenerational transmission of the memory 
of state violence in Chile has not been sufficient explored in Chile. Research has dealt with the 
intergenerational transmission of trauma from a clinical perspective, specifically with respect to 
victims of torture, and has been dominated by a psychological and psychosocial approach taken by 
the Latin American Institute of Human Rights and Mental Health (Instituto Latinoamericano de 
Derechos Humanos y Salud Mental, ILAS) and the Program of Reparation for Integral Care in 
Health and Human Rights (Programa de Reparación en Atención Integral en Salud y Derechos 
Humanos, PRAIS) from 1988 onwards61. After the restoration of democracy and following the 
Rettig report, one reparation measure was the PRAIS program, which offered support, medical 
attention and psychotherapy for victims and relatives. More recently, scholars have begun to give 
a new twist to the focus on intergenerational traumatization, legacies and transmission not only in 
Chile but also in Argentina and Uruguay (Jara 2012; Serpente 2011; Kaiser 2005) by focusing on the 
new generations and reshaping not only the concepts of ‘victims’ and ‘memory’ but also of legacy 
and trauma. This opens up new perspectives about the legacies of the military regimes within 
broader spheres. But it has been within the cultural industry that the sharpest questions and most 
compelling reflections have been articulated  (Lazzara 2009b; Nouzeilles 2005). In recent years a 
generation of filmmakers has started to narrate their biographical experiences and has explored 
                                                          
61 ILAS was created in 1988 by a group of psychologists and therapists who have worked with victims of 
repression since 1978. PRAIS started in 1991 as one of the commitments of the state to the victims of 
human right violations. It offers full health attention, with a special emphasis on mental health.  
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the complexities of having grown up in post-coup Chile as ‘second generations’. In doing so, they 
have configured a new approach to the legacies of the dictatorship and redefined the scope of 
violence beyond reductionist portraits of victimhood. Perhaps not surprisingly, they all explore the 
meaning of being the children of activist parents and inheriting family political memories.  
Patricio Guzman’s Nostalgia de la Luz is an exception to this rule, but nevertheless explores 
compellingly some of the dilemmas faced by the second generations. Being first generation, he 
has been recognized for documenting the Chilean political scenario before the military coup. This 
has been important because, rather than focusing on the devastating effects of the military 
regime, he has brought back to collective memory the years of the UP. As Lazzara has suggested, 
Chileans have largely dealt with the Pinochet years but have omitted public debate on the 
meaning of Allende’s UP (Lazzara 2006). In his last documentary, however, Guzman’s motto 
illuminates what I aim to discuss in this chapter: he sheds light on how affects triggered by political 
violence have been transmitted to the next generation and have been embodied by them, being 
mediated by family political memories. In the film, Guzmán interviews the daughter of 
desaparecidos who says that after having been taken prisoner, her grandparents were threatened 
by their captors and forced to choose between her parents and her, and inform on where they 
were hidden. In the scene from the film, they are sitting next to her, but they do not talk; they just 
look at the camera. Without a word, Guzmán takes the viewer into the hell which all this 
biographical narration might have meant for them: the grief of being informants against their own 
family, the sorrow of having lost their children, the desperation of having to choose between their 
granddaughter and their own daughter and the feeling of guilt they have to cope with – all the 
greys of violence that are not easily represented in the commemoration of the past. This shows 
how the regime put people in impossible situations. Then, the granddaughter makes a confession: 
she always felt she had a ‘production flaw’ and was afraid that people may notice it. She grew up 
feeling that something has been inherently wrong with her from ‘the moment of production’ (“una 
falla de producción”). What does it mean to feel that one has a production flaw? What is this 
saying?  
Guzman’s interview resonates with one of my fieldwork findings. Inheriting polluted identities (the 
family name, their political identity or both) was related to the experience of being born within 
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opposition families.62 In this chapter I suggest that the first generation’s ‘leftist’ stigma is 
naturalized as a ‘stain’ in the second generation; from being something external to the body, it 
becomes something within the body, embodied as a sense of self and although people may have 
various forms of appropriating it, it haunts them. Thus, different forms of symbolic violence in 
relation to political identities (such as stigmatization or the political persecution of a family 
member) - despite being socially-rooted – are felt as something personal. In order to shed light on 
this my focus on this chapter is on what it means to grow up feeling one’s self and one’s family 
marked and in what ways second generation individuals would appropriate their parents’ stigma 
as a personal fault in the aftermath of violence.  
 
 
The Imaginary of the Other 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the junta took great care to give form to their enemy. 
During one of their first public speeches, they presented their main objective:  to save the country 
from ‘the Marxist cancer’63. The latter was a metaphor of the social; it imagines society as a body 
which could be the object of surgical interventions with the aim of restoration.64 In other words, it 
refers to a process of social deviation which could be corrected and for that, the country would 
need the guidance and protection of the militaries. Like Franco’s Spain, the regime promoted ‘a 
juxtaposition of political attitudes and mental pathologies’ (Ericsson and Simonsen 2005). Thus, by 
coining the ‘Marxist cancer’ label, they transformed the political identity of diverse left-wing 
people into one category – Marxists – which they invested with a negative moral connotation. 
According to Lira and Castillo: ‘The extreme polarization existing in the country made it possible 
                                                          
62
 This was offset in cases where the second generation studied in schools which were in opposition to the 
regime. There were a few of these kinds of schools, which were private attempts to reunite and protect 
political communities. Among the most well known are Francisco Miranda and Latinoamericano. 
63
 In their first TV and radio message after the coup, Gustavo Leigh, an air force general and one of the first 
members of the junta, said: “After three years of enduring the Marxist cancer, the junta has accepted its sad 
and painful mission. Chileans are ready to struggle against Marxism and to extirpate it to the very end”. 
64
 Mary Douglas’groundbreaking Purity and Danger may provide insight into the junta’s discourse. She 
suggests that the ideas of hygiene and pollution structures classifications in social life, rather than the idea 
of fear - as anthropologists had previously maintained She writes: ‘For I believe that ideas about separating, 
purifying, demarcating and punishing transgressions have as their main function to impose system on an 
inherently untidy experience. It is only exaggerating the difference between with and without, about and 
below, male and female, with and against, that a semblance of order is created’ (Douglas 2002, 5).  
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that the left became considered as the carriers of a malignant or negative identity, promoting the 
idea that their existence represented a threat for the whole society’ (Lira and Castillo 1991, 234). 
The authors highlight how a malignant identity was projected onto the political opposition to the 
regime, and how the dichotomization between good and evil was part of the social polarization 
that affected Chilean society. For Stern, these messages ‘encouraged a disposition to see human 
rights violations either as necessary actions against savage zealots, or as manipulative lies invented 
by enemies’ (Stern 2006a, 39). 
Naming the ‘Marxist cancer’ was a perlocutionary act. Marxists, subversives and terrorists became 
synonyms in the new lexicon. From then on, all those individuals who could be associated with 
Marxism would be considered enemies or traitors of the country. In Chile and in Argentina as well, 
the expression “No eran santas palomas”65 (they were not holy doves) was used to legitimate the 
violence inflicted on left-wing activists; it is a religious lexicon used in everyday language which 
shows the intersection between the junta’s morality and the Catholic symbolic universe.66 This 
expression was used colloquially to justify human rights violations through a resource to causality 
(Jara 2012). This way, state violence was considered as the inevitable product of malignant 
activists who deserved moral and physical punishment, or at least, correction. Left-wing 
politicians, revolutionaries, sinners and criminals were all the same: they were the Other 
threatening the imaginary peace of everyday life, and in the name of that, they should be 
punished, purified or excluded from the community. 
 
 
                                                          
65
 In 2008 I conducted a focus group among upper class youngsters and I was struck by the fact that this 
expression was completely valid among them, having a cynical and pragmatic moral about the use of 
violence.    
66
 Despite the junta´s appropriation of a discourse of salvation, the Catholic Church played a role of moral 
opposition to the Military Regime under the leadership of cardinal Silva Henríquez. However, as Cruz shows 
in her study of the Chilean Church, a progressive and a conservative church co-existed within the institution. 
Despite this, the junta succeed in creating a new code of political morality this time dissociated from the 
official institution, showing how religion can serve the means of any political purpose.  
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The language of salvation 
In Chile, an important part of the military campaign to ‘open hearts and minds’67 took place at the 
intersection of language, affects and morality. A semi-religious language was part of the junta’s 
performance of power: references to salvation, healing and sacrifices gave them a numinous aura 
in a country very sensitive to religious lexis.68 In their public interventions, the military junta 
explained that their efforts were oriented towards the ‘salvation’ of the country, and then, its re-
foundation (Garretón 1992). Calming messages were given to people to encourage them not to be 
afraid “if they have nothing to regret” (Stern 2006a). In the regime’s discourse, those who were 
persecuted ‘deserved’ to be punished, mobilizing social fear against them. Those who were ‘good 
people’ did not need to be afraid. They knew how to use an important aspect of Chilean culture: 
the influence which Catholic Church and its view of the world have on people’s life. They created a 
scenario where they controlled meanings and mobilized people’s fantasies, fears and hopes 
around the ideas of being ‘good’69, being a good man and a good citizen. 
All these references make it necessary to pay attention to the place of purity and dirtiness within 
the Christian schema. Within the Christian theodicy there is a metaphor of a certain dirtiness 
which is intrinsic to every human being until they are baptized. Encrypted in this paradigm is the 
idea of original sin, which is the fault which the human being committed against the natural order. 
It means that people are born at fault, and require a certain redemption which can be obtained 
after committing to institutional rites. For this fault they were expelled from a cherished space and 
all the disgrace (suffering, death, work and shame) which follows this expulsion is experienced as a 
punishment for this very act of rebellion. The original sin is a stain marking every human being, 
and is the spiritual memory of the act of disobedience. Through immersion in pure water during a 
ceremony called baptism, people have the chance to erase their stain and be initiated into a moral 
community. In this way, religion offers a path of goodness which brings redemption from original 
sin and cleans the stain. As Seidler states: ‘(within the Catholic tradition) “Goodness” became 
fundamentally a matter of obedience, of obeying the orders of authorities who knew what was 
expected of you better than you could know yourself. The feeling of being at fault and the need 
                                                          
67
 I take this expression from Steve Stern’s book: Battle for hearts and Minds. Through this expression he 
wants to stress that legitimacy is not only cognitive but also emotional. 
68
 In Chile more than 90% of the population is Catholic.  
69 Being a ‘good sheep’ is a metaphor that comes from the Christian imaginary. 
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for redemption are crucial to the survival of the institution’ (Seidler 2010, 3). For Seidler, the 
binary distinction between purity and dirtiness, goodness and evil, obedience and disobedience is 
functional to the moral language of Catholicism. 
The military junta’s imaginary was structured in a similar way to Catholicism: it created zones of 
pollution, disobedience and deviation. These connections were clearly observed during the 
interview I did with Victoria, the daughter of an important youth leader during the UP who went 
into exile after the coup. My encounter with her was special, because her father’s name has 
featured frequently within many of the stories and anecdotes from my parents’ youth which I had 
heard and was part of my family’s political memory. Her father was my parents’ hero. Although 
her father left the country, Victoria stayed in Chile with her mother, and she only met him when 
she was 13 years old and travelled to Argentina where he was living underground. During the first 
half of the interview, I wanted to talk about being the child of a UP leader, but Victoria wanted to 
talk about her affiliation to a Christian Church, which she said had a hierarchical organization and a 
very strict code of behaviour. Rather than speaking about the dictatorship, she preferred to speak 
about the Church and her feeling of “being vaguely wrong for something” (siento una cosa 
culposa), feeling ‘dirty’ and the need to ‘feel clean’. I considered that this might exceeded the 
scope of my research. However, when she then spoke about the dictatorship, we had the 
following exchange: 
Victoria: “I grew up with fear under the dictatorship and I think it affected me a lot”. 
Interviewer: “What were you afraid of?” 
V: “…There is a repression within me, something which makes me feel guilty. I don’t want 
to feel this… What I am afraid of? For instance, when I was a child, they were constantly 
talking about politics at home, or about human rights, about what was going on with 
Pinochet and all that stuff. They warned me not to talk about that at school, they said ‘you 
can’t talk about this, don’t talk to anybody in the street even if they offer you candy’…My 
mother was really afraid, that was a time of repression, I was the child of someone 
important… “ 
Victoria’s story helps us understand that, surprisingly, for some children, the culture of fear took a 
paradoxical route: it can be tracked and connected to vague feelings of shame and guilt which lack 
a clear object. Like Victoria, in this chapter I suggest a connection between the institutional politics 
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of stigmatization and imprecise feelings which are felt as ‘personal’ but which may be seen as the 
different forms of haunting of a past which demands to be recognized: the way in which the 
regime has an afterlife. In the next section I introduce another of my interviewees, Marcela, and 
exploring her interview, I will suggest that her narrative disclosed the feeling of having a stain but 
makes of the idea of political stigma something more complex, which brings together not only the 
problem of inheritance but also that of choice.  
 
 
Introducing my encounter with Marcela: fieldwork notes  
Today in her early forties and a mother of two, Marcela is a smart, self-controlled woman who 
speaks fluently. She works in the local government offices of a semi-rural village in the Southern 
Chile. I contacted her after asking at the local government public relations office for information 
about possible interviewees who could talk about the legacies of the dictatorship. They gave me a 
list of families who were well-known during the dictatorship as opposition families: “The Pérez, 
The Rojas, etc.”, and one of these families was Marcela’s. This made me think of the agency of 
names, and how they mobilize emotions and knowledge in particular contexts, and how although 
the contexts have changed, names continue carrying ‘something’, a reminiscence of the past.70 
Rural communities have traditionally been the most conservative regions of Chile; at the same 
time the peasants live in the most precarious conditions. Even today there is still a relationship of 
subservience and domination between the peasant and the landowner. Walking around a small 
village, one can distinguish the landowners from the peasants easily by looking at very simple 
details: the way they walk, move or talk in the local market. Peasants would bring their vegetables 
to the market to sell them. Their often dark skins, worn-out clothing, stooped backs and wrinkled 
faces contrasted with the confidence of the well-dressed tall bodies, light skins, and loud voices of 
the patrones (landowners). The first morning I arrived in the town I sat down in a small park in the 
centre. The next day I met one of my interviewees and he said that the moment ‘he saw me sitting 
in the park’ he knew I did not belong there and he wondered what I was doing in a place like that.  
Decades ago the landowner provided shelter and food for the peasant in exchange for his labour. 
Being dismissed by the landowner would be a tragedy, since he was the owner of everything a 
                                                          
70 I express my gratitude to my colleague Ana Gross for drawing my attention to this. 
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peasant could have. That sense of dispossession is still alive in the everyday life of these 
communities. During the Land Reform process (1962-1973) the landowner played an important 
role in opposition against land redistribution, provoking a strong sense of resentment among 
different social actors which increased as the redistribution process deepened, particularly 
between 1970 and 1973 under the UP government. After the coup, many of the peasants who had 
taken part in land expropriations were killed. That many of those peasants were denounced by 
landowners for motives of revenge (Stern 2006) is part of the oral memory of these communities 
and something which has also been accepted by historians. However, those who survived did not 
escape the effects of the coup: the few members of the UP living in those small communities were 
dismissed from their employment, which for a peasant meant complete isolation and 
condemnation to starvation. All these experiences left deep marks among local people.  
During my fieldwork I observed that peasants and villagers were reluctant to talk about the past 
but they all remembered silently what they seemed to have forgotten. When I asked for 
suggestions of people that I could interview, I always got an immediate response: “Los Perez”, “Los 
Gonzalez”, “Los Benitez”. Families affected during and after the coup were still marked as having a 
stain. The memory of what happened to them coexists with the apparent normality of everyday 
life. Their names carry their stigmas and bring them to the present with the silent disposition 
inherited from the past. During my conversations with peasants I often heard the phrase, “do not 
bite the hand that feeds you”, expressed as their moral maxim. I saw how that expression was a 
statement of fear, affirming a status quo and loyalty to an economic relationship, making it 
somehow personal and emotional through a servant morality. This expression has a subtext: the 
memory that the peasant revolution was disloyal to the patrón. And that is the meaning which has 
prevailed in this community, a meaning which was reinforced through the threat of dispossession 
or death. It is not that there is no memory here, but that there is no room for a militant memory 
or a deviant memory. It is the memory frame of the patrón which has triumphed in its hegemony. 
In fact, in one of these villages, Ranco River, nine peasants were thrown in to the local river after 
the coup. However, in contrast to what has happened in other local communities in Chile, their 
past has not been memorialized; the peasant opposition experience has had no voice. Though it is 
well known that nine peasants in the area were thrown into the local river, there has been no 
monument at all and the memory of this event operates as rumour. Paralyzing fear still threatens 
these communities. 
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Marcela's life story  
Marcela and I met in an empty classroom in a public school near her office, which was the ideal 
setting for bringing up her childhood memories. This was the school where her parents had 
worked until the day of the coup. Since being born she has always lived in the same village, where 
everybody knows each other. Throughout the interview I could sense how mechanisms of defence 
were activated and deactivated, depending on what position I stood in, depending on what kind of 
Other I was to her. When I interviewed her, I felt how she oscillated between being very formal 
and even distant and being more open and vulnerable. It was difficult for me to establish a deeper 
connection with her at that point. I see this dynamic between openness and closeness as a 
metaphor of her childhood experience: how public exposure and personal information may 
become a threat to her family life. I tried different ways to make contact with her and cross that 
characteristic barrier I learned to know well from my second generation interviewees. When I 
exposed my own experiences to Marcela and I showed her empathy and actively demonstrated 
that I could understand what she was telling me, Marcela let me enter more deeply into her story.  
During the 60s and early 70s Marcela’s father was a prestigious local politician and member of the 
local government. He was a member of the Socialist Party and was one of the local leaders during 
the UP. However, after the coup, his luck dramatically changed: like thousands of people, he lost 
his job, was blacklisted and marginalized from social life. Having previously been a respected 
authority he came to be avoided and excluded from the village’s social life. Because he was a 
member of a left-wing party, he was stigmatized to the extent he could never re-integrate into his 
community and no one would even rent his family a home where they could live. In absolute 
despair and after being prevented from finding a job for years in a patriarchal culture where the 
value of a man is given by his role as provider, he retreated into alcoholism, from which he never 
recovered. Marcela’s family suffered years of social isolation and economic deprivation, and 
become known for everybody as “Los Pérez”, one of the leftist families of the village, ‘stain’ which 
would follow them up to today. 
Her mother also suffered from persecution. She was a teacher and, after the coup, although she 
was not an activist in any political party, she was also persecuted within the village for being ‘the 
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wife of’. For almost 15 years she only managed to find jobs in remote locations, far from their 
family home. In Marcela’s words: 
I: Couldn’t she get a job? (after the coup) 
M: No she couldn’t work within the village, she wasn’t allowed to stay here, she had to 
work abroad for being Pérez’ wife. It was a way of persecuting our family. As my dad was 
dismissed from his job, and he didn’t get a job neither here nor anywhere else ...he was a 
political prisoner for being socialist militant….so what they did was to persecute my 
mother too, and so she couldn’t find a job here either.  
Marcela shows that although they were alive and apparently ‘safe’, her family suffered 
persecution and punishment as living examples of being polluted within small communities.  
 
 
Troubled remembering: inheriting political stigmas 
Marcela was, among interviewees of the second generation, who had some fragmented images of 
11 September 1973. Marcela’s memories were not narratives or images of her parent’s past; it 
was more complicated. When I met her, curious about the apparently immediacy of her 
memories, I wanted to explore what kind of memories they were and how important they had 
been for her over the years. I wondered for instance whether having first hand memories would 
have an influence on the form in which family legacies have been appropriated.  
I: “Have you got any memories of the coup day?” 
M: “Well, I remember that that day we woke up and we left our home, we went to the 
home of an aunt who lived nearby and who was very close to my mum. I don’t remember 
if my father was there, but it is likely that he wasn’t… I don’t know where he could have 
been. I also remember the military planes, the feeling that something bad was happening, 
the feeling of danger, that something was going on…”   
(Someone knocks on the door; I stop recording)  
I: “Well, so you heard the military planes… Did you understand what was going on?” 
M: “No, I didn’t have a clue”. 
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In fact, the memories of the second generations – and this is specially highlighted in the 
postmemory frame - differ from those of the first generation because they are not based on 
witnessing, but they nevertheless mobilize affects and a sense of ‘responsibility’ which bind them 
in an ‘intergenerational liaison’ as Jürgen Habermas puts it (Habermas and Nicholsen 1989). 
However, as we see in Marcela’s interview quotation, some members of the Chilean second 
generation have fragmented but vivid memories of 11 September itself, but this does not make 
them part of the first generation. However, although Marcela says she “did not understand 
anything” the day of the coup, she did not forget any details either. In fact, she remembers. Her 
modes of ‘knowing and unknowing’ might work as a gesture of her relationship to the past: being 
present and being absent, at the same time. She did not have information, but she “felt something 
was going on”; she knew without knowing. However, as with most of my interviewees, the core of 
Marcela’s memories do not refer to the events of 11 September, but to the forms of life that 
followed it, and the multiple fragmentations and transformations that she and her family 
underwent. It was what followed the coup, rather than the coup itself, that would become her 
political memory. This raises questions about to what extent the postmemory frame is in fact 
accurate for the Chilean second generation, or that of the Southern Cone military regimes. Their 
memories, or their narratives of remembrance start perhaps on the day of the coup (probably 
before) but, on the basis of my interviews, they are not focused on an event, but on its aftermath. 
Indeed, Marcela’s narrative becomes legible through the lens of political stigmas. She spoke about 
her family’s fate after the coup, when they became polluted to the extent that they could not even 
find a place to live in. Her words are linked to the question I put forward in the introduction: what 
does it mean to grow up in a family which is marked? 
M: ”Imagine, no one would even rent us a house”.  
I: “People were afraid of you…” 
C: “They were afraid. We had to stay at my aunt’s home; we stayed there for a while, but 
then it was taken away from her… She lost her house too!” 
I: “Just because you were staying there?” 
C: “Yes, because she had received us there. Friends… they crossed the street so to avoid 
saying hello to us. No one looked at us, no one visited us, the only house we found to live 
in was an abandoned house by the river (…). We knew that we could not enter anywhere 
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because we were going to be rejected for being member of the Pérez family… We were 
the Communist Pérezes, though we were not Communists, but that was our stigma”. 
Marcela’s words demonstrate the work of pollution within a community, and how each member 
of the family group became infected by the stigma of being left-wing. In this context, Goffman’s 
groundbreaking work on stigma might illuminate some zones of such an experience, but I will 
argue that it also conceals the form in which Marcela relates to her family legacy (Goffman 1986). 
Goffman made a shift from the emphasis on deviance which was predominant in sociological 
theory to the focus on the gaze (Hacking, 2004). Noting how the view of Others shapes and 
influence people’s behaviour, the sociologist shows how attributes do not discredit as things in 
themselves, but only within certain settings and interactions. According to Goffman the term 
stigma refers to individuals who have been disqualified from full social acceptance. His work 
brilliantly sheds light on how a stain has a materiality without having it, and shows how this can be 
apprehended during interactions. Marcela, in fact, speaks of this form of materiality in the 
interview, showing how it marked her childhood. Such materiality with no physicality is referred by 
Marcela as “information which is in the air” in the following quote: 
I: “When you were at school, did you ever feel the stigma of being a Pérez family 
member?” 
M: “Yes. I was an outstanding student at school; however I could never be involved in any 
activity, for instance in the student centre, I was never considered for such roles”. 
I: “Did you ask why you were not considered?” 
M: “No, because I already knew it, so why ask?” 
I: “Where was that commandment written, that if you were a Pérez family member you 
were excluded?” 
M: “It was in the air, people were like “A Pérez would never enter here””. 
This invisibility (illustrated by Marcela’s recurrent metaphor when she speaks of social convention: 
“things are in the air”) which is full of materiality at the same time, is what struck Goffman, as well 
as stigma’s ability to create norms and habits without being ‘written’, without any form of 
objectivity. The above quotation emphasizes the interactional dimension of stigma. It tells us 
about the landscapes created by stigmas, and how they give way to areas which are forbidden and 
cannot be entered by those people who are polluted. 
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Feeling safe in the Culture of Fear 
The fact of having a non-tellable story was a common experience among my interviewees: they 
learned to manage information in front of others and to never speak too much. They did so in 
order to feel safe in the culture of fear. Camilo (whose story I will further develop in Chapter 7), for 
example, grew up in the German Democratic Republic (GDR), and once his family returned to Chile 
he learned to omit which part of Germany he had lived in. He knew the GDR would create 
undesirable connections for him, which may had made visible an ‘unworthy’ and polluted identity 
concealed in him.  
Another of my interviewees, Ruth, witnessed violence and loss from when she was a child. One of 
seven siblings, she belongs to a family which lived in a deprived rural area in the south of Chile. 
She was just 6 years old when her father, a humble peasant, was detained in their home in an 
operation known as Chihuío71. Although he was only 17 years old, her elder brother disappeared 
too. She never saw either of them again, so over the years she and her family had to accept they 
were part of the desaparecidos. For a long time, Ruth concealed her grief from others. During her 
school years, she created a fictitious life story to explain her father’s absence to her schoolmates 
and teachers as a way of protecting herself and her family from stigma. She never showed her 
grief to others, and she learned to estrange herself from her pain by creating a parallel life which 
could allow her to dwell in safe stories. Ruth tells how during her childhood her strategy was to lie 
about her father’s story; rather than saying that he and her brother were desaparecidos, she told 
her classmates they had died in traffic accidents. But Ruth says that she also felt less than others, 
she felt marked: 
I: “Did you have a feeling of persecution?” 
                                                          
71 In this infamous operation, 17 people were killed by the armed forces. Most of them were forest workers 
and young peasants who were members of the Union or had been supporters of the UP. Ruth’s brother’s 
story is known because he was taken when he followed the truck which picked up his father, and after he 
asked the soldiers what they were going to do with his father, they put him on the truck too. It has been 
remembered as one of the emblematic massacres of the regime, because the massacre and the burial took 
place on the property of one of the best-known local landlords. Source: oral interview and  CEME, Centro de 
Estudios Miguel Enríquez: 
 http://www.archivochile.com/Derechos_humanos/chihuio/ddhh_chihuio0001.pdf 
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R: “I did feel persecuted, but it provoked some feelings in me… I was very green, I think it 
lowered my self-esteem”.  
I: “Did you feel marked?” 
R: “Yes, particularly when I started going to school. I went to schools where there were 
girls who were policemen’s daughters… I had to live in silence”. 
I: “How did you experience that, what were your emotions about this, how did you feel?” 
R: “I felt inferior. Besides, those girls were like city girls and we were country girls, we were 
peasants and apart from that we brought with us a history and a secret”. 
I: “Did you feel that you carried with you a secret when you were at school?” 
R: “Right, during many years I felt I carried within me a secret, and it was about the way 
my father had died”. 
I: “Did you ever tell this to someone else?” 
R: “No. During so many years I avoided talking about my father”. 
I: “Because of fear?” 
R: “Yes, because of fear, so nobody would know the story”.  
Having a secret family story made Ruth feel somehow inferior to her classmates. This mark 
transferred to her a sense of indignity, a sense of shame: ‘Shame as opposed to guilt is a bad 
feeling that does not attach to what one does, but to what one is’ (Eng 2010, Goffman 1986). But 
Ruth learned to talk in the public space about her desaparecidos 17 years later, when democracy 
was re-established in Chile and the first prosecutions for human rights violations began. 
Encouraged by the new atmosphere brought about by re-democratization, Ruth – seeking justice – 
presented the disappearance of her father and brother in court. It was only then, when it was 
socially allowed, that Ruth and her family faced the past together and started to feel able to speak 
about it. As Das states ‘Pain, in this rendering, is not that inexpressible something that destroys 
communication or marks an exit from one's existence in language. Instead, it makes a claim asking 
for acknowledgment, which may be given or denied’ (Das 2007, 40). Ruth has moved from the 
privacy of her pain to seek its social acknowledgment and here she found the possibility of telling 
her family story to others. 
During the regime Camilo and Ruth concealed their family pasts as if there were a fault in them. 
Like Marcela, it was common for the children of victims of state violence to learn to cover and 
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protect their political identities which many times included painful family stories. These were all 
forms of muting their political identity in landscapes of fear and authoritarianism. They had to 
cope with denial by the media and the government: the second generations usually lived between 
mutually discredited and competing truths – the familial truth and the official truth –.  
As in Marcela’s story: 
I: “Was there a difference between the topics you could speak about at home and those 
you could speak about outside? Was there a difference between home and the outer 
world? Did you have to keep silent outside?”  
M: “Of course… The music which you listened to or the topics you spoke about, or if you 
criticized the political authorities… They were all family topics, they were private, and you 
couldn’t speak of them outside”.   
I: “How did you know that?” 
M: “I just knew it, it was tacit”.  
As we have seen, the opposition’s second generation lived between two forms of belonging and 
had to negotiate between them: the official culture which ruled public spaces and the counter-
official knowledge72 of the opposition and victims which ruled their private landscapes. Their 
family history was a family secret and they knew that it was a matter which could not be 
acknowledged in public conversations. 
 
 
The Ambivalence of Passing 
For Goffman, interaction was the clue to getting into the social. But he also observed that what 
was left out of interactions was important too. He used the phrase ‘the double perspective of 
stigma’ to refer to the fact that there were stigmas which could be concealed and others which 
could not73. Here, the sociologist introduces the concept of ‘passing’, which refers to the anxiety of 
                                                          
72 I consider a counter official knowledge the very act of feeling oneself a victim of state terror or having 
witnessed it. 
73 Goffman distinguished between the discredited (the term reserved for evident attributes) and the 
discreditable (those attributes which could be concealed). When the attribute is concealable, the danger and 
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revealing and concealing during social encounters, which is particularly relevant to the cases I am 
studying in this thesis. 
The concept of passing is born out of social processes which make identity a space of value and 
where, as a result, some identities are rendered ‘unworthy’. However, if the emphasis on passing 
may explain some aspects when we attempt to grasp experiences of stigmatization, oppression or 
‘otherization’, it also obscures others. What I am interested in tracing here is that which does not 
pass and, more importantly, does not want to pass, as this may be the basis for collective or 
individual forms of liaison and resistance. At the same time, this is related to the work of Assman, 
Hoffman and Hirsch on memory transmission, and the more general sense of responsibility which 
comes from the relationship between the first and second generations. I argue against Goffman 
that the relationship to the polluted or rejected attribute is not as instrumental as the strategy of 
passing might suggest, and I rather want to point out what remains as problematic and not 
disposable in inhabiting each one’s name. It is in my reading of the meaning of passing in 
Marcela’s childhood that I will depart from presentists accounts of stigmas and also explore how a 
stigma comes to be felt as a stain – a durable mark. 
Like David, Camilo and Ruth, Marcela also grew up with the legacy of a dubious kinship, or put 
better, a kinship which became suspicious from the point of view of the state in the political 
context in which they lived. Through her memories, she is caught between two belongings which 
reclaim her loyalty: her belonging to the community (represented by the state) and the chance of 
having a future with others on the one hand and her belonging to her family and the chance to 
have a memory and a legacy on the other. In my view, Goffman’s theory deals with the first of 
them – the anxiety to ensure her belonging to the community and the dominant frame of values – 
and provides tools to give an account of it. His image is of someone who wants to become 
someone else in order to belong. However, this perspective may put too much emphasis on the 
weight that the hegemonic community may have on family and individual identities. My approach, 
by contrast, is to turn from an emphasis on assimilation to alternative strategies such as mimicry 
or simulation74. The latter are different forms of response to forms of domination or value/cultural 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
anxiety related to the stigma being discovered is called the discreditable, hinting a potential future of 
stigmatization which should be avoided. 
74 For a further reflection on the ambivalence of mimicry, see: “Key concepts in post-colonial studies” 
(Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin 1998)  
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confrontation. In fact, during my conversation with Marcela about her childhood memories and 
the decline of her family after being stigmatized during the dictatorship, Marcela described an 
event which I argue clearly illustrates the experience of children navigating between an opposition 
culture and an authoritarian regime. Ambivalence and a multilayered experience (complexity, in 
Gordon’s terms) can be used as lens with which to look at Marcela’s memoir. 
During the regime, ceremonies, rites and discourses were a crucial part of the performance of 
power and glory. One day, Marcela heard that Pinochet was going to visit her village during an 
official tour. The whole village was excited about this visit and they prepared different activities to 
welcome the President. Although she had grown up listening to stories about the dramatic effects 
which the coup had on her family and they practiced the rituals of the opposition (giving particular 
meaning to speaking, for instance), she clapped and welcomed him as all her classmates did. 
Marcela remembered how she smiled in front of the authority and cheered the military dictator: 
M: “Once, when I was 9 years old, Pinochet came to the village. All the students had to go 
to the park, wearing our uniforms and waving white handkerchiefs to welcome him; we all 
had to go. But we were happy, because we were skipping classes”.    
I: “Were you happy too?”  
M: “Of course, we were skipping classes, so my classmates and I were happy (she laughs). 
We were waving our handkerchiefs, listening to Pinochet, clapping our hands”. 
I: “What did you feel for Pinochet?”  
M: “Well, I felt anger…” 
I: “Did you feel anger that day?”  
M: “No, I was happy that day, we were all happy, it was just the way children are. We were 
skipping classes, so it was fine”.   
I: “Did you associate Pinochet with your family story?”  
M: “Of course, I knew who Pinochet was, I knew everything. I was happy because I was 
sharing with others, but I also felt repudiation without being aware, in the way children 
do, letting me go with the situation”. 
The scene portrayed by Marcela has returned to me often. I wonder, was she really happy that 
day? When a child who has been victim of the dictatorship smiles in front of the dictator; is her 
smile pure joy? Was her smile an effort ‘to pass’? Though she was a child, she was left in a difficult 
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position where loyalty to her family and loyalty to the community clashed; she was in-between 
two belongings. Such dilemmas were not articulated by the children of the dictatorship’s political 
opposition, but it does not reduce the dissonance they were exposed to. It is true that the 
experience of being a child is much broader than being a child of the opposition and/or a child of 
victims, but it is also true that for them, their childhood experience contained these two 
experiences. They belong to opposition families at the same time they belong to their school and 
other social groups.  
By welcoming the dictator and applauding him, I suggest that Marcela was making and unmaking 
herself at the same time; she was publicly performing at the same time she was withdrawing into 
her private world. I argue that her enthusiasm at being part of a school activity was fractured by 
the latent knowledge of her father’s depression and their family’s social isolation after the coup 
although she was not necessarily aware of it. Marcela passed in front of her classmates, but the 
fact that she succeeded in doing it, does not express the complexity of the event. To me it is in the 
ambivalence of passing where we can grasp the task of appropriating forbidden counter-
hegemonic identities and the role of affects in this. It is in examples like this that Gordon’s concept 
of complexity demonstrates its strength as does Das’ critique of the ‘short circuit’ that the trauma 
paradigm may represent for understanding local patterns of memory of political violence (Das 
2007). In fact, reading Marcela’s gesture, as complex we can grasp a new meaning of her clapping 
in front of the dictator. She is neither the traitor nor the victim; she reclaims her right to be 
someone else.  
 
 
Dwelling in family histories 
Marcela’s legacy was lived with an inherent duality: at the same time that it may have complicated 
her presentation of the self during the decades of fear (and its aftermath), it also gave her an 
opposition identity and a sense of being part of a community of memory and a lineage. Therefore, 
if the focus is on passing and interaction, then how can we give an account of that which does not 
want to pass? That is what binds Marcela, Victoria and many other of the second generation to 
their family legacies and their political memory.  
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Inhabiting one’s family name in the aftermath of violence brings us to the intersection between 
stigma and the transmission of political memory within the family. Thus, the intergenerational 
transmission of stigma blurs the accent on interaction and opens a space for the inhabiting of each 
one’s histories and the dilemmas which stem from it. Goffman’s focus on the externality of stigma 
provides a brilliant description of the calculations involved in the task of passing, but he does not 
account for the ambivalence of passing, the ambivalence which comes from the affective liaison of 
the second generation with the first generation. It is not only about others and managing 
information, but also about appropriating (or rejecting) each one’s family legacy. 
In various interviews I heard the story of how, when children were told to sing the national 
anthem at school (which was one of the symbols of military glory during the regime), pretended 
they were singing, but were in fact just moving their lips. I remember having done the same. 
People, and particularly children who live in the culture of fear75, ‘learned’ to live in public spaces. 
This is for me the main territory covered by the presentist concept of passing. However, according 
to Hirsch and others, there is another side to it.  
For Hirsch, a sense of affiliation follows the act of witnessing traumatic experiences. For Butler, as 
we saw in Chapter 2, this sense of affiliation comes from a shared feeling of vulnerability after 
episodes of political violence, an experience which, for her, provides the basis of the feeling of 
being part of a community (Butler 2003). Lira’s work, introduced in Chapter 1, also deals with this 
aspect: how political memory is invested with personal and affective meaning every time it is 
remembered and commemorated (Lira 2011). In Chapter 6 I will further explore the relationship 
between family and political memory. All these writers observe something which also emerges 
from my fieldwork: the relationship - which may range from forms of duty, rejection, pride or 
shame - of second generations to their family political memories. 
 
 
                                                          
75 Except those families who created a ghetto culture and surrounded themselves with people who shared 
the same resistance culture. Examples of this were Francisco Miranda and Latinoamericano schools.  
However, this was an exception, and the majority of the people continued their lives in places where being 
part of the opposition was considered dangerous. 
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Stains and Marks 
When I asked Marcela her about her father and how she coped with her family fate after the 
dictatorship, she spoke of the effects of belonging to a polluted family, but another process also 
takes shape: the personalization of the mark. Like Marcela and Victoria, Ruth - the child and sister 
of desaparecidos - speaks in her interview about a mark which dirtied her. The language of 
dirtiness and cleanness structures her experience as it structured the national imaginary of the 
junta and the transnational imaginary of Catholicism. In the context of these multiple experiences 
around the left-wing stigma intergenerationality, this shows not only how political violence 
transforms the world in which we live, but how we inhabit it.  While stigma is a mark which is 
triggered during social interaction, the metaphor of the stain points at a different operation: the 
stigma naturalization as a ‘personal’ attribute. Let’s go back to Marcela’s words: 
D: “What did your father do after the coup?” 
C: “Well, my dad… His story is not too different from other people, but it is sad. What 
happened? He was imprisoned for three months, he was exonerated, he was released 
from prison, and as we didn’t have a home any more, we here homeless. Then we found a 
new place (…) What did he do then? He became a Mormom (she laughs), he became a 
Mormon… I was already 8 years old. After he was a Mormom, he tried to be a shoe maker, 
and then, he started drinking, he is an alcoholic. Afterwards, he tried to work and in 1995 
he found a job within a school in Valdivia, where a group of people who had been exiles in 
Switzerland sent resources to open a school and by this way offer job vacancies to those 
people who had been exonerated”. 
D: “Could he re-integrate?” 
C: “He re-integrated, but… He worked there a couple of years but then and due to his 
alcoholism he was dismissed. (…) For someone who had worked all his life, who was 
recognized within his party –in fact here there are still people who know who he is and 
who recognize what he did, and there is a certain respect for him…– so for him, to become 
no one, it was too heavy to cope with…”. 
I: “(….) How did you live your father’s transformation (into an alcoholic)?”  
M: “I have always coped with a sense of marginality, knowing that you are on the margins. 
Why? Because you know you can’t enter anywhere because you don’t belong to the 
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political system. You don’t assume it, you don’t accept it, and you will also have to cope 
with the feeling of persecution and with the stigma. We know this although no one told 
this to us, it is just the perception which floats in the air, because in fact, no one ever told 
us anything (…)”.     
(…) 
Speaking from the standpoint of the subtle difference between being the target of stigma and 
inheriting a concealable stigma, Guzmán’s Nostalgia de la Luz and Marcela’s interview trigger a 
question: how did Guzmán’s interviewee and Marcela grow up, how could they have kept a secret 
which was impossible to talk about? Guzmán’s film shifts the focus from the mark to the process 
of inhabiting a mark and, in doing so, situates the stigma in the space of legacies. As we see, 
Marcela speaks of feeling on the margins and not belonging. This ‘being on the margins’ is not 
simply a matter of the other’s gaze, but a form of making her family political story part of ‘her’.  
Marcela’s quote shows how a stigma might be contagious, resulting in the isolation of her family, 
but it also becomes something else, a personal stain, the product of the naturalization of violence.  
I: “Later on, have you searched for the effects which this feeling of being discriminated, of 
being stigmatized, had on you?” 
M: “No, but I think now that is why I am so anti-establishment”. 
I: “Was it a defence mechanism?” 
M: “Yes. It was like making the double effort within a society which doesn’t value you, so, 
this way, maybe unconsciously, I tried to stand out, as a student, at work, you try to do it 
the best you can and the double you can, so this way you validate yourself”. 
 (….) 
I: “Let’s go back to your childhood, when you went to school. Were you ever in conflict 
with authority figures?”  
M: “In fact, I have conflicts with accepting authorities today. I find it difficult to respect the 
authorities; I have conflicts with accepting them”.   
I: “What happens to you in the face of authority?”   
M: “Actually it is not about the authority figure… I feel really angry when I see that there is 
too much injustice and I react and I need to speak out. I can’t stand unfair authorities”. 
I: “But at the same time, you make efforts to be valued by authorities, as you said…”   
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M: “Yes, but I want to be valued by the society itself rather than by authority. It is like 
winning my right to have a space, to feel that I am someone and that I have the right to be 
here and live my life and do whatever I want, independently of what I think or what I do”. 
(…) 
In the quote above there is a clue to the problem of the transmission of stigma, because we see 
the appearance of a personal ethics in the account of the past. This appears both as a survival 
response to the politics of stigmatization, and also as a form of agency before it. It shows how the 
phenomenon of stigmatization becomes more complex in the aftermath of violence when other 
elements come to play a role. When Marcela says that the stigma became a source of a personal 
ethics (“that’s why I am so anti-establishment”), she is posing it in different terms, which requires 
a language with which to speak of the process of the inhabitation of one’s own name. 
 
 
Appropriating legacies 
The metaphor of the stain provides an entry to the passing on of painful memories of political 
violence (physical or symbolic) and its embodiment. But this also means a shift from classic 
accounts of stigma, such as Goffman’s. I described how his work emphasizes the gaze and the 
interactional dimension of stigma76; however, his theory does not help understanding of the 
passing on of political stigmas to the next generation and by what means such stigmas became not 
only transmittable but inhabitable by them. His theory does not give an account of the 
relationship between stigma and different generations, and the process of appropriating an 
inherited mark and the tensions that may stem from this.  For inhabiting might also mean the 
desire to escape from legacies which are too oppressive, something which became clear to me 
after an odd encounter in the village where I interviewed Marcela.   
                                                          
76
 Goffman says that though stigmatized people may feel normal or like everybody else, through interaction 
with others they realize they are not the same, that they are not allowed to be like everybody else, and this 
makes them feel shame and experience different forms of self-degradation. Thus, stigma is conceived as 
fundamentally given in the interaction between people. The notion of stigma, then, ‘…will be used to refer 
to an attribute that is deeply discrediting, but it should be seen that a language of relationships, not 
attributes is really needed’ (Goffman 1986, 13).  
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I tried to interview the son of a former political prisoner, who was also part of the marked families. 
We had a common acquaintance who helped me to arrange an appointment with him. I wanted to 
interview him because I knew that he had become a right-wing militant and an activist against the 
Concertación alliance and especially, the Socialist Party – in which his father had been a militant –. 
He was the counter-example to the idea of legacies, a topic which I will further explore in chapter 
7 (Family Countermemories). But on the day of the interview, he did not open the door to me. 
After I had been waiting outside for half an hour, someone appeared at a window: it was his young 
wife, telling me that he was at work and he would come back very late that night. Frustrated, I 
went to the shop near their home and the shop owner who had seen me waiting, intervened, 
assuring me that my interviewee was at home. The next day I called him just to be sure that he did 
not want to talk and to close the encounter, but now he said he wanted to speak briefly and he 
invited me to come to visit him. When we met, he had only one ‘message’: that he hates conflicts, 
he hates political divisions and he believes in forgetting and reconciliation. Then he left. It was an 
odd encounter, and his difficulties in talking and his defence of reconciliation were striking. It was 
as if in his case his father’s past was indeed too heavy a weight for him, and he had made a huge 
effort to distance himself from his father’s political identity.  
In Marcela’s case, the appropriation of the legacy of stigma and the memory of political violence 
was not a desire to escape or deny, but she too distances herself from what she considers part of 
her legacy. This is important because it reframes transmission and the problem of legacies, not as 
a linear progression or a form of predictable transference, but as a process involving choice and 
reflection on the part of the second generation. I asked Marcela whether she ever became part of 
a political party:  
D: “Have you ever been part of a political party?” 
C: “Never, because I had a negative view of political parties… I have an issue with groups; I 
don’t like groups where I have to obey. The left-wing political parties were too pessimistic: 
‘we are so bad, Pinochet has taken us down so much, we are so sad, everything is so 
terrible, and all this is a tragedy’. But there was also another side to life and we had to 
make the most of it, we had to continue our lives. I didn’t like that Manichean vision, black 
or white that the left-wing groups had (…). That is to load a too heavy bag, where there is 
nothing I can do to solve it, nothing, for what does it give me to say that they are the evil 
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and we are the good and the victims? If you make  yourself a victim, you don’t believe in 
rights”. 
The quotation above shows Marcela’s distancing of herself, as a second generation, from the 
portrait of being a victim of the regime. Although in her story she acknowledges suffering, she also 
seeks for a retrospective in which the narratives of victimhood do not prevail.  
 
 
Chapter Conclusions 
The politics of fear triggered a process of stigmatization of the left-wing militant which reaches the 
second generation, mostly because they grew up within the culture of fear. This makes political 
memories not only a matter of remembering, or a form of ‘postmemory’, but of embodying the 
post-coup landscape. For instance, I suggest a relationship between the feeling of being marked –
which came up not only in Guzman’s film but also in my interviewees – with the otherization of 
the left-wing activist promoted by the regime. However, we have seen that the second 
generations were not only passive victims of the politics of fear and stigma, but that they also 
inhabited and appropriated these legacies in complex ways. In fact, I have not only explored the 
legacies of the politics of fear on everyday life, but also the forms of inhabitation and 
appropriation of these legacies by the second generation.  
Examining the feeling of being marked and marginal in Marcela’s life story  or in Ruth’s case the 
feeling that something ‘is wrong’ with them, the chapter reflects critically on what it means to be 
politically stigmatized and problematizes the focus on normative culture that stigma theory (in 
Goffman’s version) carries with it. I suggest that although the second generation learnt to navigate 
the culture of fear and ‘passed’, they also practiced ambivalent forms of relating both to the 
official culture and to their family legacies.   
In my critique of passing, I suggest that this does not mean that their family political identities 
were only something to conceal in front of others so as to stay safe. I have emphasized instead the 
affective liaison that they have with their family memories and the ‘pride’ they may find in 
inhabiting such a legacy. However, I have also suggested that there is not only one way of 
appropriating these memories, and although Marcela has honoured her family political memory, 
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she also distances herself from it, by questioning, for example, left-wing institutions and their 
narratives of suffering.  
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Chapter 6: Family Memory and the Intergenerational Remembering of 
Political Violence 
 
[The working class struggle is] ‘…nourished by the image of enslaved ancestors  
rather than by the ideal of liberated grandchildren’  
(Walter Benjamin 2011, Thesis 12). 
 
‘… there is an intuition which belongs to keeping such forms of memory that they should 
be preserved and transmitted as a kind of bearing witness, as a debt owned to a 
community. This obligation in certain respects is closely kindred to justice, as we shall see, 
and might be described as a kind of indebtedness: what is owed within the context of an 
enduring community, an obligation incumbent on us as persons sharing a life- in-common’.   
(Booths 2006, xii) 
 
 
Introduction 
In the last chapter I explored some of the dilemmas of being a descendant of victims of state 
violence during the authoritarian regime. Although the chapter focused on the legacies of 
stigmatization within opposition families, I suggested that their political family legacy (or stain) 
was not something that the second generation would want to completely conceal, simulate or 
‘pass off’. Instead, examining Marcela’s interview I suggested that there was also a sense of loyalty 
and belonging which would rather bind the second generation to their opposition family identity. 
Now, in this chapter, I aim to explore the affective ties that are transmitted in the language of the 
family, the way intergenerational memories of state violence are invested with an affective value 
and also in what sense families may act as memory ghettos in contemporary Chile. What happens 
when family legacies are political? To what extent can state violence and political violence be 
inherited as family legacies and if so what does this mean? What happens when political memories 
are remembered as family memories?  
First, I describe the encounter I had with Rafael, the son of one of Pinochet’s collaborators, who 
contrasts with my other interviewees’ narratives and life experiences. However, I suggest that his 
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interview sheds light on the role of family in the shaping of ghetto memories and therefore 
situates the chapter around the topic of inheritance but also of memory ghettoization. Rafael’s is a 
very interesting case because it shows how little value the context and general framing of public 
opinion have had for his narrative of the crisis of memory, registered in the language of family and 
social class. His account of the legitimacy of the military coup has remained basically unaltered 
despite changes in the politics of memory, and after previously having been the official point of 
view, it has become a peripheral narrative as a result of political changes. Presenting Rafael’s case, 
I argue that these peripheral memories are sustained within family life, which emerges as a 
memory site which might contest, oppose or defy state and official memories.  
Then, I introduce Gabriel’s life story, the child of exiled parents, which is a family history of 
diaspora. His case raises questions about transmission, the making of political narratives within 
the family sphere, and to what extent his family’s fate after the military coup was influenced by 
family memory. Examining his interview we see how different events (the First World War, the 
Franco dictatorship and the Military Junta) are entangled within his account of the past. I highlight 
how his family memories triggered subtle but dense connections between different times, 
generations and dictatorships. I also show how intergenerational legacies of state violence are 
shaped not only by narratives but also by silences. I refer to how, when living abroad, he 
remembered a place he had never been to, and once he returned he had to learn the codes of 
political opposition. Describing his ‘return’ (which in his case was not exactly an arrival and not 
exactly a return) to the culture of fear, I explore how he had to learn new codes because of the 
landscapes of fear, which included both forms of friendship and secrets. I explore, for instance, the 
moment of transgression of a code, and show how even in that moment Gabriel was performing a 
form of loyalty to his family legacies. Therefore, I suggest that family memories mobilize a sense of 
duty between generations, which may vary in its forms, and may range from sympathy to political 
agency, but which nevertheless refers to a response to the legacy which has been passed on. To 
close this section, I refer to a form of haunting which Gabriel told me about once we finished our 
conversation, and suggest that a dream in this case would be the ghost which mobilizes histories 
traversed by a transgenerational political fear. Drawing a parallel between Gabriel’s dream and his 
family legacy, we see how the dream can be the messenger of a ghostly fear which has no name, 
which might be triggered anywhere and can make everyday life suddenly terrifying. It is the 
awareness of the potential interruption of normality provoked by an ambivalent representation of 
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the state or of figures of public order (in the Fear chapter I called this awareness ‘poisoned 
knowledge’). I then introduce Eliana and Gustavo. They are the grandchildren of desaparecidos, 
but their ancestors’ encounter with state violence is remembered by them and they have become 
carriers and activists of memory. My aim in this section is to further explore what it means to have 
a duty of memory. Their different family models of transmission show that political violence may 
be told or hidden, may be narrated in early childhood or found later in life as a missing piece of the 
puzzle, but for both of them, learning about their grandparents’ story brought a sense of duty and 
of belonging to a lineage. It is not so much the mode of transmission which is relevant but rather 
the sense of duty the past has. 
 
 
The everyday life transmission of family political memory 
Smart states that family affairs are entangled with public values and the personal construction of 
the self (Smart 2010). For the sociologist, tracking family matters shows how the personal and the 
cultural are linked as well as the political, the historical and the social. Consistent with Smart’s 
concern with the family, Stern’s The Memory Box  shows how a politically motivated position, for 
instance the critique of the Land Reform process which took place in Chile in the 60s and early 70s, 
was entangled with a whole worldview where affective bonds, family traditions and class beliefs 
are overlapped. He also shows how whilst the parameters of family life were built over cultural 
and social conventions, still, they were lived within the dense web of loyalties and affective forms 
of relatedness of family life.  
Stern provides a new understanding of the impasse, by showing how what constituted ‘the 
traumatic’ for Pinochet’s supporters was the feeling of threat which burst into the midst of their 
family life. In other words, he portrayed the social clash in terms of subjective characters. From his 
perspective the memory impasse draws attention to the mechanisms through which legitimacy is 
built and also points to its affective foundations. At the same time, through Stern’s life-stories(as I 
explained in the introduction), the reader finds that family intimacy had an important role in the 
shaping of attitudes and affects on both sides of the memory impasse (supporters and opposition 
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to the regime). This insight reveals how non-institutionalized relationships have an influence on 
the crisis of memory, which is usually misrecognized in the analysis of the politics of memory.  
In 2010 I interviewed Rafael, the son of one of Pinochet’s Ministers, who was introduced to me by 
a mutual friend. Although he was not part of my sample, his case also serves to reinforce my 
argument in this chapter and throughout the thesis. His family history has paved the way for his 
memory-framing of the past. The child of parents from landowning families, he in turn married a 
few years ago into another landowner family too (“I am married to Anita, who has the same family 
history as mine… they belong to Los Larraín who are landowners too”77) and that is the 
fundamental worldview which structures his – and his family’s – relationship with the past. My 
interviewee speaks (and reproduces) the narrative of the high class Chilean elite and portrays a 
dynamic where certain surnames are the introduction to family prestige and give them a symbolic 
capital which will ensure their belonging to a class with a perceived common past and a desired 
common future.  
The positionality of Rafael’s memories is that of a privileged family. It was within the family that he 
learnt of ‘the nature of things’ and that he created a horizon of values which would sustain and 
protect that ‘nature’. He was socialized in what seems a different sense of context to that of the 
majority of my interviewees. This pushes our understanding of how the sense of the local is built in 
the light of divided memories, shows in what sense they can be ghettos and also challenges the 
chronologies which scholars usually assign – or struggle to find – in the Chilean crisis of memory. 
He told me, for instance, that he never heard of the word ‘dictatorship’ during his childhood: 
“Actually, we never used the word ‘dictatorship’ within my family or at school”. 
This statement constitutes a striking contrast when we listen not only to dozens of my 
interviewees but also to the hundreds and thousands testimonies of Chileans who suffered state 
violence during that period. What this means is that, for some people, the very basis of their 
childhood experience was precisely the fact that the first thing they learned about the world was 
that ‘there is a dictatorship’ and at the same time there are a significant number of people of the 
same cohort who never heard such a concept. What does this say about their future together and 
                                                          
77 Larraín is one of the surnames of Chilean aristocracy.  
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the way they contribute to thinking about their (un)common past? I will come back to this point 
later. 
Once Rafael’s father left the government, he was sent as an ambassador to Switzerland. Rafael 
remembers the changes of environment which give a different status to his family. After growing 
up among supporters of Pinochet in a school attended by right wing elite – including Pinochet’s 
grandson – he then went to a public school in Switzerland. Abroad, they were in a position of 
isolation in terms of international relationships. Rafael says for instance that they would not be 
invited to international meetings, and that just a few other ambassadors were interested in having 
friendly relationships with them. But none of this made Rafael questions the meaning of the 
dictatorship or his father’s role in it, even today when he is an adult and two official reports on 
human rights have been published. In fact, he also tells how after the regime the democratic 
insight could not trespass the boundaries of his family. 
When I asked Rafael about this (lack of) ‘knowledge’ about the dictatorship and state violence, his 
response confirmed what my other interviewees have said: that rather than a systematic 
knowledge or a coherent memory frame, family political memory is a fragmented mixture of 
values which most of the times are picked up in the everyday of family life. However, the fact that 
they are fragmented does not mean that they are not stubborn. In Rafael’s words:  
I: “Between your parents…. who do you think transmitted the political identity within your 
family?” 
R: “Both” 
I: “In what ways?” 
R: “Yes, well, my dad was part of the regime, so I associated him positively with it. My 
mum… in her family they are all women and they are all intense, so…. no one ever 
explained to me…. I just heard what they spoke”. 
I: “And to whom did you listen speaking about politics more often?” 
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R: “Well, to my mum; we met every Sunday during the 80s, at my grandmother’s home on 
my mother’s side. We were a crowd there and we [the children] were allowed to sit down 
in the dining room78. We all eat together in my family… so I always heard…”    
Rafael’s interview suggests that the family operates as a carrier of political memory and this would 
explain that my interviewee finds anecdotic something which I found really striking:his mother’s 
refusal to take into account the official reports on human rights (see introduction for a context for 
these reports). He does not make an issue of this:  
R: “My mum, instead, until today she can assure you that that [human rights violations and 
the Riggs case] didn’t happen, although she knows it happened, but nothing would make 
her change her political views”.  
I: “How do you explain that?” 
R: “I think that her position is not rational; it is completely emotional, absolutely. I mean, 
for her Allende was the devil and Pinochet saved them”.    
The interview quotation shows that Rafael was socialized within a ghettoised memory framework 
which was first picked up within everyday life of family. Lazzara, in fact, commenting on the crisis 
of memory in Chile, suggests that there is no better definition of what is memory than: that which 
is talked about through family onces (tea time) (Lazzara 2010). Rafael’s comment about his 
mother’s refusal to accept the ‘truth’ of the regime’s crimes is intriguing: “although she knows it 
happened”. What does it mean to know and not know at the same time? This quote introduces a 
gap in the periodization of the memory field, for Rafael’s tradition of memory seems to travel 
parallel to the memories of my other interviewees, and obey different logics to those of the state 
politics of memory. Rafael’s narrative seems impervious to ‘progress’ in terms of historical truth or 
judicial truth. He resorted to the idea of a ‘fair battle’ which is argued on the right-wing memory 
tradition: “they died in their law”, he says.  
The above mentioned is in tune – although it also contrasts – with Lira’s work on the ghettos of 
memory in the left-wing tradition, presented on chapter 1, when she comments that these 
                                                          
78 He emphasizes this because just a few decades ago, the fact that children would eat separately from the 
adults was common. During the 80s this convention started to change and made possible a different kind of 
convivencia within the family.  
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memories remain meaningful only to their community. I mentioned in the Introduction how 
Crenzel picks this up and reflects on the major problem of the ownership of the memory of state 
violence. In light of these questions, the problem of the ownership of memories shows us much of 
(an impossible) political future, as opposing traditions of memories seem to obey to different 
genealogies, articulate contending pasts and project divided futures.  
 
 
Official memories, family memories 
As I explained in Chapter 1 and also refreshed in the introduction to this chapter, in Lira’s account 
the memory of the victims of state violence and its ritualistic transmission have been at the heart 
of left-wing political communities, leading to the ghettoization of memories in the long term. It 
was an illustrative example of how communities of memories engage in ‘memory work’ and may 
become hegemonic in their interpretation of the past. For her, the essential feature of social 
memory would be that the memory of left-wing institutions (mainly the Communist Party, which 
has a long tradition in Chile79) is a memory of tragedy and commemoration of violence, which has 
solidified a transgenerational militant memory. However, as I have shown, Rafael’s interview 
challenges Lira’s equation between social memory (as opposed to state or official memory) and 
the memory of the oppressed, and also the implicit opposition between official memory and social 
memory. Social memory has not been always oppressed and the memory of state violence might 
also become official memory, as it has done the last decade in Chile and as the example of 
President Lagos asking forgiveness shows (see Chapter 1).  
During the dictatorship, Rafael’s family narrative was in tune with the official memory of the 
moment, but once the transition period started, it lost that status. Once democracy was re-
established and more and more people felt free to speak and researchers started documenting the 
past, the supporters’ version become more ‘peripheral’80, but not necessarily weaker, especially 
                                                          
79 Founded in 1912 as the Socialist Worker Party (Partido Obrero Socialista) and then refounded in 1922 as 
the International Communist Party (Partido Comunista Internacional).  
80 Boeseen et. al. link the idea of peripheral memories to ‘small’ memories, which are neither the focus of 
national or transnational memory. However, it is interesting to note that for the Chilean case this relation 
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during the first years of the transition when the fear of a new coup haunted Chilean society. As 
Rafael says, there are people – like his mother – who today still identify with such accounts of the 
past (people who say “that didn’t happened” – eso no pasó –, or who thinks that it was a fair war), 
even when the fallacy of such statements has been demonstrated81. This shows that official 
memory is a mutable category and does not refer to a content of memory, but rather to its 
institutional position. But it also shows how once oppressed memory may become official and vice 
versa. However, Rafael’s interview and also the analysis of family memory during the dictatorship 
open a fissure on the hegemony of official memories by showing how peripheral accounts of the 
past still circulate and are transmitted within the intimacy of family circles who mobilize a 
particular idea of justice and truth – not the state version at least –82. 
What emerges from listening to Rafael is that although recognition of the reality of state violence 
becomes an official memory, this does not mean that it can permeate antagonistic communities of 
memory. Instead, Rafael’s interview shows how less institutionalized forms of transmission, such 
as the memory of everyday life remembered in the subtle language of the family (i.e. in the classic 
Chilean family lunches on Sundays) can equally have the ghetto effect in the long term. Here we 
start elucidating the core of my argument: the stubbornness of family memories, their active role 
in shaping public opinion in a mode which has not been sufficiently taken into account.  
In the section that follows I focus on the family transmission of state violence but now from the 
opposition perspective. As I argued in the literature review, research has tended to deal with how 
memories change and how the past is shaped by the politics of the present. However, there is also 
another side to the presentism of memory, an aspect which makes us think about the mechanisms 
through which some memories become less permeable and remain affectively meaningful and 
charged across generations. My focus is on how they are invested of affects within family life. 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
does not work because although supporters’ memories were not official, they were not ‘small’, even if they 
were peripheral (Boesen et al. 2012). 
81 Part of the effort of human rights lawyers and organizations has been to demonstrate that supposed 
‘confrontations’ were in fact military raids against left/wing activists.  
82 Peripheral accounts or countermemories have usually been assigned of a ‘redemptive’ value, or related to 
the struggle of working class. However, Rafael’s interview and also my next chapter contradict this common 
understanding by suggesting no teleological form to any mechanism of memory.  
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Introducing Gabriel: His family story 
Gabriel is a creative writer, historian and journalist in his mid-thirties. We already knew each other 
before the interview, but it was the first time we talk about ‘this’. I asked him to choose the time 
and place for the encounter, and he chose a local pub in Santiago, one evening. During the 
interview we talked about being a child during Pinochet’s dictatorship – an experience we shared 
– and I asked him about the legacies of fear within his life. He did not know exactly what the 
legacies were; he had never thought about this before. During the meeting I was trying to find out 
how ‘understandable’ the effects of the dictatorship were and to what extent the legacy of the 
regime was something that I could talk about with my interviewees. It coincided with the period in 
which I was shifting my approach from a focus on traumatic memories to a focus on everyday life 
during the dictatorship.  
When I asked Gabriel about his family life story, he went back to the early 20th century. I asked 
him the same question I asked other interviewees: “tell me about your family history/political 
trajectory”, with no more specific demarcations. I realized that Gabriel’s conception of family was 
notably broader than that of other interviewees and to explain his family present he retraced his 
family history for three generations, to the time they had left Franco’s Spain at the end of the Civil 
War. He articulates a narrative that crosses frontiers and mixes nationalities.  But, significantly, he 
focused on his mother’s family history, as it that is the legacy he has chosen to inhabit. In his 
words: 
“My mother grew up within a Republican family, and she is the one who inherited the 
tragic legacy of this political default”. 
His grandparents left Spain during Franco’s dictatorship (1938-1975) as his grandfather had fought 
with the Republican forces during the Spanish civil war; after Franco’s triumph, he escaped with 
his family by sea. They were war refugees who arrived in the port of Valparaíso in the late 1930s, 
together with two thousand other exiles aboard the Winnipeg, an emblematic ship in Chile’s 
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cultural history83. Once settled in Chile, he run a family business, brought up his children and 
became himself a prestigious doctor.  
During Allende’s government, the doctor – Gabriel’s grandfather – was involved in social issues 
due to his interest on public health and he even became one of Allende’s candidates for the post 
of Health Deputy. After the 1973 coup, which took place almost 30 years after the Winnipeg’s 
arrival, Gabriel’s grandfather was imprisoned and tortured. He did not belong to any political 
party, so the reasons for his detention remained unclear to the family and the idea of 
‘treason’(that someone wanted to damage him) has resonated as the most likely explanation. In 
fact, during that period, political accusations were often inspired by personal revenge and often 
had tragic consequences. The regime promoted such situations as rewards were offered to people 
who denounced ‘the traitors’. 
While in prison, Gabriel’s grandfather managed to see his daughter and advise her to leave the 
country immediately, though she was not directly threatened by the regime. He was very 
emphatic about this and pushed her into exile. As a result, she went into exile for several years to 
a neighbouring country in South America, while all the other members of the family went to 
diasporas in different parts of the world. It was a difficult time, as the family members were living 
in different countries and could not reunite for years, rewriting for the second time their family 
traumatic past after Franco’s regime.  
Gabriel was born in exile and grew up as a child of a mixed family in Ecuador. With his mother, 
they lived in the exile and he grew up listening stories about Chile. After the social mobilizations 
started in the early 80s, he came back to Chile with his mother, being part of the first waves of 
‘retornados’ to the country. Gabriel was just 6 years old when they returned. His family got split 
again: in Ecuador he left his father and his family line. 
 
 
                                                          
83 The ship was sent by Pablo Neruda, a Chilean poet, and is part of the cultural and political memory of the 
left in Chile.  
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Remembering a non-past from abroad 
During their time in exile, Gabriel’s family met other exiled Chileans. He came to know of Chile 
through adults’ stories about the country and the nostalgia they felt for the homeland was the first 
lens through which he learn of his maternal history. He was socialized in the practice of 
remembering from abroad a past he never lived, but which was part of him:  
G: “There was a community of Chileans in Ecuador and they met in a Chilean restaurant. 
Every 18 September84 there were empanadas, posters of Violeta Parra85… They 
remembered Chile, they spoke about politics… it was a very free environment, because 
they were exiled. Although I was a child, I remember the political atmosphere. It was very 
clear to me. I knew exactly who Pinochet was; I was very clear with respect to Latin 
American politics… ‘Very clear’ in brackets, of course. But I understood, for instance, what 
was happening in Nicaragua. It was a much politicized atmosphere (…)”. 
I: “What did you know about Chile?”  
A: “I knew it was my mum’s homeland. I looked at the maps and I found it so weird, such a 
long country. There was an affective bond to it. I grew up with icons, Violeta Parra, 
handcrafts of Rari86, the arpilleras87, so many things (….)”. 
I: “Did you know about Pinochet then?” 
G: “Yes I knew, I knew there was a terrible dictatorship, which was gloomy, I knew there 
was so much pain. More than knowing, I had a perception of fear and suffering in relation 
to what was happening in Chile. And nostalgia: It was a mixture of fear, pain and nostalgia 
(…). I think that never in my life I heard so much garabatos88 as then. There was a notion 
of what it meant to be Chilean, of Chileans who were there. My mum’s friends had a 
football team and they played against Ecuadorians, Argentinians and Uruguayans… it 
                                                          
84 The National Day, which is celebrated with ramadas, empanadas and wine.  
85
 Chilean folklorist,  composer, poet and visual artist who dedicated her life to documenting Chilean oral 
traditions of music and created the basis for the New Chilean song movement. A left-wing icon, she 
committed suicide in 1967, aged 50.  
86
 Rari is a village in Southern Chile in the Andes foothills where, traditionally, craftswomen make unique 
handcrafts with horse hair (crin). These objects are used for decoration.  
87
 Arpilleras are handmade quilts whose origins are credited to Violeta Parra, who was the first Latin 
American women to exhibit her work consisting of arpilleras and oleos at the Louvre. Later, arpilleras were 
promoted in workshops in Vicaria de la Solidariad and became a symbol of women‘s opposition to the 
dictatorship. Today, for instance, in the Museum of Memory they have become part of its forms of 
merchandising.  
88
 Bad language. 
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coincided with the exile of Argentinians and Uruguayans, so there was a group of people 
coming from the Southern Cone… I’ve got memories of the Chilean restaurant, of people 
speaking until very late at night, I don’t remember what they said, but I was always a sapo 
[interloper] there… I’ve been always a night bird, so I listened…” 
Gabriel tells how during the time he lived in Ecuador they recreated the Chile they missed, through 
exaggerating its features. While empanadas are the typical national food, Violeta Parra was the 
left-wing singer who would condense the identity they wanted to reaffirm and protect. Garabatos 
are a colloquial way of speaking a transgressor language, which would only trespass a boundary 
within Chile. This shows the role of the aesthetic in creating a place like home abroad, which also 
meant maintaining visible that distance. These were all nostalgic resources which mark a 
difference between the past and the present, and therefore reinforced the distance so to make 
the object of loss more clearly visible and memorable. The recreated home was not home, it was 
like home, so it kept the nostalgic practice of reconstruction visible. 
 
 
Intergenerational remembering  
As we see in the last quotation, Gabriel speaks of ‘a perception of fear’, suffering and nostalgia in 
his childhood. But it is the presence of fear which he will constantly allude to throughout the 
interview. Although he did not grow up under a dictatorial regime, the poisoned knowledge was 
still passed on to him. When Gabriel looks back at his family story, he thinks it was the inherited 
family memory – a memory inscribed in their bodies as the memory of fear, almost mechanically 
as habit memory – which made his mother leave the country after having been advised to do so by 
her father and thus reproduce the family drama: exile and not belonging. Within theories of 
memory, the habit memory concept has been used to refer to information which is stored 
unconsciously, a mnemonic function about how things are to be done89, and has also been used to 
                                                          
89 For Paul Ricouer, drawing on Bergson’s work, habit-memory: ‘is the one we employ when we recite the 
lesson without evoking one by one each of the successive readings of the period of learning’. In this case, 
the lesson learned ‘is part of my present, exactly like my habit of walking or of writing, it is lived and acted, 
rather than represented’.  (Ricoeur, Blamey, and Pellauer 2006,25). For Booth: ‘And as well, body, habits of 
the heart, mores and place are intimately intertwined in the presence of the past, and they are not 
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name the kind of background knowledge of social life (Ricoeur, Blamey, and Pellauer 2006; Booths 
2006). When Gabriel tells his story, he implicitly says that there were no ‘real’ reasons for his 
mother to leave the country, but once she did leave she became inheritor of a family story of 
persecution and exile acting out her habit memory of persecution and exile. He also speaks of 
inheriting a political default, which would link the republican loss to the UP loss years later, 
configuring a sort of familial ‘eternal return’. According to Gabriel, the fear of the state had been 
passed on (at least) from his grandfather to his mother and then to him.  Let’s listen to his words: 
I: “Do you feel there is a pattern in your family, a ‘diaspora pattern’, transmitted among 
generations?”  
G: “I don’t believe in karma”.  
I: “It is not about karma perhaps, but a sort of intergenerational transmission…”  
G: “Of fear. Yes, I believe there is a physical fear which has been transmitted. Indeed, on 
my mother’s side there is a huge fear of violence”.  
I: “Do you recognize it within you?” 
G: “Yes, I believe I have an inherited fear related to what can happen to my body. There is 
fear… My grandfather was tortured, and although he has never spoken about it, I believe 
that this experience has been transmitted to us through subtle but consistent interstices”. 
When Gabriel tells his family story, he mixes generations and they often participate in each other’s 
life: his grandfather is often present in his mother’s actions and in his. His family story shows the 
effects that members of the family may have on other members, and how once experiences are 
transmitted they become part of family identities, shared by its members, though in different 
forms. However, Gabriel’s family story roots him in a relationship with a past which is not national 
but diasporic, where two violent and dramatic political episodes of the 20th century are entangled 
in the family biography.  
What is Gabriel doing when he remembers his grandfather’s deeds? He is inscribing himself in a 
genealogy. According to Smart, family memories may sustain kinship relationships while narratives 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
something that we intentionally inscribe on the world but rather are acted out in that world or elicited by its 
memory spaces’(Booths 2006, 36) 
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may lend substance to the family lineage90 (Smart 2010). In her work about family narratives, 
Robyn Fivush identifies what she considers an intergenerational self, which would then explain 
how memories can be diasporic within families and how this can give them a meaning for kinship. 
She argues that  family stories create meaning beyond the individual, to include a sense of self 
through historical time and in relation to family members ((Fivush 2008; Fivush, Bohaneck, and 
Duke 2008). For her, part of who a person is, is defined by the experiences of his or her parents 
and their parents before them: the intergenerational self is a product of family reminiscences 
(Fivush, 2008). Thus, Gabriel’s sense of intergenerational self leads him to include the diasporic 
movements of past generations as part of his personal story, where the personal trespasses 
national imaginaries.  
These intergenerational narratives ‘do things’ in the world: they have an exemplary status, they 
are constituted as the frames within which to read presents and futures, or to brake with them. 
Gabriel says, for instance, that he cannot stand the idea of going abroad, because he is afraid of 
not being able to return to his homeland. He also says that the same ‘intergenerational 
knowledge’ caused his grandfather a moral default too, a dispossession of dignity, immediately 
after the coup: he acted out his fear. Soon after Gabriel’s mother left the country, his grandfather 
was asked to provide refuge for a family friend who was being persecuted by the military junta. 
Though he had himself been tortured, he refused; he could not act on the basis of his moral 
convictions or sense of empathy. He denied help to his friend. Instead, he gave her money, and 
bought her a bus ticket and elegant clothes so she could escape.  
“It is all about memory. What my grandfather did was to remember what women did 
when they escaped from Franco (…). He remembered that, and after witnessing the 
meaning of war, he used one of the European refugee’s resources. However, he couldn’t 
[help his family friend]. I think he felt very bad about the way he behaved, but he just 
wasn’t able”.     
 
                                                          
90 Specifically, she refers to the virtual myth, as a family secret ‘which took the form of a well-rehearsed 
account, such as the one focusing on a distant uncle running away with a circus entertainer or being related 
to royalty. The colorful story does not have to be totally mythical, but it offers a strong narrative about the 
qualities of ancestors whose exploits somehow lend substance to the family lineage’ (Smart 2010, 542). 
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According to Gabriel, his grandfather returned to the memory of his fragile body and intertwined it 
with his past memories (fighting against Franco’s regime). These embodied narratives impeded 
him from acting on the basis of his ethical beliefs, but rather subjected him to fear. Through 
Gabriel’s voice, I could still feel his grandfather’s shame for not being able to act irrespective of his 
fear. The same way the prisoners were devoid of morality when using the hood (see Chapter 1), 
Gabriel and his grandfather have seen themselves constricted by old fears and spectral psycho 
geographies. This, for Gabriel, “is all about memory”.  
 
 
Unspoken narratives 
Gabriel’s grandfather never spoke about torture or about the Civil War, but those experiences are 
at the heart of his family intergenerational memory. This shows how silence also has the power to 
shape a narrative about silence (Fivush 2010). Episodes of physical suffering were not articulated 
as told stories; they were left in silence within the family’s closed memory box. However, they 
remain as an intergenerational knowledge, although several decades have already passed since a 
member of his family had suffered state violence.  
I explained above that Lira’s concept of ghettoization links the dynamics of memory to local 
history, political tensions and community commemoration. However, in Gabriel’s story we see also 
that other forms of passing on and commemoration, which are less institutionalized, trespass local 
boundaries and takes place within family relationships. Let’s focus now on the second part of the 
quotation from the interview: 
G: “Yes, I believe I have an inherited fear related to what can happen to my body. There is 
fear… My grandfather was tortured, and although he has never spoken about it, I believe 
that this experience has been transmitted to us through subtle but consistent interstices”. 
I referred before to intergenerational narratives which may provide a sense of self, but here I open 
a new sense to the means of legacy and how they can be transmitted and appropriated. For how 
could the body learn about fear, how can the body know? Gabriel is speaking of a certain 
knowledge, dealing with “what can happen to my body” which has been transmitted in the silence 
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of the unspoken. In her work about the relatives of desaparecidos in Uruguay (quoted in the 
literature review) Fried described these ‘silent narratives’ as ‘nonverbal expressive practices’. 
According to her findings, they were often used within family life as way of remembering daily the 
un-mourned victims of state violence91: ‘...mainly through their nonverbal expressive behaviour 
and implicit exemplary teachings embodied in ‘pedagogies under terror’, muted emotions and 
affectively charged silences, these caregivers passed on to their children a legacy of pending 
obligations towards the disappeared’ (Fried 2011, 151). In Gabriel’s interview we see that it is not 
only something which happens after disappearance but also after a wider range of experiences of 
fear and state terror.  
From a different context, but also sustaining the idea that silent or incoherent narratives are 
passed on and constitute part of family identities, Smart states:  ‘Of course, in considering family 
secrets and memory there is a problem because secrets are not typically thought of as being 
rehearsed and refreshed. Secrets, it is assumed, are just buried and forgotten (…). But it is equally 
likely in families that secrets can be kept alive by innuendo, palpable silences, evasions and 
rumour’ (Smart 2010, 543). Contesting the common-sense based idea that silence is synonymous 
with disappearance, Smart explores the way that secrets are transmitted within families: she 
argues for the efficacy of silence and the unspoken and how it constitutes one of the family 
legacies. Similarly, although the experience of his ancestor’s physical suffering has not been 
articulated as a detailed family narrative, Gabriel talks about an awareness of the body’s fragility. 
Gabriel ‘knows without knowing’; paradoxically this diffuse knowledge of family experiences is 
quite common within families who have suffered political violence. Details are lost but the 
generalities of the event remain and moreover, are passed on. It is precisely this never-told 
knowledge, a narrative of the family which is absent but which constitutes a precious part of 
family identity, which will be at the heart of the intergenerational self in families of victims of state 
violence. At the centre of this identity there is an operation of knowing the untold, of grasping or 
picking up what is at the zone of rumour but which constitute a ‘transformative’ knowledge. This 
recalls Martin, quoted in the chapter on Fear, when he says that he feels different to his peers 
because he knows “what the state can do to him, that he may become a desaparecido”. 
Throughout David’s story I mentioned how knowing would work as a rite of passage. Similarly, 
within Gabriel’s family, the (silenced) experience of physical suffering became a ‘poisoned 
                                                          
91 In Uruguay an amnesty law has been approved twice (explain)  
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knowledge’ carried between generations, which brought the fear of what may happen to the 
body.  
 
 
Returning to the Culture of Fear 
Fear wasn’t born of his direct experience, but it was a family legacy in his early childhood. Gabriel’s 
story is interesting because, although he lived in exile during his childhood, he tells that still he had 
a vivid perception of fear in those days. In Chapter 4 I situated the poisoned knowledge in relation 
to the landscape of the culture of fear, but Gabriel’s case shows us something else. Not only would 
the poisoned knowledge be shaped according a landscape, but it could be transmitted through an 
imagined reconstruction of the lost home or past family deeds. Probably aware of this contrast, in 
a prior quotation he mentioned that remembering Chile in exile happened in a “free 
environment”. Later, when he remembers their return to the country, he will perceive the signs of 
coming back:  
“Political discussions at home continued to be intense, but they were less festive, less 
fuelled by the warmth of wine and empanadas, but much more oppressed…” 
Gabriel was 6 years old when they returned to Chile and he narrates the encounter between him, 
through his semi-foreigner eyes, and the Chile of Pinochet’s years. As happened to my other 
interviewees, the intersection between fear and the second generation took place at school. In 
Gabriel’s case the situation was peculiar because he was enrolled in a school which had been 
intervened by the military regime. When he speaks about school time, the first thing he says is ‘it 
was too authoritarian’: 
I: “Why did you feel that your school was that authoritarian?”   
G: “Because of the teachers, and we had to sing the national anthem every Monday, and 
wear uniforms… it was shocking!”   
I: “Why did your parents chose that school?”  
A: “There wasn’t enough money. It was the affordable school. But it had some positive 
things too”.  
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His passage to the opposition culture also meant that he became part of the memory communities 
of reciprocity and belonging. He explains for instance how at the same time he disliked his school 
system, it was there that he met his first friends. He describes the process of recognition with one 
of his classmates who also belongs to an opposition family, providing an ethnographic insight into 
these encounters, in which a sense of friendship was shaped: 
G: “Alberto was my first friend, and thanks to him I started to settle down here, thanks to 
the support of this friend who was also part of an opposition family (…). His parents had 
been communists, he never mentioned this, of course, but all his family had been exiled in 
Switzerland or the GDR”.  
I: “How did you realize that you were members of the same ‘tribe’?”  
G: “Speaking. You look each other, you speak and realize that you both have forbidden 
topics. The first thing you learn is that you have forbidden topics, you can’t say anything. 
Not of Cuba, not of nothing, not if you dislike Pinochet, nothing, my mum, my family, 
everybody warned me. And for Alberto it was the same. So you find those weird secrets, 
you start visiting your friend’s home, and you start hearing the music they listened to –
which is key –, or the home decoration, the posters  (…) So I started identifying the icons 
and the music,  so then I started asking questions (…)”. 
Gabriel shows the extent in which the second generations were also actors within the culture of 
fear, and knew the codes and how to navigate them.  Their friendship was shaped around the idea 
of a shared secret around which they were complicit. In fact, the fear of being persecuted or 
sanctioned was part of Gabriel’s childhood and he remembers how he created all sorts of codes to 
communicate with others safely. He made his family-forced camouflaging practices part his own 
practices. In the quotation above he tells how his best friend was one of his classmates with whom 
he shared common practices of opposition.   
I: “During the time that you lived this part of your life as a secret, how did you live that 
with your friend, the fact of sharing a secret?”  
G: “I think that there was a childish thing in that too: there was something that you know 
and that the other knows, so you play around the idea of complicity. (….) I had the same 
complicity with other friends, and it was something like a shared secret which was also a 
shelter, and that was the good side of it. It was childish in a sense, it was something that 
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you were aware of, and so you believe that… like masons, I think, when they enjoy having 
a secret”.   
The idea of the secret and the way Gabriel’s describes it, allows understanding of in what sense 
the second generation would not be the victims of the culture of fear, but they would rather 
appropriate it and transform it. 
 
 
The duty of memory 
The sense of responsibility and intergenerational bonds make the family a place of inheritance and 
legacy. For it is not only goods, possessions or names that are passed on between generations, but 
stories fully charged with social identifications, images, myths and affects. Although social class, 
for instance, influences the way subjectivities give meaning to life stories, the very fact of having 
experienced state violence has also a binding effect and crosses the boundaries of social class. The 
recognition of a violent common past frames the way Gabriel and other interviewees of the 
second generation organize their own life stories, although this past contains what were at some 
moment forbidden experiences which were ‘secrets’. As I showed above, these secrets sometimes 
offer shelter among friends, but they could also be dangerous and should not be transgressed. 
In fact, on one occasion he felt he had failed his family because he spoke ‘the truth’ in front of 
others: he said what he thought about the political contingency and did not use the concealing 
codes that his family had taught him to use. He was caught in an aporia. His family legacy was at 
stake and he saw a conflict in two forms of duties: to defend his family story or to obey his 
parent’s instructions not to speak ‘outside’.  
G: “I was friend with a girl who was right-wing and we started a discussion about Pinochet. 
We started very soft, but then we got into an argument. I think we were 12 years old, we 
were not adolescents yet. But then it became a heated dispute, we were shouting each 
other, and when it finished I became aware of the transgression and I felt fear. I felt I had 
betrayed my family, and I knew that it was a secret, a secret and I sold them just because I 
got angry with this girl and I remember that Alberto looked at me and he said ‘shut up’ 
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and I couldn’t because I was outraged. I remember how afraid I was, and I went to confess 
everything to my mother…” 
I: “Let’s go back to the moment when you unveiled your family secret. What did you feel, 
what happened to you, what did you feel?” 
G: “I was afraid of people, not the girl. I was afraid of the teachers, what would have 
happened if they had listened… in fact they listened and they were frozen… I don’t 
remember, but I know Alberto said shut up and I was shouting with my head off”.  
D: “Why did you feel so angry?” 
A: “I was so angry that she could think of that… because we were discussing human rights. 
I knew there were people who had been assassinated, desaparecidos, I knew there were 
crimes, I had it very clear and I couldn’t stand that someone denied it. It made me angry 
that someone would lie, that someone could deny what was evident, even if she was a 
child…”  
When Gabriel broke the law and spoke against the regime in a public space, he was not only 
performing a political preference, but a family past, an inheritance. My argument here is similar to 
the one I used when I analysed Marcela’s case, pointing to the task of dwelling in one’s family 
name (see the chapter on stain). In that chapter I situated Marcela in relation to two forms of 
belonging: to the community or to her family, and I showed she would know how to simulate 
clapping for Pinochet. Gabriel here resolves it in the opposite way to Marcela. Gabriel’s feeling of 
anger somehow blurs the demarcations of Hirsch’s postmemory (the rigid distinction between 
generations and memories, for whose memories was he protecting?) but at the same time it 
highlights one of the main points which gives Hirsch’s work its relevance: that it takes into account 
the responsibility that follows witnessing, and establishes a connection and liaison between 
generations on the basis of various forms of listening (see the discussion on Hirsch’s work in the 
literature review) to their common past.  
However, I do not want to develop a fixed idea of what duty means. In the first section of the next 
chapter (Family Countermemories) I will present Albertina Carri’s film, which is a critique of the 
expectations that the second generation may have as the ‘inheritors’ and ‘representative’ of a 
certain kind of memory and discourse. Taking into account what Lazzara called ‘the generational 
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remove’, the duty I am trying to frame here is not a duty to act in terms of similar political codes: it 
rather refers to affective ties to family political legacies. 
 
 
Haunting dreams 
Once we ‘finished’ the interview, Gabriel wanted to tell me about a recurring dream which he 
intuitively associated with my question about fear and with the presence of the past in the 
present. It is significant that this dream came up once the tape recorder was off. Before we had 
had a very long conversation about his family story and the diasporas that have marked his family 
life, all of them occasioned by political fears and important events. The dream came up when the 
interview ‘finished’ (when I turned off the recorder and we walked to the bus stop after an almost 
three hour conversation). In part, this might have happened because of the generalized 
understanding that ‘dreams are not important’ or the fear that a dream might be considered too 
esoteric or invalid knowledge. However, at the same time, I tend to think that speaking the 
content of the dream could only come after speaking about the family history. The dream did not 
have any connection with Gabriel’s family story, but was remembered after the interview took 
place; it was a result of the previous narrative. So I finish this section where he finishes the 
interview: 
“In the dream, I walk around Plaza Ñuñoa [a very popular park area in Santiago] and 
suddenly feel panicked. I see a strange figure, like Faustus, walking around the park. I 
recognize Pinochet’s grey suit”.  
In the dream, fear is presented as something uncanny and Gabriel saw Faustus as a sort of 
phantom, who brought with him the destabilizing presence of fear in his everyday life, with no 
clear object but rather in terms of a diffuse anxiety. It recalls what Lira and Castillo described as 
‘the chronic fear of the dictatorship’, which also haunted David in chapter 4. It shows how the 
dictator’s grey suit came to invade his daily life, thereby transforming it, making it uninhabitable 
and dispossessing him of his familiarity with an otherwise too familiar place. But what I found 
remarkable is that before this conversation, Gabriel never thought of a possible connection 
between his Faustus and Pinochet. 
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It may be useful to draw attention to the concept of the uncanny. Freud states that the uncanny is 
something which is familiar but which has become suddenly unknown (Freud 2003). The uncanny 
has proved –and this is something that Freud might not have expected– to be adequate to 
describe certain experiences of state violence in the Southern Cone. Lira has used the concept to 
refer to experiences of state violence, which dispossess people of the feeling of everyday life, but 
which, paradoxically, become normalized as everyday life (Lira 1993). She describes how during 
the first half of the dictatorship, social meanings and spaces were disarticulated and invaded. The 
fear of death and social distrust were the effects of an external power over precarious bodies. It 
means an estrangement over one’s sense of everyday life, ‘one’ as the centre and autonomous 
subject of memory. In the chapter of fear, referring to the testimony of someone who went 
shopping and went kidnapped, I illustrated the same point. Was the dream about the pervasive 
effects of fear on Gabriel’s everyday life? Or could the dream be speaking about familial 
inheritances of fear although he himself has never experienced an encounter with state violence? 
The heuristic power of Gabriel’s dream is that it makes visible not only the dictatorship’s traces on 
everyday life and its unwitting but constant presence, but it also makes visible and therefore 
capable of being narrated other stories that precedes him and interrogates the way past affects 
have been linked to the fear of state violence throughout his family past, and the feeling of loss 
and grief it mobilizes.  
 
 
Interviewing the Third Generation: Introducing Eliana and Gustavo 
In this section I introduce two new interviewees whose cases provide lens to further explore the 
way intergenerational memories mobilize affective ties and memory duties. I met Eliana and 
Gustavo in a fuente de soda (a diner) in Santiago. Although they were not part of my targeted 
population – in other words, they were not second generation but third – I felt very curious to 
know them because they were the grandchildren of victims of state violence and were 
descendants of people whose victimhood was to have been orphaned due to the action of the 
state. I felt unsure about how to approach them; I was too aware, perhaps, of the generational 
difference between them and the rest of my interviewees. They were about 10 years younger than 
my other interviewees and had been born in the late 80s. They went to school in the 90s and 
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2000s, during the Concertacion governments, when how to talk about the past started to unveil an 
impasse which has proved to be profoundly entangled in Chilean politics (see introduction). 
However, their apparent ‘newness’ to the dictatorial experience, the fact that they grew up under 
democracy, does not mean that they are estranged from about the questions this thesis deals 
with. In fact, I found multiple connections between the second generation and the third which I 
will discuss in the following sections and which, moreover, illuminate the relationship between 
family memory and political memory.  
 
 
Their family life stories 
Eliana works as a secretary and in her spare time she volunteers in memory initiatives, while 
Gustavo has pursued an academic career in memory studies. They are part of the Paine third 
generation. They are the grandchildren of peasants who were executed, or desaparecidos in a 
rural community which has the sad record of having the highest number of deaths in relation to 
their population. After the coup, Paine had more than 70 victims of which 40 are still 
desaparecidos
92. Eliana and Gustavo were both actively engaged in memory work and have been 
engaged in the construction of the Paine Memorial since 2004.   
Their grandfathers and granduncle were peasants who were involved in the Land Reform during 
the UP. As happened to other rural communities, after the coup and in revenge for the 
resentment triggered by the redistribution of lands, they were persecuted. Being a small 
community, Paine’s case is striking: apart from having to deal with state terror, victims and 
perpetrators knew each other as close neighbours, as this interview with the President of the 
Agrupación (Juan Maureira) shows93: “We know that the lieutenant Magaña knows what 
happened to my dad and other 22 peasants, among other cases. He killed our relatives. The police 
have denied that they were involved, but they are the same ones who still live in this town. How 
can they deny it if everybody here saw it? It is the same for the civilians who acted. Paine is a small 
                                                          
92See  http://www.fasic.org/doc/notasmedios/caso%20y%20memorialPAINE.pdf 
93
 Interview by Arnaldo Pérez (2003) Available at: 
  http://www.archivochile.com/Experiencias/exp_popu/EXPpopulares0021.pdf 
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town”. Similarly, the Paine Memorial’s web page tells us94:  “70 victims were killed during those 
terrible events, but it was the whole community which was destroyed on the basis of fear and 
dread”. After the coup, Gustavo’s relatives became desaparecidos whist Eliana’s relative was 
found dead weeks after his disappearance. Thus, their grandmothers were among the first women 
who went out to look for their husbands, contributing to the creation of a powerful moral 
opposition to the regime.  
 
 
Growing up among divided memories 
Despite the fact that when they went to school the dictatorship was officially ‘over’, they found 
very similar mechanisms to those of the culture of fear still active in the classroom: they had to 
cope with a ‘memory impasse’ (Stern 2006) and ‘memory ghettos’ (Lira 2011) among their 
classmates about the ‘history’ or ‘story’ of the desaparecidos. Even years after the human rights 
reports were published and officially accepted as ‘truth’, they still faced the scepticism of some of 
their classmates. Once the debate became an issue among the students, the silent response from 
the teacher followed, avoiding making this a matter for reflection: 
G: “Once I had a highly symbolic experience at school, within my classroom, that I won’t 
ever forget. I don’t remember why, but we engaged in a discussion… It wasn’t part of the 
class contents, but it came up that I was the grandson of a detenido desaparecido, and one 
of my classmates said “the desaparecidos doesn’t exist, is not true”. Then, the entire class 
got divided (…)”. 
I: “What happened then?” 
G: “Well, we were all divided (…). Some of my classmates started writing on the 
blackboard “Long live Pinochet”, while others wrote “Pinochet is a murderer”. I am not 
lying; I can remember that all this happened. And then the teacher came into the 
classroom (it was in between two subjects). The first thing he did was to erase the 
blackboard, and he asked everybody to go back to their seats… he didn’t touch the topic…” 
I: “Did he say anything to the class?”   
                                                          
94
 Quote available at the Memorial web page: http://www.memorialpaine.org/  
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G: “No, no, he didn’t. He just said, oh, let’s erase this and go back to your seats, let’s start 
with the lesson. The issue was over”.  
Their stories provide insights into how changes in the political system allowed for some 
conversations to take place, for instance at school, but still faced with old fears, denial and 
displacement. This, by people who lived through the dictatorship (like the teacher), but also by 
others who did not (like the classmates involved in the impasse). I argue that this parallel is 
important to the points I am trying to make in this chapter: the recognition of historical truth is 
entangled with the family transmission of memory. Scholars were acting out what they saw and 
listened to in their everyday life and they were performing their family legacies too. The discussion 
between the classmates, which took place not too long ago, is striking. Gustavo was not as afraid 
as Gabriel was when he ‘spoke’ at school, transgressing the landscapes and culture of fear, but he 
was rather frustrated: he found that the ghettoization of memory still works in spite of the human 
rights reports. If denial was not promoted by the Concertación governments, but rather the 
opposite, then why did his classmates persist in their parallel truths? Like Rafael’s interview, this 
episode also provides an insight into the nature of the memory impasse: it may come up in any 
context, whilst triggering passionate affiliations. It corresponds to what I defined in Chapter 1 as 
‘memory burst in the public sphere’ (Wilde 1999). The impasse activates boundaries and 
communities of belonging which seemed to be inactive, but which suddenly are there. My 
argument is that family transmission of memory plays a fundamental role in maintaining and 
protecting institutional memories of political violence which can circulate in spite of the 
information being public. This, because they are lived as affective family legacies, part of 
intergenerational legacies and may work as parallel sources of legitimate truth. Otherwise, why 
would youngsters see themselves involved in such impasses with respect to something which they 
have not experienced?  
We saw that Hirsch argues that ‘having an experience’ is not necessary to ‘have that memory’. 
However, it seems necessary to add that people need a memory which is accepted as their own. 
This attachment to an inherited memory rests on the family identification, the set of truths and 
statements that the family have defined as their own, even when they have not been articulated 
as such and when they may act as contradictory statements between them. Here we find a link 
which can help us to think about the role of family as a carrier of political memory, complementing 
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Lira’s work. The children reproduced within the classroom what they had heard within their 
homes.  
The classroom story is an insightful metaphor: the teacher shows himself unable to deal with the 
impasse, either because he is afraid of what is behind that impasse, or because he thinks that 
‘politics is dangerous’, or because he thinks that at school ‘people go to study not to protest’ 
(which was an infamous expression of a Chilean celebrity). For Gustavo, both, the fact that 
someone as close as a classmate would be sceptical of his grandfather’s tragic fate and the silent 
indifference of the teacher, were painful but predictable (he calls it ‘symbolic’). It resounds with 
Fried’s notes on disappearance in Uruguay and the unresolved mourning which followed: ‘Forced 
disappearance and civil society’s prolonged denial of acknowledging it, leaves the families with 
sole responsibility for searching for the disappeared, claiming them, and making sure they are not 
forgotten’ (Fried 2009, 140). As Fried writes, for the children of desaparecidos the realization that 
they have no clear place in memory (despite having one in official history after state recognition in 
two official reports) is deeply unsettling and confirms the anxieties of state violence lineages: that 
violence may take place again. The identity of the offspring is in part made of divided memories: it 
is a reinforcement of what others reject, deny or neglect. That some people would deny an 
experience of violence and suffering is a violent experience of social life and shows how the 
legacies of the culture of fear still organize the way that my interviewees perceive social space.  
 
 
Dealing with family legacies in the aftermath 
In a previous section, exploring Gabriel’s case, I explained that I did not want to use a fixed idea of 
the duties of memory. Speaking with the third generation I found support for this: it is not the case 
that generation would suppose a lineal and predictable form of relationship to the past. In fact, 
despite being third generation, both interviewees revisited their family stories and had to deal 
with different family models and different ways of handling the past. Their stories show evidence 
for and against using the concept of intergenerational transmission of memory. On one hand, they 
show there is no one model of transmission and that the image of silence or ‘the wall generation’ 
(defined by Grimwood as the generation which is in between a first generation and the Holocaust) 
is usually too rigid to give an account of haunting within families in the context of contemporary 
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Chilean history. At the same time, there is not one kind of victim, there are different forms of 
transmission. On the other hand, when they narrate their life stories, they situate themselves in 
relation to a lineage which shares the memory of state violence, and to which its very narration 
constitutes one of the practices which define them as members of the family. On the other hand, 
the very act of knowing about this past may mark a different status within the family.  
Eliana grew up in a family which dealt silently with the death of the father and with fear, while 
Gustavo has been involved, since he was an infant, in public demonstrations against the 
dictatorship. Eliana learned the tragic fate of her ancestor when she was a teenager, while 
Gustavo had known about it “since he had memory”. However, both of them feel they are the 
inheritors of their grandfathers in different ways. Despite having different stories, they both have 
a relationship to memory and legacy. Eliana experienced the moment when she learnt about her 
family past as a moment of illumination. She knew her family story when she was a teenager, but 
she adds “I always knew that something weird had happened”. Eliana believes that it was her 
grandfather who in some way inspired and guided her, having a sort of totemic relationship to her 
ancestor.  
E: “My grandmother told me the story when I was about 14 years old…I always sensed 
that something weird had happened, but I didn’t know what. But one day they told me 
suddenly, and from then on I got involved in the question (…) and that is why I decided to 
link my life to this (…) I have always felt and always dreamed that I have inherited my 
grandfather’s character. Everybody told me that… I feel that he has taught me through a 
form of inheritance.  “ 
I: “And do you like that?” 
E:” Yes”. 
For her, the concept of lineage has a strong meaning. The ancestor, from the past, gives her a 
calling for the future. Here we find the connection between memory and justice, as her 
grandfather’s presence demands that a truth be known. Gustavo instead emphasizes how he 
picked up from the environment stories about his grandfather. He speaks of his familiarity with 
intergenerational knowledge of state violence, and how its poison “has always acted and will 
always act”. He shows how the intergenerational narrative does not need to be understood so as 
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to be spoken and how, while it binds him to some family members, it poses him against or in 
opposition to others: 
G:  “Since I was very little I knew that my grandfather was a desaparecido. Perhaps I didn’t 
understand what it really meant, but I always knew it. And perhaps that had certain 
effects, for instance, for me it was a contradiction when I heard at school that the police 
were there to protect us and that the Army would defend us… whilst I had a family story 
which was different and I thought ‘It happened something different to me’”.  
Gustavo reinforces the idea that has appeared in many of my interviewees: that state violence is 
learned through a form of knowledge which does not require understanding: “I did not 
understand, but I knew it”. As I described before, Smart’s focus on family secrets and zones of 
rumours and partial revelations might help us to make sense of these expressions. They show a 
form of latency in knowledge, but which does not interfere with the work of the poisoned 
knowledge and the making of a lineage.  
Both, Gustavo and Eliana, have a consciousness of and distance from their place in family life. They 
see how their parents felt an intense anger with respect to what they had undergone. These 
feelings of anger are problematic, as they are not always directed against the state agents, but are 
sometimes directed at the victims themselves (the lost relatives, the victims). It is not clear 
whether this historical awareness has something to do with their position in terms of generations 
or with the politics of memory, namely, that in a repressive system people could not see beyond 
fear while in democracy there has been more information about the past. However, they do mark 
their difference with their parents in terms of generations, and fulfil this sort of duty to their 
family history and family fate, which will shape their attitude towards politics and the state. Fried 
calls this sense of intergenerational liaison between generations ‘the transmission of pending 
accounts’. In her words:  ‘The burden of ‘not knowing’ creates a sense of urgency and obligation to 
unearth the truth about the fate of the disappeared, a task which is passed-on from grandparents 
and surviving parents, to younger generations, This sense of urgency and obligation distinctly 
impacts children’s character…’ (Fried 2009, 144). Fried’s point complements Smart’s view of family 
with respect to the specificities of state violence and the kind of relationships that are forged after 
such critical events. Their stories, as well as Gabriel’s story, show the family role in the 
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transmission of  memories of state violence, and how its sense of lineage contribute also to 
embody the memory of a tragic past which is also used to imagine a form of future.  
 
 
Conclusions 
In this chapter I have been concerned with intergenerational transmission of memory and its 
double sided influence: how it shapes family inheritances, but also how it may shape memory 
ghettos. I have explored life stories which are beyond the limits of my initial sample. However it 
has been precisely through contrast (in Rafael’s case) or extension (in the third generation cases) 
that these life stories shed light on the focus of the chapter. 
Through my reading of Rafael’s interview, I problematized the conception of legacies and showed 
how at the same time family political memories they may act as forms of resistance and 
endurance, family memory provides the solid for ghettoization. Family memory might not 
recognize history or any external sense of truth, but only its sense of lived experience, transmitted 
and anchored to affective ties. Having pointed this out, I marked a difference with Lira’s concept of 
ghettoization. For her, the concept links the dynamics of memory to local history, political tensions 
and political community commemoration. However, I aimed to present in the chapter also those 
other forms of transmission, commemoration and ghettoization, which are less institutionalized 
and might even trespass local boundaries. In fact, through face to face interaction and 
communicative memory, I have shown that family narratives can also be diasporic: the 
intergenerational self narrated by the family can bridge different territories, expanding Lira’s 
understanding of ghetto memories and the sort of solidarities they may sustain.  
Based on my interviews, I also pointed to the tasks and duties that remembering may entail for 
the second generation in specific contexts: I showed how, once it becomes part of family legacies, 
political memory carries a sense of duty towards and inheritance of the past which is not only 
narrated but transmitted in multiple ways, and which helps to give form to a sense of an 
intergenerational self. Particularly throughout Gabriel´s, Eliana’s and Gustavo’s stories, the family 
appears as an intergenerational long body carrying messages, knowledge, affects and experiences.  
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Chapter 7: Family Countermemories 
 
With the passage of time, frames of reference change and experiences lived in the past by 
mothers and fathers may become practically illegible to sons and daughters. How can the 
daughter of a disappeared revolutionary, for example, fully understand the weight or 
density of the politically charged experience of the 1960s and 1970s or, for that matter, 
what it meant to suffer torture?  
 (Lazzara 2009, 148).  
 
 
Introduction  
When exploring intergenerational narratives of memories of political violence within the family in 
the previous chapter, I suggested that affective ties of family memories of political violence also 
entail a sense of duty to the past. There have been rich discussions of how we can think about the 
duty of witnessing and how can this be related to some form of memory (Booth 2006; Hirsch 2008; 
Caruth 1995; Fried 2009). However, framing the relationship to the past in terms of duty should 
not lead to rigid taxonomies of intergenerational relationships. In this chapter I will further 
develop the complex meanings of duty by exploring countermemories, one of the multiple ways of 
responding to or appropriating past legacies. Throughout the chapter I will also use the concept of 
countermemories to show how behind family memory transmission there is a reworking of 
memory contents, family relationships and also of what counts as valuable and memorable within 
a society. My aim is to frame a sense of legacy which is not passive, but which implies an active 
relationship between generations. 
In this chapter my focus is on the children of left-wing guerrilleros and activists who question their 
parent’s displacement of family life during the 70s and 80s in the name of the causa. Although 
they were a minority among my interviewees, I felt they were pointing at an important aspect of 
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family memories. Their narratives of loss are embedded in the memory (promoted by human 
rights organizations) of the traumatic national past of state violence, but expressed through the 
voice of family collapse and private loss. They tell a different story to that of the memoria 
militante
95
 or even to those stories told in the previous chapter, complicating the post-dictatorial 
reconstruction of the past. Together, they divest memory of any teleological sense, and open gaps 
and fissures in any attempt to construct representations of the past.  
In the first section I introduce two films: Albertina Carri’s Los Rubios (The Blondes), released in 
Argentina in 2003 and Macarena Aguilo’s El Edificio de los Chilenos, released in Chile in 2010. 
These films show how memoria militante has triggered intergenerational countermemories which 
question the very consensus about what is rendered valuable within a society or in this case within 
a specific tradition of memory. The countermemories I explore here criticize (Carri) and hint at 
(Aguiló) parental abandonment and also their disappearance, understood this time in the sense of 
disappearance from the everyday life of the child.  
In the following sections I contextualize the countermemories I am dealing with in the chapter in 
terms of the politics of gender in South America and specifically in Chile. On the one hand, I refer 
to the challenges that recognizing gender particularities threw up for the radical guerrilla-inspired 
left-wing organizations. I refer to a critique of the militant model of ‘disembodied militancy’ which 
demanded that women erased all traces of their gender, but which has been also contested by the 
testimonies of women who disagree with this approach and who defend their right of redefining 
their womanhood, including their role as mothers or wives. Next, I show how state violence 
unveiled what I call ‘the Antigone model of mourning’ which would expect women to be those 
who mourned and searched for lost relatives, who would often be men, who then become heroic 
(even in the form of martyrs).   
I then introduce two of my interviewees, Tamara and Ernesto, who hold countermemories to their 
parents’ memoria militante. By exploring the interviews I hope to contribute to the understanding 
of how cultural frameworks, generations and memory are intertwined in the operations of 
countermemories. Tamara’s and Ernesto’s accounts are striking because their memory of the past 
is built on the moment at which male activists leave their family life, something which became a 
                                                          
95 The memory work of members of leftist groups. 
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crucial point in their life stories. Their countermemories break with the Antigone model of 
memory (the gendered model of memory in which the father who left home is rendered heroic), 
but are also its inversion: the father is not reclaimed as a dead corpse but is grieved for his 
absence. Through their interview analysis I examine how they denaturalize cultural and family 
models of political mourning, redefining whose and what suffering counts, and how in doing so 
they destabilize the primacy of the public over the private as a sphere of legitimate or real value. I 
argue that they destabilize the dominant militant version of the past, decentering the strictly 
political debate (framed for instance in terms of left, centre and right wing) through moral 
questions. In the case of Tamara, I explore how she points at a tension between grand narratives 
and experiences of everyday life, and how it is on the basis of the latter that criticizes the 
universalism of her parents’ political causa. Then, in Ernesto’s case, I develop his countermemories 
and draw attention to a new complexity: he found out that once the opposition became part of 
the political system through the Concertación coalition, his father’s past as an internacionalista 
became a taboo memory for second time, due to his relationship with armed struggle and guerrilla 
warfare, which became an uneasy past and a difficult memory to unveil.  
  
 
Examining Los Rubios and El Edificio de los Chilenos Countermemories 
In the early years of this century, there was a debate in Argentina about a film which challenged 
the memoria militante (the dominant left-wing narrative about the dictatorial past) shedding light, 
not only on issues of social memory and private loss during the transitional process, but also 
destabilizing assumptions about the transmission of memory within the family space. In this 
chapter I shape these tensions with the concept of family countermemories, which refers to the 
reworking of similar memory contents but in a different direction within the family sphere.  
Albertina Carri, the daughter of Montoneros96 desaparecidos, directed in 2003 Los Rubios (The 
Blondes)97, a film which dealt with the vacuum and sorrow their absence left in a 4-year old girl. 
The disappearance of Albertina’s parents by the military regime became secondary to their 
                                                          
96 Argentinian left wing guerrilla group active during the 60s and 70s. 
97 The script was written in collaboration with the writer Alan Pauls. 
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disappearance from her life98. In fact, she disqualified the importance of their political past (and 
therefore, historical research) for her search: she wanted to know about her parents, not about 
the activists. Despite the fact that her parents were intellectuals committed to the political causa, 
she asked their comrades unusual ordinary questions which suddenly became much more relevant 
to her (“were they tall?”). According to Nouzeilles, Carri reacted against the monumentalization of 
memory, this is to say, against those monopolistic narratives that exclude difference and pretend 
to have caught the past and own it (xx). For her, the film would be an example of what Huyssen 
described in Present Pasts: ‘Out of the ruins of conventional history emerge, multiple and 
contradictory, the fractured discourses of memory’. In contrast, Sarlo reacted harshly to Carri’s 
film and, recurring to Susan Sontag, demanded ‘more history and less memory’. Commenting on 
the film, she stated: ‘A revolutionary utopia charged with ideas gets an unjust treatment if it is 
presented as fundamentally a postmodern drama of the emotions/affects’99 (pgxx). When she 
speaks of an utopia she is speaking about the Montoneros as a political movement, and she then 
undermines a memory-based version of its past.  
Agreeing with Nouzeille in her reading of Carri’s film as a response to hegemonic memories, I see 
it as an example of the struggle over values within the memory field. The most interesting aspect 
is that these different judgments about past actions are situated within family life and involve an 
intergenerational dimension. Carri’s refusal to create new idols and mythologize memory is also a 
critique of the ways of making not only memory but history. In this sense, her film works as a 
countermemory which demystifies dominant versions of memory in transitional contexts, 
destabilizing the consensus about the dominant – or the true – version of the past. It brings new 
judgments and criterias to the making of history, and by doing so, transforms the landscape of the 
past and gives voice to unacknowledged losses.  
In 2010 Macarena Aguiló released El Edificio de los Chilenos (The Building of the Chileans) which I 
situate in a similar way to Los Rubios, although the narrative voice is far less tensioned towards the 
first generation. The film starts with Macarena’s experience of being kidnapped by the secret 
police for 20 days when she was just 4 years old. She was the daughter of the leader of the MIR100 
                                                          
98 In one compelling scene she said: “I hate candles on birthdays because they remind me how I had only 
one wish: that my parents come back”. 
99 Translation by John Beverly. 
100 Hernán Aguiló. 
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and her disappearance was a threat to the whole group. As the historian Cristián Perez observes, 
this was a warning of the DINA to the MIR, which for the scholar would work as the context for 
what came later101. In fact, the film is about what came next: the story of a group of a left-wing 
militants living in the exile (in the film, in Paris) who, in 1978, decided to return clandestinely to 
Chile in what was called as Operación Retorno102 (Operation Return). During the first years of the 
Operación, only men and not women returned to Chile, so a group of militant women began to 
think of a way to join them: to do so, they created Proyecto Hogares103. MIR militants involved in 
the Operación would leave their children in the care of collective parents (padres sociales) who 
would raise them and act as an alternative to their biological family. In total about 60 children 
were raised within this project for a period of close to 5 years. For Perez104 it was also a way of 
dealing with the group’s Achilles’ heel:  
‘It was about avoiding what had happened to Lorena (Irene), the protagonist of The Double 
Life written by Arturo Fontaine. Disobeying her chief, she refused to send her child to 
Cuba. However, when the agents of the regime found out about her child, they took 
pictures of her and filmed her at school, so as to show them to Lorena. After seeing this, 
Lorena broke down and became an agent’105.  
Aguiló was one of the children who were raised in Proyecto Hogares. Her documentary explores 
her mixed feelings of appreciation and respect for the militant’s commitment to the Marxist 
                                                          
101 However, in opposition to that of Pérez’ reading, there is also another interpretation which circulates 
among left ex MIR members, and that is that Miguel Enríquez –the former leader who died after being shot– 
was the ideologue of Proyecto Hogares. It is interesting to note how each version responds to different 
genealogies: one emphasizes the culture of fear, while the other emphasizes the militant project and tends 
to reify the visionary leader as the inspiration of such a project. See interview: xx 
102 The MIR had a particularly stormy relationship with the exile and the idea of asking for asylum, since its 
emblematic leader Miguel Enríquez created the slogan “The MIR doesn’t seek political asylum” (El MIR no se 
asila). Instead, they believed in organizing the armed struggle to overthrow the dictatorship. Later, they 
were criticized for the high amounts of deaths among their members in what was considered a political 
suicide. The cover of a local newspaper referring to their death is infamous: ‘They fall as rats’ (Caen como 
ratones). 
103 According to Pérez, by 1983, once Operación Retorno failed, Proyecto Hogares also lost its rationale and 
the children started to be absorbed by the Cuban schooling system, and the tutors started looking for new 
jobs. See online edition:  
http://diario.latercera.com/2011/09/11/01/contenido/cultura-entretencion/30-83334-9-la-historia-de-los-
hijos-del-mir.shtml  
104
 Ibid. 
105 This fear was rooted in the Flaca Alejandra, which was en emblematic case of an ex MIR who became an 
informant of the regime.  
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revolution, but also a vague uneasiness with their decision to leave their children behind on behalf 
of the causa. This uneasiness is not, however, expressed as reproach. She films her talks with her 
mother, a radical left-wing militant too, and asks her about the decision, while they also read 
together the intimate letters her parents sent each other. The mother did not show regret but 
rather conviction, subverting the meaning of motherhood and family ties.  
In the film it is not clear whether Macarena would ever find clear answers to her life story. Edificio 
constitutes a nostalgic exploration of a private past in the light of collective history, where rather 
than giving most importance to what had actually happened, she leaves the audience wondering 
about ‘what never happened’. It is an exploration of the several sites of multiple losses: the 
guerrilla project, the family ideal, the UP government, the never attained armed defeat of the 
dictatorship. As an alternative second generation documentary, one of its strengths is that it 
succeeds in exploring the greys of memory, where rather than blacks or whites the spectators are 
haunted by unresolved dilemmas. In Vidaurrazaga’s words:  
‘The film distances itself from narratives of heroism/victimization, because it is not the story of the 
public deed or the resulting martyrdom which is told, but the consequences of the revolutionary 
dream for the private life of its protagonists’ descendants’ ( Vidaurrázaga, 2012:157).  
Commentators in Chile have been sympathetic both to the way Aguiló does not judge her parents’ 
decision, and also to the complexities of the dilemmas of ‘a different time’ (the 60s and 70s). 
Pérez, for example, says of an interview in which one of the protagonists of the Proyecto says that, 
when the children were leaving Paris for Cuba, “they were sad, but not so much”, and in that way 
he opens a new clue to reading the story: not as an experience of abandonment but also as one of 
discovering new forms of relatedness. In fact, during that experience, children also created new 
relationships and created new affective ties. For instance, Pérez says: ‘The collective parents 
promote communitarian ways of life, they challenge conceptions of family, women’s roles, couple 
relationships and the traditional ways of bringing up children, becoming the only attempt in the 
history of the left in Chile to move towards the construction of the New Men, as the revolutionary 
literature claimed’ (2011)106.  
                                                          
106 Cristian Pérez in La Tercera. 11 September 2011. See online edition:  
http://diario.latercera.com/2011/09/11/01/contenido/cultura-entretencion/30-83334-9-la-historia-de-los-
hijos-del-mir.shtml  
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For the erudite historian Manuel Salazar, the operation should be read in two ways:   
‘it was a dual project: a) political-military (the disciplined return of militants split from their 
filial and social networks) and b) socio-educational (educating children in accordance a 
pristine socialist project). In the first dimension, they experimented with the life of parents 
with no offspring. In the second, they experimented with the human development of 
offspring with no parents. The supreme imperative was the absolute commitment to 
defeating the dictatorship at any price, together with the popular movement… Everything 
was done in the name of the Pueblo’107.  
However, there is a tension that the film suggests, which challenge memory hegemony and which I 
found productive to explore since I also found it in my interviewees: the unvoiced feeling of loss 
which haunts the film and which in the Manichean local debate has tended to be considered as 
‘reactionary’108. There is a scene where Macarena asks one of her friends what he thinks about 
what their parents did and he vehemently defends their decision, situating it in the context of life 
or death. However, Macarena’s silence does not solve the questions she is raising, and her 
nostalgic approach remains as her central mechanism for exploring the past. In this chapter I deal 
with these unnamed losses and the nostalgic feelings lived within family life (or in its ruins), and 
which have not been voiced yet in the collective memory field. My argument can be summed up in 
Vidaurrazaga’s words: ‘that this story might not have been told yet as it hurts even more than the 
political defeat’ (2012). I draw attention to these narratives because they have remained as the 
unspoken, and have been dismissed by dominant and collective left-wing memory frames, both at 
a national and family level. This is because they point to grey zones of memories which, as Lazzara 
argues, destabilize the Manichaeism of memory which has constituted the memory discourse 
(2011). But I suggest here that these unvoiced injuries demand to be acknowledged and 
reconsidered in the light of the aftermath of violence.  
                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
107 Manuel Salazar in La Tercera, 11 september 2011, ‘Los Hijos del MIR’. 
http://diario.latercera.com/2011/09/11/01/contenido/cultura-entretencion/30-83334-9-la-historia-de-los-
hijos-del-mir.shtml  
108 An academic colleague told me that, when she commented to the head of her department that she 
would like to show El Edificio to her students, she disagreed by that, saying that this film was too 
reactionary. It is a similar response to that of Sarlo to Los Rubios, even though Aguiló is far less openly 
critical of the memoria militante.  
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Gendered militancy and gendered bereavement 
What is at stake in these family countermemories? What politics of memory is behind the 
acknowledgment of such a sense of loss? In what sense are feelings of loss not only private but 
also of cultural relevance, and not only a ‘postmodern drama’? The stories of Albertina, Macarena 
and the interviewees I will present later become legible once we examine the cultural contexts in 
which they speak. The family stories I am introducing in this chapter are structured around a 
critical point in their family life: during the 1970s, when political life was lived as a moral duty to 
the extent that it could displace family life voluntarily (through active militancy, resistance, 
internacionalistas) or involuntary (through state abductions). Although there is no clear estimate 
of the distribution of militants according to gender within left-wing groups, the history of left-wing 
militancy in Chile has been written predominantly in a masculine voice, while the relationship 
between gender and politics has remained problematic or displaced. 
The culture of the militants was supposed to be neutral, but that neutrality was in fact identified 
with the masculine or with the disappearance of ‘women’s traces’ and their reappearance as 
militants or mourners.  This left women in a difficult position, caught between abstract discourses 
of what it should mean for them to being ‘a good woman, a good mother and a good militant’.  
However, there have been other approaches to the role of women within the guerrilla movement, 
which have attempted to frame differently women’s militancy, such as Rojo y Negro by 
Vidaurrázaga (2006). In these works, the authors explore the life stories of women who were part 
of revolutionary groups and show the dilemmas they courageously faced. They maintain that 
women were not disembodied militants, but rather were the kind of militants they wanted to be. 
Rather than pointing at the sacrifices they made, they point instead at the fact that these women 
had to break with cultural expectations about what they were supposed to be and the roles they 
were not fulfilling (i.e.: mothers or wives).  
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The model of Antigone 
In fact, the cultural context in which these women lived was dominated by the silent assumption 
that the mother was left in charge of children and is supposed to do the work of family carer and 
often, of mourning, while the militant male leaves home for the battle field. The entrenchment of 
this model is explored in Sonia Montecino's groundbreaking  research Madres y Huachos, where 
she shows how mothers have traditionally been the carers of the family since the days of Spanish 
colonialism, due to the pattern of women abandonment and rape (2007)109 . Her argument is that 
the huacho(the name given to illegitimate child), has played a central role within Chilean culture 
and she shows how an initial experience of loss was transformed into a festive relationship 
between mothers and her huachos. In fact, one of the most recurrent memories of the post-coup 
period, and one which has been installed in the collective imaginary of the past, is that of women 
looking for their husband or son outside detention centers. Like others of my interviewees, Ruth, 
for instance, remembers:  
R: After a few days (…) those women who were now widows started their search. My 
mother came to Valdivia, and she met other women and they started asking, asking and 
asking for them. In the meanwhile my brothers and I were left in the care of other people, 
because she could be away for weeks,  
I: Were you aware of what your mother was doing?  
R: Yes, I knew she was searching my father. 
Another of my interviewees, Maria, describes how, when searching desperately, her mother –
holding one of her babies in her arms – visited every public place where the regime was known to 
keep its prisoners. A double moral existed then, when military personnel were touched by the 
image of a women-with-a-baby-looking-for-her missing-male. Once she found him, a young soldier 
agreed ‘to be part of the story’ and helped to introduce (clandestinely) the new born baby and 
father. The Chilean military coup’s oral story is full of this kind of anecdote, where people who 
were fulfilling their roles suddenly transgressed them. For some reason, people are keen to tell 
this kind of story. In the Chilean case, I see this as the need to reassert the social bond over and 
                                                          
109 The woman’s right and duty to be the carer of the family (children) is defended and promoted by the 
Law, except when the woman is lesbian, losing the right to maternity, as in the dramatic case of Karen Atala, 
who lost the right to raise her children for being “morally dubious” according to the Chilean courts. 
http://www.elmostrador.cl/opinion/2012/04/01/fallo-atala-el-golpe-al-poder-judicial-chileno/ 
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above the political impasse; it is like saying: “we are killing each other, but we are still humans, are 
we not?” 
These stories worked as a form of Antigone strategy to claim a place in history (Das 2007). This 
refers to a Greek myth in which Antigone demands her right to bury her brother, who, in turn, had 
been expelled by the state for being considered a traitor. Hegel’s view of Antigone differs from 
Aristotle’s. Aristotle saw in Greek mythology the stories of heroes; Hegel, by contrast, considered 
that what made of Antigone a tragedy is that two legitimate realms of value were opposed (Das, 
2007). 
The Antigone model is embedded in the Chilean culture, where family is seen as a natural site, one 
with religious and moral connotations, and which is safe from political ‘contamination’. Political 
widowhood became almost a template in the recovery of political memories, in which women’s 
political role has been to reclaim the men’s bodies, fulfilling social expectations of gendered roles 
within families110. In the Southern Cone, the mother’s/wife’s search for her desaparecido son or 
husband was used as an image of the resistance to the dictatorship, removing the struggle from 
the semantic field imposed by the Military Junta (the Marxist cancer) and locating it within 
different moral terms. The appearance of women gave the resistance an aura of moral legitimacy 
(Stern 2006b) for they were doing ‘what they had to do’ without this being exclusively political. 
They appealed to the ‘ideal Mariano’ and to the idea that ‘everybody has a mother’. All of this 
gave the search of missing people the legitimacy of Antigone’s claim within Hegel’s interpretation. 
To the aim of the state of cleaning the social cancer –as the Junta described its actions– these 
women opposed their right to reclaim their husband’s or son’s presence. In fact, Madres and 
Viudas reclaimed their relatives’ bodies from the state. That was the power of the encounter and 
why they succeeded in entering into the public imaginary, gained media attention and therefore 
became a relevant actor for the state until today.  
The memory of the Familiares is a clear example of the ‘memory work’ (Jelin, 202). The search for 
relatives taught women, who often did not have any prior relationship with speaking in public, to 
speak and denounce publicly (like Ruth in Chapter 5 or Eliana’s grandmother in Chapter 6). 
                                                          
110 I do not intend here to diminish the role of women in the struggle of the dictatorship. There are valuable 
accounts of how resistance from the private domain was key for certain social manifestations, like ollas 
comunes apart from their experience as militants. However, I am pointing out that the Antigone model of 
political intervention has a double side which hasn’t been fully appreciated in terms of political power.  
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Women brought a private disappearance into the public domain, making evident how the 
distinction between what is rendered private or public becomes fragile in extreme circumstances. 
Thus, women learned to speak politically, to have a collective voice and to be spoken by a 
discourse, the discourse of the Familiares who became, not only in Chile but also in Argentina (Las 
Madres y Abuelas de la Plaza de Mayo), a powerful and influential social actor. They represented 
the ethic of family love beyond politics, and on this basis obtained strong public support. However, 
in the next section I will show how the second generation’s countermemories destabilize both the 
gendered attempts to include feministic concerns within militancy by challenging the ideal 
mariano, and also Antigone’s politics of loss. Rather than accepting the departure of the hero, my 
two interviewees would reclaim the hero’s presence not as a corpse but as a ‘living’ father. 
 
 
My first encounter with Tamara: Contesting generational remembering 
I first met Tamara in 2010, during one of the two focus groups I conducted with post-coup second 
generation participants, inviting them to talk about their experience of growing up during the 
dictatorship. Collective metaphors of the past were recurrent during group-interviews. Although 
the interviewees recounted personal experiences, they were in fact reproducing communitarian 
ways of remembering. Thus, when they remembered opposition family codes, they stressed the 
generational dimension of their socialization – the way people’s experience found an echo in that 
of others in similar age cohorts: i.e.: parents listening to Radio Cooperativa, families hearing 
Violeta Parra, etc –. The fact that they have all grown up within opposition families facilitated the 
use of collective tropes, as we see below: 
Men: “When one is a child, one doesn’t realize that one’s family is different, until one gets 
in contact with the external world. The saucepan demonstrations [cacerolazos], the 
blackout and using candles were funny; at least, our parents showed us those things in a 
way that wouldn’t scare us. But once we started hanging out (…) [for instance] I did my 
secondary education at a public school where we had to sing the national anthem every 
day and raise the flag. Then when I came back home and sang there the national anthem, 
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my father would say: Shut up!. And I wondered why, because all my classmates had sung it 
(…)” 
[Laughs]  
Woman: “You could sing the first part [of the national anthem], but never the second 
part…”111 
Men: “Sure! … And there were those ‘weird’ conversations, which were spoken like in 
code, or books that we couldn’t open or take out from home. When I was a child I read 
Mafalda, and I thought that reading Mafalda112 was completely normal, but then I realized 
that no one else in my class knew who Mafalda was, [and I thought] how come they don’t 
know Mafalda? Then, my dad couldn’t get a job, and things were not good for my mum 
either, so my brother and I went to live with my grandparents. My grandmother was super 
facha
113, she had a photo of Pinochet in her dining room, and for me it didn’t make sense 
that it was the same person I had seen in the Fortin Mapocho114 in those caricatures with a 
skull on his hand and with a killer expression in his face. 
The quotation above reveals interesting details of how an opposition culture is created upon the 
details of everyday life, and how it will become full of ‘material symbols’. Quotidian objects would 
become barriers between political communities: this way, having read Mafalda’s stories would be 
part of the kind of knowledge that within their families were validated. Once again, the national 
anthem also appears as a crucial marker for the second generation: they learn the meaning of 
simulation and mimicry, which will protect their subversive identities and will keep them safe.  
Conversations about the past within the (former) opposition tend to be quite nostalgic: the group 
sought to find certain elements in common, such as remembering once secret codes which are 
now being increasingly processed as part of communitarian memory of everyday life under the 
dictatorship. They speak of their individual remembering but deploying the grammar of ‘one’ 
(uno), which is broad enough to include the other participants of the group. Here we see that ‘acts 
of memory are performed by individuals in a cultural framework that encourages these acts’ (Bal, 
                                                          
111 The ‘second part’ allowed here refers to a verse added by the regimeto the national hymn.   
112 Argentinean comic strip written by Quino. Mafalda is a 6 year old girl who, being rebel and sweet at the 
same time, represents the humanitarian concern with the political affairs. This humanitarian criticism made 
it part of the opposition culture in Chile during the dictatorship.   
113 A coloquial way to refer to someone with right-wing political preferences.  
114 It was the opposition newspaper during the dictatorship.  
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1999, xiii). They stress the collective ‘communality’ of memory, but as we see in this chapter they 
displace unvoiced and individual experiences which have been left out of history so far.  
 
 
Contradicting the Past: Unmaking Memory Frameworks 
Tamara broke the spell and brought into the group a certain uneasiness which did not receive a 
clear response from the group115, threatening the shared feeling of nostalgia and the very 
cohesion of the group. She somehow disrupted the flow of the conversation by bringing a 
divergent idea to the group: she talked about her resentment against her parents for having 
abandoned her and her siblings because of the ongoing political events. This was striking, because 
in most of the narratives of the children of opposition we find that the enemy is imagined 
‘outside’: Pinochet, the state, the police, the momios, the informants, etc. For example, I described 
in the methods chapter how one of my interviewees remembered how, when she was a child, she 
could not sleep for trying to come to terms with the idea of evil, and that she could not bear the 
thought that so much evil existed embodied in only one person: Pinochet. The external world was 
full enough of danger so as to make possible a distinguishable ‘us’, associated with the moral 
attributes of the opposition. However, Tamara’s countermemory destabilizes the homogeneous 
sense of being ‘us’ and creates new internal distinctions and fractures. In a way, she was 
threatening the identity of the group and also of her family by questioning the feeling of 
complicity and identification with their parents.  
“My friend and I have that contradiction. We understand the ‘causa’, the lucha, the 
idealism, the political project, all that, but we feel that we had to take its toll. Our parents 
weren’t there with us. In my case, my parents failed to be there. I was alone, I felt scared 
(…). That basic thing, having a family space, didn’t exist for me. So there is lots of anger 
because of that, because of what one didn’t have, so… fucking causa! For instance today, 
one of the reasons I have preferred to be a full-time mum is that wound. I have no option; 
my wound doesn’t allow me to leave my kids. Because I lacked it, although I understand 
why, I needed it. I feel anger even though I also understand, but I feel anger for their 
                                                          
115 Moreover, I even hesitate to say that she had feedback: after many of her interventions, no one 
commented on them. 
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abandonment anyway. You see, the contradiction is too big. When I can forgive and when I 
can’t forgive my parents. It is not the same as forgiving the oppressor, no, because the 
parents are your closest figures (…). 
Tamara questions the collective forms of remembering being in the opposition by giving voice to 
unvoiced memories: that a parent’s active involvement in politics meant in many cases that they 
had to displace their family life and their relationship with their children. This dynamic is 
particularly interesting if we think of the way sociology has shaped memory since Halbwachs’ 
studies: the preponderance of group memories over individual memories. Here, in turn, individual 
uneasiness with collective memory frameworks struggles to be heard and gain recognition. 
Tamara departed from the idea of memory as a collection of anecdotes about the dictatorship (a 
memoir) by situating herself in rivalry with cultural frameworks of the past. Tamara was 
un/speaking the past, she uncovered a taboo subject, thus questioning the basic consensus of the 
mnemonic group: the fact that there was a moral and universal value in being in opposition to the 
dictatorship, and that this would legitimate her parent’s life story. Although she is not questioning 
directly the point of being in the opposition, she destabilizes the consensus about heroism by 
voicing the gray zones of memory, challenging the idea that there is a lineal and redemptive 
narrative of the past, even if this past consists of trauma. 
I approached Tamara after the group session and asked if she wanted to be interviewed in depth 
about her experience, and she agreed straight away; this was something she definitely wanted to 
talk about.  
 
 
Tamara’s family story 
Tamara is the child of UP activist parents. After the coup her father became a fugitive, so her 
pregnant mother and 2 children stayed in her grandmother’s home while he was away. When 
Tamara was born, her father visited his newborn daughter, but the very same day he was caught 
and became a political prisoner. The family did not hear from him in months; it was a painful wait 
at a time when there were many stories circulating about state violence and the shock-strategy of 
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spreading fear through exemplary killings. Like thousands of other families, Tamara’s mother and 
her three children were left in total ignorance of his fate. To some extent it was a gendered issue: 
as most of the activists were male, many women faced the drama of their missing husband (or 
children). For many of these women, the husband’s absence also meant the risk of starving.  
After a year, Tamara’s father came back to the family home, but the experience of being tortured 
for so long had completely changed him. He woke up in the middle of the night and hid under the 
bed, thinking someone was persecuting him. The experience of torture was a limit experience and 
triggered in Tamara’s parents different responses to the crisis. Soon after he was released, the 
father decided to actively fight against the regime. The fact of having gone through a limit 
experience gave him a sense of being called, a moral duty, and he started working for the Vicaría 
de la Solidaridad
116.  
By contrast, her mother felt she could not stand again the fear of persecution and asked him to 
choose between family life and political commitment (which meant underground activities)117. 
Verbalizing this tension and presenting it as a dilemma, triggered the family’s rupture: the choices 
were irreconcileable. Tamara’s father left the family home and some time later got married again 
to a partner he met in the Vicaría and formed a new family. He remained committed to the 
resistance against the dictatorship and became even more deeply involved. He helped to transport 
people to the embassies where they would ask for asylum, to hide families from the police, etc. He 
scarcely ever met his former family, and had a distant relationship with them. Years later, he 
moved with his new family into another city, far from Santiago, where his 4 new children grew up. 
By contrast, Tamara’s mother never accepted their family rupture and did not rebuild her life. In 
her search for a better life for her and her children, she focused only in her job for giving them a 
“better standard of living”.  
                                                          
116 ‘Carrying on the work of the Peace Committee set up in 1973 and banned in 1975, Monsignor Raul Silva 
Enriquez, Cardinal Archbishop of Santiago, established in 1976 the Vicaría de la Solidaridad with the three 
firm basic objectives of defending the lives of those persecuted, obtaining freedom for prisoners and 
providing aid to the poor”. Source: http://portal.unesco.org/culture/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=9373&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html 
117 This need to choose between normal life and political commitment is present in many of the first 
generations and it shows the extent to which the culture of fear spread and invaded people´s subjectivity.  
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Assessing the Past 
I started the interview wondering about Tamara’s experience of the dictatorship. However, rather 
than speaking about the culture of fear (which I had at first expected to be the subject of the 
interview), she wanted to speak about family life and her experience of abandonment. She 
brought a new association to the experience of being part of the opposition to the dictatorship; 
the mourning of the loss and the fracturing of people’s lives and how this was lived within families. 
Despite the fact that this narrative was common among the first generations, it was usually 
structured from their perspective as ‘victims’, and therefore the narrative tells the story of how 
they were affected by state violence. Tamara, however, re-narrates these stories by carrying out a 
reassessment of the values which are narrated in those pasts. Contrary to narratives of victimhood 
or heroism which see altruism and honor in personal sacrifice, Tamara focuses on how the 
commitment to the causa meant the displacement of family life. Thus, she reconfigures a different 
sort of ‘victimhood’: that of the children of the militants who were ‘abandoned’ by their militant 
parents. Offering a similar interpretation to that of Carri, Tamara gives more importance to her 
family drama than to the sociopolitical context. However, it is not just a matter of the privatization 
of the past: Tamara is questioning a political paradigm detached from a sense of the local, the 
affects and the value of everyday: 
I: “Did your mother talk to you about the political situation within the country? What did 
she transmit to you about the dictatorship? Did she talk about fear, for instance (…)?” 
T: “Actually she didn’t talk to me too much. She was never there. I feel abandoned by my 
father and my mother, in different ways, but in the end neither of them was there. My 
mother didn’t speak about anything at all. But she transmitted to me, through my senses, 
fear (…)”. 
The sorrow of abandonment, and having been displaced by her father and then replaced by 
political commitments has turned into anger and reproach, and become overlapped with a 
demand to know (and understand) her family past. Tamara questions the first generation’s 
narrative (ie: the causa was the most valuable principle; the commitment to the Pueblo over 
personal commitments) which sees in the public sphere more value than in the private sphere. Her 
memory instead is structured around the non-heroic aspect of her father’s political commitment, 
or in the effects it had on her: she remembers, for instance, how little they met him, and how he 
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was always busy doing ‘important’ things. In order to listen to Tamara’s voice, I depart from Sarlo’s 
view (who dismisses Carris’ film as a post-modern drama) and rather see in these narratives 
gestures of a radical critique of the political culture and the consensus about what is rendered 
‘valuable’.  
“As the children of survivors –or at least this is my story, I won’t pretend I am representing 
anyone else– we felt that our suffering wasn’t valid enough; we didn’t feel that we were 
entitled to have a valid drama. I felt invalidated for a long time with respect to my 
demands, because yes, of course, my father had been a political prisoner, he suffered 
torture and my mother was on her own, and almost starved; she worked very hard to 
support us. There is a story of suffering around us, where my mother is a victim, my father 
is a victim, we are victims, and everybody is a victim then. But come on! (…) Do I have a 
future? Do I have a hope, Can I find reparation? Just as my father has looked for ways to 
repair, can I validate my own drama? Can I suffer when I am 13 years old and have a spot 
in my face? It’s been like ‘you and your silly and little life’ (…)” 
In the quote above we see that Tamara articulates two kinds of complaints: how the grand 
narratives overshadowed her sense of everyday life and the criticism of a culture where 
victimhood became a template for speaking about moral strength. Tamara explained how both of 
these narratives are functional to the first generation but leaves the second generation’s 
experience out.  
 
 
Grand narratives v/s everyday life 
Tamara grew up dealing with the dilemma between everyday life and political commitment, 
inherited from her parents’ conflict as a couple but provoked by the impossible situations the 
regime put people in. For Tamara, the tension between political commitment and everyday life 
destroyed her family. She feels that her life story was overshadowed by the urgency and 
magnitude of the events. However, this had a counter-effect for her, and her own story was 
somehow invalid in the context of her parent’s stories, and was dismissed as ‘less valuable’. She 
felt that her feelings or even her everyday life as a teenager had become irrelevant.  
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“There was a void for the children of desaparecidos or political prisoners; we didn’t play, 
we were shut up within our homes all day long, we never went to parks… We were 
abandoned children, some of us were left in the care of our neighbors, there were also 
children whose father and mother were both missing. This is a fact, but no one cares. We 
were living in a world made for adults, and children were just… I don’t know… it was very 
difficult for us, we were just on our own”. 
Tamara has a sense of a ‘generational experience’, which is explained by the fact that she studied 
in one of the schools in which the left-wing opposition gathered. For Tamara, her childhood was a 
symptom of a generation who lived in what she considers ‘a world of adults’, pointing at the 
private effects – with a focus on affective damage – of committed resistance. In this sense, like the 
children of the Edificio, Tamara’s experience differs from other children of the opposition. The 
majority of the children of opposition were ‘camouflaged’; for instance, they had to hide their 
political identity at school and therefore the limits of their belonging to school were complicated. 
In turn, Tamara grew up in a school community where there was nothing to hide, and where 
integration into society was not the main (and most complicated) task. She did not have the 
experience of dissimulation or dissociation but was openly socialized as being part of the 
opposition. She grew up with people with similar political experiences to her and with whom she 
identified. There, she could create an imaginary of her story as part of a generation; she could feel 
part of a community of people, a feeling which contrasted the solitude she felt at home.  
 
 
Against the causa 
“(…) One day, when we were youngsters, I was chatting with one of my friends about our 
life stories, and it came to her mind that in fact the political cause was a bitch, that 
because of the just cause, all us children were on our own”. 
The above quote shows how complex the tension is between particularism and universalism in 
everyday life. For Tamara, the causa, the collective project, has become distant enough to become 
an abstract discourse opposed to her everyday life, and furthermore, one which interfered 
negatively in her affective relationship with her parents. Tamara stressed this tension: she calls it 
“the just cause” to emphasize the moral legitimation of her parent’s political commitment. 
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Nevertheless, she opposes to it the negative domestic effects that the militant culture had on 
some children during Pinochet’s dictatorship (“we were in our own”). Tamara’s countermemory 
works as a sacrilege in the commemorative works of memory. She is transgressing the social 
convention on values (i.e.: that struggling against the dictatorship was heroic) by questioning who 
are the objects of value and who deserves a place in memory.  
Tamara refers to Gladys Marín, a local left-wing leader from the Communist Party who, after 
having been Deputy in Allende’s government, fought against Pinochet’s dictatorship118. When my 
interviewee speaks of her, she destabilizes her label as ‘hero’ by emphasizing that Marin’s 
relationship with her children raises difficult questions: 
“For instance, Gladys Marin, she is an idol, it would be a shame to criticize her, but, she had 
children, and the children were left without their mother, because this woman preferred to 
commit herself to the revolution, and she went into hiding, and she had to live abroad and 
come back clandestinely to see her children while they were playing in a park… This provokes in 
me physical sensations, I find this unfair, too unfair… And yes, looking back in 2010, yes, it 
happens and now we have different codes, I understand. But anyway, they are now adults who 
didn’t have a mother, they were not cuddled, if they had fever, their mother wouldn’t sing 
them a song. I find that in the end, these things are really worthwhile. Perhaps it has to do with 
my story, but I feel that what is cool today is to stay with your children, to be a family. It sounds 
crazy to listen to me saying this, because during my whole childhood the idea of family never 
made sense. My parents were divorced, we had a collapsed structure, the exploited family, 
everyone was on their own… but actually I believe that our parents’ generation chose a global 
and communitarian cause, and now things have changed”.  
Marín is an example of the kind of dilemmas that the militant culture would bring to people and 
how these might be reworked as moral dilemmas of the greys of memories. This quotation 
introduces the kind of tensions countermemories might bring, and how they also go beyond family 
life: they point at a broader tension between everyday life and local worlds on the one hand and 
universal values on the other. It is interesting, for instance, that Tamara uses references to the 
body in order to question Marin’s commitment to the causa over her children: “This provokes in 
                                                          
118 Being the leader of the Communist Party, she was the first person who brought a criminal suit against 
Pinochet in January 1998 (Wilde, 2008) on behalf of her desaparecido husband .  
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me physical sensations”, she says. She opposes to the abstract commitment the image of the 
cuddle, and the reference to “the baby with fever”.   
 
 
Struggling against the reification of victimhood 
The second path opened by Tamara’s complaint points at the effects that the status of being a 
victim have, as I mentioned before. For years, there was consensus on the strategic need to 
become a victim of the regime: how important it was to establish that there were human rights 
violations and that the regime was based on terror (Stern). Tamara questions the political project 
of narrating the past in a victimhood narrative form as it was done in the 80s and 90s. She shows 
how for her it was a reduction of her identity and that at the same time it fixed her to a certain 
relationship with history and a past she did not want for herself. The criticism of the victimhood 
frame also developed in Chile from 2005 onwards with the militant memory framework, but it is 
not that narrative either which Tamara embraces when she remembers.  
However, Tamara’s countermemory, as well as Carri’s film, can only be the indicators of a different 
period, one where it is not the status of victimhood which is at stake, but instead the critique of 
the reification of that experience. Tamara says:  “…There is a story of suffering around us, where 
my mother is a victim, my father is a victim, we are victims, and everybody is a victim then. But 
come on! (…) Do I have a future? Do I have a hope, Can I find reparation?” This is a complicated 
figure which however leads us to the weight of history and the paradox of the struggle for justice.  
For years, being the victim of the dictatorship was not acknowledged and –even worse– it was 
denied in the media, dismissed as an invention of ‘enemies of the fatherland’. It meant years of 
political organization, social activism, church intervention and international pressure so as to 
obtain acknowledgment, first, that there had been state violence –and not national security, as 
they preferred to call it– and, second, that there were human rights violations. This meant that for 
years the status of victimhood was desired, and in a way, it also concealed another category: that 
of the hero, or better, the martyr. The struggle for truth during the dictatorship also meant the 
polarization between good and evil, and gave to the status of victimhood an aura of sanctity: the 
victim easily became a martyr, and somehow, the recounting of one’s wounds was proof of 
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resistance to the dictatorship. But Tamara destabilizes the long held consensus about these 
categories, emphasizing the values which underpin the victim/martyr/hero framing. Tamara is 
rebelling against the victim’s cultural status, and the way her family have told and presented their 
story. 
 
 
Reclaiming the value of intimacy 
During her childhood, Tamara’s pain was projected against her mother, and then transformed into 
anger. She remembers a distant mother whose suffering she could not understand and whom she 
blamed for her father’s abandonment. During the whole interview, Tamara showed herself to be 
understanding about her father but very hard in relation to her mother. Sometimes she realized 
this and attempted to be fair to her mother: “at least, she was there”. Paradoxically, in spite of 
critizing her father’s choice, she reproduces the gendered organization of memories in Chile, and 
the valuation of the man and the public as heroes, and the displacement of privacy and everyday 
life as less valuable. Even in her memories, she reproduces this gendered distinction between 
everyday life and politics in Chile: she remembers her mother’s face and gestures, her quotidian, 
but remembers her father’s political anecdotes and deeds.  
T: “[After their divorce] my mother was depressed and got hospitalized. We were alone for 
long time, neither our father nor our mother was there. She [my mother] was emotionally 
unstable most of the time. I remember her face, she looked bad, bad, bad, and she even 
tried to commit suicide”. 
I: “Because of your father’s abandonment?” 
T: “Because of everything, everything. It was horrible, I can imagine it, horrible, and it was 
like hell. Besides, she had to take charge of our family. My dad didn’t give us anything; he 
didn’t help us with money. He lived almost in the underground, and then he got married to 
Sheila, and they had kids together. He got a parallel family”.  
(…) 
I: “You said you were displaced by political events. When did that feeling start? Did you 
feel that during your school days?” 
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T: “No, it was later”.  
I: “And that anger… Was it there since your childhood days?” 
T: “I think it was there, but I didn’t give it room, and I didn’t have the resources to name it. 
I was too young, and I didn’t have the concepts, but there was always a feeling of anger 
that I couldn’t manage. I always expressed my anger against my mum, I hated her, and we 
had a very bad relationship. We always fought during the little time we spent together, it 
was so bad. I couldn’t understand her. I didn´t understand her, I criticized her… we had a 
bad, bad, bad relationship”.  
The gendered model of memory is questioned by these experiences and located within a different 
context. It is no longer a demand for memory as a form of justice; the struggle is not expressed in 
terms of remembering or oblivion, but of value and recognition. The uneasiness of Tamara as 
second generation comes from a struggle over the zone of value and legitimation: the dichotomy 
between the public and the private is reintroduced and this time, the value of private family life as 
‘the real’ world is striking, and brings a story of disagreements and cultural gaps entangled with 
local politics of memory.  
Judith Butler asks in Precarious Life what deaths are to be mourned. ‘The question that 
preoccupies me in the light of recent global violence is: Who counts as a human? Whose lives 
count as lives? And finally, What makes for a grievable life?’ (2003). In doing so she is posing 
difficult questions about the memory making process in post-conflict societies. She is undoing the 
politics behind loss and memory, and redefining the objects of loss as a struggle of forces in order 
to give meaning, and in the end, value. She is pointing at the site of memory (and history) as an 
active site of power, desire, affects and belonging.  This insight portrays the experience of what is 
lost and how this is traversed by social conventions. Butler’s expression of ‘what counts as…’ takes 
us to the idea of acknowledgment, which refers to the interrelational need of being visible and 
audible to others. Behind any act of recognition there is a principle of inclusion and exclusion 
operating, and that is the paradox that Butler’s question and Tamara’s story point at in the 
quotations above.  
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Introducing Ernesto 
I met Ernesto in his flat in a wealthy area in Santiago city. When I arrived at his flat he was 
nervous. Like many of my interviewees he had high expectations of the interview. This was not 
because he wanted to know more about my research, but because he was eager to tell his story 
from the point of view of a child of the dictatorship. Ernesto was eager to be framed and be 
acknowledged as a child of a generation who suffered repression and political trauma, an 
acknowledgment which somehow liberated him from an unspoken personal past, which 
demanded recognition. He was aware of the implications of meeting for an interview: to make his 
past as a child of the dictatorship tellable. Of all my interviewees, Ernesto was the one who most 
‘needed’ to speak. Somehow, most of them have been able to articulate their experiences in 
shared narratives, having found a voice in which they can identify with others and therefore be the 
subject of social recognition. Media series like Los 80 o Los Archivos del Cardenal (see 
Introduction) have helped in this sense.  
 
 
Ernesto’s family story 
Ernesto is the child of UP activists who left the country after the coup. His parents settled in the 
Federal German Republic (FGR) with Ernesto and his elder brother. However, during their exile, his 
mother left her political activism and started to focus on raising her children, while his father 
strengthened his commitment to political activities. ‘Politics’ was the label that concealed for 
years his family’s past from his eyes. As the years went by, he discovered that ‘politics’ in fact 
consisted of firearms and guerrilla training. But this was a dangerous knowledge, and Ernesto 
heard about this only after the transitional period.  
In the early 1980s, while his mother decided it was time to return to Chile and reunite her children 
with their family, his father made the opposite decision: he decided to go to Nicaragua to fight as 
an internacionalista119. He became an international guerrillero, loyal to a political project of 
                                                          
119 See Misión internacionalista, by Jose Miguel Carrera Carmona, 2010, Ed. Latinoamericana. 
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resistance and revolution. Thus, after having lost their political project after the coup, their native 
language, their family connections and their friends in exile, his parents lost the personal 
connection which had united them, making different choices in the face of their personal crises in 
the aftermath of the coup. While his mother turned to ordinary life and found in the family space 
an emotional refuge, Ernesto’s father decided to commit himself not only to the Chilean political 
struggle but to Nicaragua’s political crisis. As a couple, they negotiated the agreement that she 
and their children would return to Chile, while he would fight for the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. He 
would send money and letters from time to time; and they planned to meet in a neighbouring 
country in the near future, for Ernesto’s father couldn’t enter Chile and continue to participate in 
the guerrilla. But they never met.  
One day, Ernesto’s mother – already living in Chile with her 2 children – stopped receiving her 
partner’s letters. After a long search, she found out that he had died in combat. She had to deal 
with the most difficult aspects of underground life. She had to keep her grief and her pain 
somehow frozen, and couldn’t show her sorrow and ask the questions she wanted to ask. 
Performing publically her bereavement could have jeopardized her life or that of her children. She 
had to deal silently with the fact that as he had entered into Nicaragua illegally, it was very difficult 
to reconstruct the whole chain of events; she was told he died, but there was no corpse and there 
were no details about the circumstances. She didn’t have the right to keep his belongings either; 
she wasn’t entitled to anything. In such a context, she couldn’t appeal to the Chilean embassy to 
intervene, because political affairs were strictly regulated by the military regime. Over the years, 
she had to rely on testimonies of people who travelled to Nicaragua and on other rumours. She 
reconstructed a diffuse story of his participation in the guerrilla war and the circumstances of his 
death. After years of uncertainty and only after the end of the dictatorship, was she able to travel 
to Nicaragua and bring the corpse of her husband back to Chile, to bury him close to their family. 
 
 
Forgetting the Past  
The family past of alienation, losses and hidden pain had a high cost for Ernesto. His mother’s 
muted widowhood was a model for his own bereavement, one which could not be shown to 
anyone and had to be grieved in silence and in secret.  Giving voice to it has been a long struggle, 
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and it started just a few years ago, when he was already an adult. Ernesto’s memories started 
when he, his mother and elder brother returned to Chile from the FGR, in the midst of the 
dictatorship. While he cannot remember anything about their life in Germany, his memories start 
the day they arrived at the airport and met for first time his Chilean family. In his words:  
E: “Look, I am blocked; I don’t have many memories of Germany, just a few, only pictures. 
I went to Germany trying hard to remember and I am not sure whether it helped me to 
remember, but I went to the place where we lived, and I saw how changed it is. In fact, 
that Germany in which we lived, doesn´t exist anymore (…)” 
(…) 
E: “I’ve got just a few memories of Germany. I remember when we arrived there… I 
remember some specific facts… but I hardly remember my father. But I do remember with 
great detail when we got to the [Chilean] airport. I remember going out carrying my 
luggage and seeing lots of people who came to welcome us. There was a lady who was 
crying; we were still inside the airport but she looked at as… I didn’t recognize her, but she 
looked at me. She was my grandmother on my father’s side”.  
His encounter at the airport portrays the paradox of the return from exile for children: they came 
back to a home which nevertheless was foreign for them, the same way he could not recognize a 
lady who was crying only to learn later that she was his grandmother. Ernesto had known since he 
was a child that, once in Chile, his personal story could never be completely told to anyone. He 
could not tell his classmates where he came from; although he did not have personal memories, 
he was aware that coming from FGR meant having a dangerous background and had to 
manipulate and recreate a ‘tellable past’ in order to pass in front of others. 
I: “What did you know then [about your family situation]?” 
E: “I knew that my father wasn’t there. When we came back to Chile [from exile] it was a 
situation in which we couldn’t speak, we couldn’t say where my father was, or where we 
came from. We usually said “Germany” and if people asked “what Germany” we had to 
lie… we couldn’t go into further details”. 
I: “Who taught you that?” 
E: “My mum. Yes, [she said] it was dangerous, that we had to watch our words. It was very 
complicated, especially after my dad died. He died in Nicaragua (...). I was going to school 
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then, so everybody asked me about my family and I had to start lying, that he had died in 
an accident, whatever. My mum told us it [speaking] was dangerous. I am not sure if she 
literally said we were under a dictatorship, but we had to be careful. One knew that one 
had to be careful and watch one’s words with the police and the military, and also with all 
of those who weren’t part of our family, one had to be careful with what one said…”  
As the children of the dictatorship could not control the way their stories were listened to by 
others, their words could act against them. So Ernesto’s family story was not tellable and at the 
same time, it was not knowable for him. For years, a shadow was cast on his family situation. He 
did not really understand why his past was ‘forbidden’, though he was not really ‘interested’ in it 
anyway. He obeyed his mother’s orders not to talk in public about their family story, and by doing 
so he created a pattern of disconnection between him and his family past. He learned that he 
could not talk about certain things, and as he was not socialized into an active opposition 
community, he did not feel pride but rather seemed distant about political matters. He felt 
estranged from and ashamed about a family story which did not fully belong to him. 
 
 
Contesting the Hero 
At some point during his adolescence, Ernesto began to feel that his father’s decision to go to 
Nicaragua rather than going back to normal life in Chile had fractured for good the family 
structure, being the deepest loss in a chain of losses that his family had to face since the 1973 
coup.   
I: “How did you bear your hidden family history before the Plebiscite? How did you feel 
about it?”   
E: “I have spoken a lot about this with my analyst, because I have been having therapy for 
different reasons. But I have realized that the fact of not being able to tell, or say who I 
am, where I come from, it was… in that moment I saw it as a complication, but once the 
time has passed… I think it was like not telling this because I might feel ashamed… it is not 
shame but… all of it affected a lot my personality. I was a rather shy person, very 
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introspective, and not being able to say certain things made me more introspective and it 
took a long time for me to gain in confidence. (…) I found it hard to open up and say who 
my father was and to feel proud about him. Because at that time I rejected him, I didn’t 
understand his story, it was when I had just started to understand what was happening in 
the country. My mother told me that my father had been in Nicaragua fighting for a just 
cause. I started reading a book and asked her why he left us, why instead of going to 
Nicaragua we didn’t go to somewhere else together as a family. Because he left us 
knowing that he could die! In a country where there is a war, one is likely to be killed. My 
mother always replied ‘you will understand your father when you grow up’, but I didn’t 
understand. Until I was 17, I always felt anger, anger towards my dad; I didn’t understand 
why he had left my mother. I was always very close to my mum, I tried to make her life as 
easy as possible, knowing that she was on her own and she supported me and my brother 
and everything she did, she did it for us. I always tried to support her, but I didn’t 
understand why she had agreed to that…” 
In the quotation above, the concept of ‘just cause’ contrasts with Ernesto’s perception about 
losing his father. As with Tamara’s experience, we see how this moral definition of the political 
action as a just cause, gave it an abstract meaning which will deny his embodied experience of 
everyday life: “Why instead of going to Nicaragua we didn’t go to somewhere else as a family”. His 
life story is traversed by these kinds of tensions and contradictions, which oppose his immediate 
feelings to the morality of universal values.  
What Ernesto’s approach to his past shares with Tamara’s is the fact that they both destabilize the 
cultural consensus in which their family memories have been framed and interrogate their stories 
from the standpoint of private affects. When he asks his father: why instead of going to 
Nicaragua…?, he is tackling the structure of values on which his father’s actions rested. It is 
interesting to see how differently his father’s actions were understood by his mother who never 
hesitated to support his political commitment, suggesting a possible generational gap in the 
memory contention and the problem of what counts as loss and mourning within the family in 
postdictatorial Chile. I addressed this in the interview, and wanted to know what it meant for him 
to grow up in the shadows of the hero’s (his guerrillero father) path.   
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I: “What has it meant to have such a heroic image of your father, very close to the Che 
Guevara… how do you cope with that?” 
E: “My father was a hero, but an underground and hidden hero… For my brother… For me, 
because I am very rational, it was difficult to understand it. My father fought for that, we 
belong to that (…). I think I am marked by this… my dad… I am 36 years old… I wonder 
what my dad and mum did at my age… their experiences are very different to my 
experiences, the type of government, everything. (…) That’s why I appreciate that my 
brother has inherited all these characteristics from my dad. My brother works as a 
volunteer (…). I admit I’ve got a more selfish kind of education.”    
Ernesto and his brother seemed to reproduce to some extent their parent’s dynamic, and both of 
them made different and maybe incompatible choices, reenacting their parent’s roles and each 
identifying with one of them. Somehow they actualized their parents’ split in their everyday lives. 
Ernesto identifies with his mother, who would be the ‘grounded’ model within family, while his 
elder brother seems to be identified with his father who would be allowed to be the ‘dreamer’ or 
the romantic. While Ernesto has followed a traditional path, and is an economist, his brother is a 
yoga teacher who works as a volunteer in charity initiatives.  
The quotation above shows that the generational gap alone does not explain Ernesto’s 
countermemories. His brother, unlike him, has an easier relationship with his father’s memory and 
has approached his father past as an inspirational memory. The fact that it is Ernesto who does 
not identify with the narrative memory available for him within his family sheds light on the 
discontinuities of memory transmission among generations, and redefines family, not only as a 
sphere of fluid passing on, but also of contestation and reworking in the light of transformed 
cultural landscapes. As in Tamara’s case, Ernesto’s questions destabilize the politics of loss and 
memory within the opposition’s retrospective reconstruction of the past.  
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Unsuitable memories 
For years, Ernesto felt distant towards his father, oscillating between a lack of interest and feeling 
resentment against his father for having gone to Nicaragua instead of coming back to Chile with 
his wife and children. When his father’s body was sent back to Chile, which happened once 
democracy had been reestablished, Ernesto started to reconstruct at his own pace various 
fragments of his father’s past. His case has an extra complexity in relation to Tamara’s, because his 
father status of guerrilla martyr was problematic during the first years of the transition. They were 
not ‘the white’ (or clean) victims of the dictatorship but rather political actors with agency. They 
exemplified the reasons the Military Junta had given to justify state violence, the relationship 
between left-wing groups and armed struggle, and therefore undermined the society’s confidence 
in the political transition.  
E: “… when we came to know how my dad died, my mother… she resorted to the Party to 
repatriate him, to identify his corpse, but the Party did not help her at all…” 
Once he decided to recover and reconstruct his father’s story, he had to make a double 
exhumation: first as part of the opposition to the dictatorship, and then as a fallen hero of the 
armed struggle in relation to the Concertacion’s moderate perspective taken from the 90s 
onwards and the general mea culpa of the parties which were part of the coalition (see Rettig 
Report on Chapter 1). This mea culpa meant that these groups took a more distant position 
concerning their former inspiration in models such as the Cuban revolution and the Soviet Union 
and also meant distancing themselves from prior models of political action, with much more 
pragmatic approach to governing. Concepts like consensus, reconciliation, or even ‘Concertación’ 
were revealing of a general mood among political actors of the post dictatorship which came to 
constitute the new elite.   
I: “Do you feel that after the Plebiscite you were able to talk about your family story, that 
there was a sort of social permission to talk?” 
E: “It wasn’t like that in the beginning, I mean it just wasn’t natural for me to start talking, 
it was difficult. I think it happened after we got my father’s corpse back…” 
(…) 
I: “How was the process of learning to speak [publically]?”  
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E: “It was… before, I could only say that my dad had died in Nicaragua giving military 
support to Sandinistas. I knew those things, but the story I knew finished there. I didn’t 
know more. But then I started to ask questions, who my father was; what motivated him; 
how he was; was he happy? and it was difficult to start speaking”.  
Thus, for Ernesto, recovering the past has been much more complicated and he does not question 
only the gender bias in terms of framing values, but has also faced the fact that the memory of his 
father was a taboo memory among his peers after the re-establishment of democracy. He found 
that for his father’s political party it has been also a struggle to acknowledge the 
internacionalista’s pasts, because they were part of the past which had to be forgotten (or 
silenced) in the first years of the transition. For him, the recovering of the past and its voicing did 
not correspond to the arrival of democracy, but has taken longer in terms of the status of armed 
struggle within Chilean society. He found that there were some pasts which could not be 
remembered even once democracy had been reestablished, because they were part of the dark 
side of the past of some moderate left-wing circles. Ernesto’s challenge has been to search for a 
past which has taken longer to be memorialized.  
 
 
Gathering the Past  
E: “I have done some research, because as I have told you, years ago I started to create a 
register… everything started on a trip I made to Germany (…). I met people who had 
known him, I went on my own initiative and I called one of his friends. My mother gave me 
the phone number of someone who lived in Germany. I called him, though I didn’t 
remember who he was. He remembered me, “little Ernesto”, but I didn’t remember 
anything (…). He invited a group of friends and we met in his home, I recorded everything, 
it was funny… I went on my own; If I had gone with my mother or someone else it would 
have lost its meaning. They told me things about my dad (…), about the time when 
everything was underground, and when my father was involved in armed struggle, he was 
specialized in tanks, and went to Nicaragua to give military support; he wasn’t a nurse, he 
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gave military support. I heard about this and started to come to terms with it in a different 
way”.   
In the above quotations we see perhaps in its clearest model what Hoffmann and Assmann 
envision in her work on the second generations: their position as recollectors of different objects, 
testimonies, fragments, histories which together bridge the second generation with a lost part of 
their genealogy. This reconstructed past is overall the process of reconstruction and, according to 
Assmann, that is what would define the second generation position in relation to memory: it is a 
certain position within social time but also family time, and an access to sources which may be still 
be found as living-memories but which are about to become part of the past. In this way, they are 
in a moment of urgency, in the transition from orality to written forms of memory transmission. 
This, again, shows second generation memory not just as a search for meaning, but overall a 
reappropriation of a legacy which after being inhabited would result in new values, memories or 
judgments. 
I: “Did your mother tell you about this before?”  
E: “Not in this way (…). I met my father’s friend and he told me many stories. He is old 
today and he told me many stories that I don’t think my mother actually knows, and if she 
knows about them, I don’t know why she never told us. They are very painful. He told me 
where they were, where they were hidden, everything they lived through (…). I started to 
get to know my father and my own history, because before this, my story was my mother’s 
and everything she has told me. So… my story was idealized… Through speaking with my 
father’s friends, I was able to get a new idea. I also found my mum’s letters and some 
recordings… but still, there is something missing…” 
(…) 
When Lazzara adds: ‘How can the daughter of a disappeared revolutionary, for example, fully 
understand the weight or density of the politically charged experience of the 1960s and 1970s or, 
for that matter, what it meant to suffer torture?...’, he is asking for the possibility of 
understanding, of translation, not only between different cultures but even between different 
generations. He points at the gaps provoked by the passing of time, and he destabilizes the hope 
for transparency, highlighting the horizon of opacity among generations. At the same time that 
there is an intergenerational self (as I suggested in the previous chapter), there is also a reverse 
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process which doesn’t define identity as sameness but as difference. How shall we think of the 
relationship between memory, cultural change and generations, without getting caught up in the 
dichotomy between tradition v/s radical change?  If transmission somehow emphasizes on the 
continuities of memory, Lazzara also sees in it discontinuity, contributing to framing the 
intergenerational transmission of memories in terms of impossibility but also of conflict.  
 
 
Conclusions 
In this chapter I have explored how countermemories have the potential to destabilize dominant 
versions of the past, creating alternative routes to coming to terms with it. I have argued that 
countermemories may seek the social acknowledgment of up-to-date emotions which until then 
could not be spoken about, and therefore claim for their social existence in the realms of memory. 
By reading their parents’ actions through this frame, we saw how Ernesto and Tamara de-center 
the strictly political debate about the military coup (framed in terms of left, center and right wing) 
and bring new complexities to the understanding of the past. They depart from a discussion of 
political projects, and focus on affective loss and, indirectly, make a critique of militant and 
political culture. Tamara’s and Ernesto’s claiming of kinship are part of the Antigone model, but in 
a different direction, and that’s why they are a counter-memory: they open up a new field of 
concerns, which are to be listened to as a dispute about value. As Raphaela Mamphele argues, the 
acknowledgments of the pain and loss of social actors is a profoundly political act: it is about the 
contesting of moral space (1997:101). Through this process, memory is defined as a space of 
contestation, something which is emphasized by the idea of countermemories. 
Ernesto and Tamara, as they tell their stories from the perspective of loss and family collapse, 
redefined the past in terms of moral dilemmas between the universal (the political cause) and the 
particular (the family). Their relationship to the past asks for a reassessment of values: they frame 
collective heroism in the light of the subsequent dislocation that followed their fathers’ departure. 
Thus, they dispute their participation in history as mourners and victims of a different nature. In 
their search for their fathers we see how they are trying to compensate for a personal absence 
and ask questions of value: whether the public or the private are ‘truer’. These are difficult 
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questions and show a dichotomist organization of life, where private and public worlds have 
become divorced and enter into contradiction. Their countermemories mark for them a shift in the 
broader relationship to their past, redefining the family as a space to ‘recover’, in a sort of 
affective neo-conservationism.   
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Chapter 8: Concluding Remarks 
In this final chapter I aim to develop some concluding remarks about the major themes which have 
been discussed in the course of this research. I start by i) examining how the notion of everyday 
life gives an account of the way in which state violence might be embedded in local patterns of 
remembering; then ii) I highlight the importance that context (memory landscapes) has in shaping 
family political memories - in this thesis, how the authoritarian government contributed to shaping 
opposition memories; iii) I discuss the notion of memory which traverses and underpins this 
project, framing a way to think about stubborn memories and position them in the current 
memory field;  iv) define the role of the family as a producer of memory in the everyday life while 
discussing what it entails and v) draw attention to the concept of the afterlife as a challenge to 
fixed concepts of time after episodes of violence. In the closing section vi) I discuss some final 
thoughts about the second generation and its role in the memory making process in post-coup 
Chile.  
 
 
i) Everyday Life and Trauma: Inhabiting Memories of Political Violence 
The thesis has offered a perspective in which it can be understood that state violence might affect 
and injure communities not only through episodes of physical or symbolic violence, but also by 
undermining the sense of  social trust and by inscribing an intergenerational memory of fear of the 
state in their members. This is something which the majority of my interviewees has referred to 
and which I have described as a ‘poisoned knowledge’. For example in chapter 4, through David’s 
life story, I described it as the moment in which the rite of passage made him part of the 
opposition to the dictatorship during the regime. Through various examples across the thesis I 
have shown that this ‘poisoned knowledge’ is a haunting political memory which may be arise 
later in time, even years later.   
From this first point stem various elements. First, the extent to which I have aimed to reimagine 
the role of suffering and experiences of victimhood in the midst of the critique of the trauma 
paradigm. Inspired by works such as Das’ and Butler’s, I have aimed to portray a complex notion of 
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suffering, one which, on the one hand, recognizes episodes of vulnerability before the state or 
before others as fundamental moments for identity making, but, on the other, also offers a 
perspective in which suffering is by no ways the only effect of state violence. Thus, while many of 
my interviewees experienced events of violence against their family members or forms of 
intangible violence, I have also shown their mechanisms for survival. In doing this I have been 
concerned with giving an account of the effects of a past which is not ´traumatizing’ and does not 
reduce people to their experiences of pain and loss but which at the same time recognizes in 
experiences of vulnerability crucial moments in subjective and intersubjective life. As Butler says, it 
is in the acknowledgment of pain that a politics of responsibility may be engendered. I have found 
in uncertainty, vulnerability and doubt, creative moments instead, which overall have shown the 
complexity of the experience to which I was trying do justice when analysing the interviews.   
As I mentioned in the thesis, the memory of state violence and its transmission has usually been 
studied in its form as traumatic rupture, belated memories and dislocation. I mentioned in Chapter 
5 how a psychotherapeutic tradition emerged in Chile in the face of the desperate need to give 
care and attention to the victims of state violence. However, its normalization in everyday life and 
its absorption into the quotidian have been ignored in local studies, which have instead focused 
either on traumatic violence or in the politics of the regime.  I have argued that although this is a 
valuable knowledge, it does not exhaust the subject. In the thesis I have been interested in 
exploring the forms of life, relationships and inhabitation of the social world that the family 
political memory has contributed to shape. Rather than doing an oral history of the forms of 
remembering the past (for instance, like Kaiser’s study of the Argentinian post memory) I have 
aimed to analyse how the familial political memory becomes invested with meaning, how this 
meaning influences the modes of inhabitation, and how also this familial political memory is not 
transparently inherited, but may imply complex modes of appropriation. In this sense, my 
perspective on the memory of the dictatorial era has given to me a complementary perspective 
with regard to the work of political violence in the aftermath.   
Drawing on Das’ emphasis that what matters after episodes of violence is to understand how 
violated worlds are inhabited, I have drawn attention to process of inhabitation of political 
memories. By emphasizing inhabitation I have suggested an interrelational approach between 
generations. On the one hand, the first generations transmit a political memory spoken through 
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the language of family, invested with affective resonance for family members. On the other hand 
the second generations inherit this legacy. Although its appropriation happens under similar 
conditions, they deploy different mechanisms of inhabitation – to use Das’ expression again, ‘how 
do they own the world’, in this case, a world intersected by political memories and the identities 
that they help to reconfigure? This, because, as I have argued, political memory may operate as a 
form of embodied knowledge in the aftermath of political violence. It is constituted by shared 
narratives, symbols, and affects which deal with political histories and transform them into stories. 
In the case of this thesis, I have explored the appropriation of these stories by the family. By 
exploring the various forms and circumstances in which a political memory is inhabited as a family 
legacy by the second generations I have aimed to reflect on what happens to the memory of state 
violence when it is carried for generations as a memory of conflict, inhabited as an 
intergenerational narrative, and creates space for forms of resistance and meaning subversion 
(countermemories), forms of doing (or not doing) politics but also to forms of suffering and 
resentment.  
A second aspect which stems from the perspective on everyday life is that it draws attention to 
the way that people may become habituated to political violence. While I acknowledged the 
contribution of Holocaust scholars to understanding the aftermath of violence, in chapter 2 I also 
described some critiques which show how their perspectives may obscure the everyday life of 
trauma and memory. In the literature review I developed the insight that global memories or 
universal memory frames do not give an account of local dynamics of memories. I have used 
instead Das’ work to provide a framework for thinking about how painful experiences of political 
violence - which need to ‘disappear’ so as to permit everyday life to continue - are normalized in 
the aftermath of violence.  
Exploring the memory of the opposition I have been concerned with a perspective which looks 
beyond the coup itself, in other words, beyond ´spectacular´ forms of violence. By doing this I have 
aimed to shed light on how the memory of a critical and traumatic event is entangled with and 
woven into everyday life and is shaped in accordance with it. In this context, the work of Das has 
been insightful in portraying a complex understanding of the internalization of violence and its 
concealment in the ‘innocuousness’ of everyday life. I recall Das’ ethnography in India when she 
says:  
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…the memory of the Partition was not then in the nature of something gone underground, 
repressed, hidden away, that would have to be excavated. In a way, these memories were 
very much on the surface. Yet there were fences created around them; the very language 
that bore these memories had a certain foreign tinge to it as if the Punjabi or Hindi in 
which it was spoken was some kind of translation from other unknown language. (Das 
2007, 11). 
This statement has guided my own research in terms of where and how I was to find the afterlife 
of violence among my interviewees. Das’ insight was also complemented by Hoffman’s description 
of the ambivalence towards violence in the post-Holocaust generations, which means that the 
abnormal is inhabited as a part of everyday life.    
In fact, one of the main challenges in postdictatorial Chile (where the conflict has been ‘left 
behind’ and society has moved forward to a new stage) is to uncover the mechanisms whereby 
violence has been actualized, normalized and how it acquires a form of life which is different from 
the events which gave birth to it. During my fieldwork, it was striking that what I conceptualized as 
the legacies of violence was often not acknowledged or remembered as violence, or was 
experienced as such but not named. For instance, the stigma of being the children of persecuted 
families persists even today in small villages where the children, today adults, meet at work with 
people who in the past created and promoted rumours about their parents. Or the case of the 
successful executive who feels that he cannot tell his colleagues that he is a leftist because he feels 
that this could be detrimental to his position. 
Thus, one of the main difficulties of understanding the legacies of the dictatorship is that often the 
legacies of state violence were not recognized as such among the second generation. Initially, I 
thought that this happened because the second generation would tend to think of themselves as 
non-victims of the dictatorship, and to think of the coup as the barbarism of the armed forces 
taking prisoners and turning them into desaparecidos. However, thinking in terms of the second 
generations means that I have been concerned with how torture sites become part of the 
landscapes of normality, and the complex and multiple ways in which state violence may leave 
traces in intersubjetive life. By exploring the legacies of state violence and also opening up the 
meaning of what being a victim means and what violence is, I have integrated varied and rich 
experiences which (initially, unexpectedly) led me to an ethnographic-inspired approach towards 
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growing up under the dictatorship which has practiced ‘hospitality’ (and attention) to the ghost 
(recalling Gordon’s expression). In framing legacies I have shown how violence might not offer a 
reductionist victim portrait but instead a complex phenomenon in which the memory-making of 
state violence entails multiple processes, stages and struggles.  
 
ii) The authoritarian regime and the memory landscapes 
It was in the course of trying to understand the transmission of specific political memories - 
opposition memories - that the very context of their production became relevant: how they 
became oppositional, how they were articulated within and how they also articulated 
intersubjective landscapes which were structured around notions such as inside and outside, trust 
and distrust, speaking and silence, and friends and enemies. I will come back to this point later. 
Contrary to the idea that the traumatic is woven exclusively as a form of structural repression or 
dissociation which is acted out every time it is remembered, I have shown that the political 
memory of state violence takes the form of the social patterns in which violence is embedded. In 
the thesis this has meant assigning importance to the authoritarian context in which political 
memories of state violence were to be transmitted and circulated. In the case of the Chilean 
second generations, their experience was not based only on their relationship to the first 
generation, but also on the fact of growing up under a military regime. The regime repressed and 
constricted the memory of the coup, defining not only the content of (opposition) memories but 
the overall meaning of bearing them.  
Thus, the first two chapters explore what it meant to grow up within the culture of fear, inhabiting 
a heavy legacy of being members of opposition families and performing an opposition memory 
within an authoritarian regime. I explored how bearing this tradition of memory gave way to a set 
of practices, tastes, aesthetics and relationships which stem from the very fact of being in 
opposition to the regime. In order to do so, I explored ‘the culture of fear’, suggesting that it 
shaped the way the memory of opposition was performed and remembered.  
In chapter 4 I described the politics of fear and a set of discourses and practices which were 
deployed by the military junta to create controlled landscapes, a culture of fear of the other and a 
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change in the patterns of sociability which divided people into friends or enemies. These were the 
terms in which political memories would circulate within the regime landscape, subverting its 
meanings. For instance, mimicry would become at one and the same time a form of simulation 
and also a form of cynical (and libertarian) distancing from the regime. In chapters 4 and 6 I 
described how family political memory of state violence was to a certain extent ritualized despite 
the fact that it was learned and practiced in the loose spaces of the everyday life: it distinguished 
between inside and outside, was passed on as a form of rite of passage and created the idea of the 
second generation as the carriers of family secrets. These findings were transversal to all the 
interviewes I did with the opposition’s second generation. That’s why in chapter 4 I suggested that 
political memories are performative: they do have an effect on their ‘bearers’ or memory-holders. 
So for instance, in focus groups it was easy to find a common generational experience (sustained 
in a weak narrative, but strengthened in the process of remembering together), with shared 
meanings and anecdotes (for instance, the reading of Mafalda, or listening to Cooperativa radio, or 
singing the national anthem). This is a generational experience, but one which again fractures 
Chilean society and divides it into political communities, so that in reality the generational 
memory is shared only by the second generation of the opposition. I showed, for instance, how 
Rafael, the son of a Pinochet’s minister, learned of the word dictatorship later in his life.  
From the interviews also emerged the idea that the second generation has remembered as a form 
of resistance at the same time as they have chosen not to remember in order to stay safe. The 
post-coup political memories were transmitted as something to be remembered in silence but also 
to be remembered with others – very specific others. Opposition political memory was 
ambivalent: it was meant both to be muted and to be spoken, to be forgotten and to be 
remembered, to distinguish between the speakable and the unspoken. Here, the dialectic 
between silence and secret family stories may be insightful. Although secret and silence may seem 
similar, in fact, secrets are to be rescued from silence, but to be kept in this condition. That is to 
say, many family political memories are ‘publicly’ secret, or untold outside home, but through 
family transmission they are made to persist and be kept as secrets.  
In chapters 4 and 5 I showed how the inhabitation of the stigma –one of the legacies of the politics 
of fear- was also ambivalent: at the same time that being the victim of ostracism created scenarios 
of shame and fear, it was also experienced with a sense of pride. In the course of investigating 
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these themes, in chapter 5 I questioned classic approaches to stigma, such as Goffman’s, and 
suggested that political memory is at one and the same time something to conceal and something 
to own and protect.  
 
 
iii) Stubborn Memories or the Stability of Memory 
Throughout the thesis I have drawn attention to something that Stern called the ‘memory 
impasse’ and which Lira has called ‘the ghettoization of memory’ and have done so from the 
perspective of one of the memory traditions in Chile – the left-wing. While Stern’s perspective 
situates the conflict within a particular moment in Chilean history, Lira’s concept sees it as a 
process. In Chapter I outlined how both of these authors explore the crisis of memory, suggesting 
that such an antagonism requires an insight into what is implied in political remembering. Stern 
shows how memories are ways of legitimizing complex forms of life while Lira, in turn, explores 
institutional commemorative remembering and how this invests the memory of a consecrated 
narrative through its very transmission. Building on these contributions I have added a new 
element to the understanding of the crisis of memory and its afterlife: the thesis has approached 
these complex intersections from the perspective of the transmission of experiences of state 
violence within the family and their display in modes of familial political remembering. Through 
these modes of remembering state violence I have shown that families create intergenerational 
narratives which also include political violence, and are passed on to the second (and third) 
generations: these narratives are meant to be transmitted.  
Although Lira’s insightful article offers new perspectives for the understanding of political 
memories and also for thinking about and questioning the future of memory in Chile, she does not 
deal with the relationship between national or institutional memories and ‘private’ memories, 
which are transmitted in the family space. In my fieldwork, by contrast, the institutional character 
of memories of state violence is much more blurred than in Lira’s account. I develop this in 
Chapter 6. Otherwise, how can non-official memories (such as the scepticism towards the 
existence of desaparecidos, or the belief that speaking about Pinochet might be dangerous, as 
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some of my interviewees have shown) circulate in Chile - despite being publicly discredited - and 
have persisted until today? 
Throughout the thesis I have distinguished between various kinds, levels and forms of memory 
(family memory, official or state memory, peripheral memories, political memories, opposition 
memories, countermemories, habit memories, etc). Making these distinctions between these 
various forms of memory – rather than speaking of memory as if it were a homogeneous concept 
in its various expressions - has been productive in the same way that the criticism of the 
presentism of memory tradition was in shedding light on the complexity of memory. For instance 
in Theories of Remembering Mizstal describes how Eric Hobsbawm’s studies shed light on the role 
of official memory as a product of the dominant sectors of society with the objective of producing 
a common past which serves their interest (Misztal 2003). Hobsbawm’s paradigm in The Invention 
of Tradition emphasizes the way in which new traditions are deliberately invented so as to create 
new political realities and how memory is a construction which serves to legitimate social 
institutions that aspire for a shared destiny. Though this approach has served to enhance our 
understanding of the role of ideology in social memory and can always show something about the 
‘who’ beyond the official narratives of the past, it also has its limitations. The presentism of this 
study has been criticized because it reduces the idea of social memory to the notion of ideology, 
does not explain why some traditions become popular and others not and underestimates non-
official sources of memory (Mistzal 2003).  
In the end distinguishing among these different forms of memories point at similar conclusions to 
those of, for example, Welzer and Gudehus: that family memories are a form of appropriating 
other forms of memories which circulate in the social.  Holocaust research has explored how third 
generation Germans (the grandchildren of perpetrators of Nazi and their followers) have re-
appropriated the global memory frame of the Holocaust into their family narratives of the Nazi 
past in such a way that it helps to portray their grandparents as victims (rather than perpetrators 
and supporters of Nazi crimes), and also tend to highlight positive and heroic deeds (Hohenlohe 
2011), In the same way, I have also reflected on the gap between family memory and broader 
memory frameworks, i.e.: state politics of memory. This raises difficult questions, but overall 
shows that memory is ubiquitous and cannot be fully represented or monopolized in any of its 
forms.  
215 
 
In the thesis, however, whilst I refer to the malleability of memory, I also refer to its stability. Let 
me explain. Among my initial observations in the Chilean case was the insight that the 
memory/forgetting dichotomy would hinder other dynamics of memory, and specifically, those 
forms of memory of private and everyday life forms of remembering, such as the memory of social 
class and the right to property, for example, or the configuration of an identity in opposition to the 
state (the memory of luchadores sociales). Otherwise how can memories that are meant to be 
erased by official memories persist?  
Making these distinctions has allowed me to see memory as a multidimensional category, in which 
different temporalities, purposes, ethics and meanings coexist and where memories are shown to 
be both malleable and also stubborn (or stable). Thus, in addition to focusing on how the 
authoritarian regime shaped an opposition memory, I have also been concerned with the idea of 
stability within certain memories: in the thesis, family political memories of state violence. In J. 
Assmann and A. Assmann’s distinction between cultural and communicative memory, family 
memory is defined as essentially malleable. However, I have pointed at an alternative 
understanding of family memories, which recognizes in them a certain stability which gives shape 
to intergenerational identifications in the political world and which are not necessarily malleable 
by official or institutional forms of memory discourse.  
I recognize in the culture of fear and the regime’s politics of stigmatization, for instance, the ability 
to shape silenced memories and memories of shame, which may obey memory landscapes (that of 
the culture of fear) in terms of their ability to speak in public. However I described the case of 
Ruth, who sees her life as a process of speaking out about her sense of shame, who after lying 
about her father’s fate ended up becoming an active member of the AFDD. She has responded 
actively to the changing contexts of memory and become an agent of memory. Or the case of 
Camilo, who for years ´forgot’ his forbidden family story and only started to recover his past at the 
time democracy was recovered within the country. In his case this process was associated with a 
compelling metaphor: the unearthing of memory was triggered by the arrival of his father’s corpse 
in the country in order to be buried. 
The above-mentioned stories show how speaking and silencing are interrelated with broader 
´memory landscapes ‘or ‘politics of memory´ but are not determined by them. On the contrary, 
the influence might also go in the other direction. Although I agree that individual memory is 
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shaped by collective memory frames, I also want to point at a slightly different phenomenon. I 
have been concerned with exploring under what conditions memories might be stubborn and how 
their stability might lead to a long-term perspective of memory, such as Lira’s transgenerational 
approach. For example, how despite Ruth’s ashamed memories or the fictitious life stories she 
told to her classmates, her memory of desaparecidos would resist or persist. Or how Gabriel, in 
chapter 6, recognizes in political violence a tragic family legacy after transnational and 
transgenerational episodes of political violence. 
The above mentioned resounds with the broader phenomena of multiple layers (and forms) of 
time and memory division in Latin America - silenced memories, unspoken memories, ashamed 
memories, militant memories and official memories, to name just a few – which have coexisted. 
The division of memory has been part of the very history of the region, including Chile, for five 
centuries. The tension around the idea of a ‘discovery’ of the new world, and then the meaning of 
being a colony and the project of independence have created layers of divisions and contested 
meanings. One of the most dramatic has been the period called ‘pacification of the Araucania’ 
which refers to the political project of the Chilean state during the 1850s of first reducing the 
Mapuche pueblo to a small territory, and then of converting them into Chileans. For the Mapuche, 
having a memory is the same as having a history, and memory thus has become a form of 
resistance which has endured to the present day, when ethnic conflicts have been revived. The 
case of the Mapuche pueblo shows how having a memory of the past has been a form of 
resistance and how, as an alternative to official socialization by the state, oral transmission of 
family memory has proved to be effective and durable (even beyond the classic three generations 
scope pointed by the Assmann).  
Through my analysis of the family transmission of memories of state violence to the second 
generation I have shown how the crisis of memory is grounded in a sense of long term memory. 
The gap between family memories and other forms of politics of memory is related to the 
discussion of whether memory is to be conceived as purely malleable or in terms of stability. 
Constructivist approaches have prevailed in memory studies, and they start from the premise that 
memories are malleable and that virtually any memory could be constructed (Cole 2001). The 
presentist tradition has been crucial in showing how memory is malleable and how an invented 
past can be created through myths and the creation of stories about the past. However, these 
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approaches do not help us to think about why there are memories which persist even when they 
are not commemorated, when they are repressed or when they provoke feelings such as shame, 
fear or guilt.  
In the literature review I presented Gómez-Barris’ research, which has been innovative and has 
opened a new line of enquiry in the understanding of memory making in post-coup Chile: 
envisioning family memory as a form of shelter from official memory, she has pointed to stable 
forms of memory-work, which operate at the level of embodied transmission (communicative 
memory, in Assmann’s terms). Exploring family memories and attempting to understand the 
circulation of repressed memories and objects during the authoritarian regime, she suggests that 
family memory ´protected´ forbidden political identities and memories, rendering them 
clandestine within private forms of circulation. She destabilizes the relationship between silence 
and forgetting and shows how, despite being silent, the memories of the state victims had an 
afterlife. Therefore she attempts to explore how they could be impervious to state politics of 
denial during the regime and then the so-called politics of forgetting afterwards.   
Using a similar approach, questioning the assumption of the malleability of memory within the 
family sphere, Booth states: ‘But family memories are not all the work of narration and invention. 
Some, on the contrary, seem to come back to us, as if the event “wants to be remembered”, and 
not always happily and voluntarily’ (Booth 2006, xi). For Booth it is not always the community 
which brings back the past, but it would be the memory which would ‘haunt’ the community. 
Thus, memory has become crucial to understanding the way people feel attached to some of their 
memories and in what ways some memories may work as the ground for certain forms of 
community. It is this last aspect which I believe is crucial for thinking about the memory of state 
violence and its aftermath.  
For this, in a field in which constructivist perspectives have usually been dominant and productive, 
that which is not malleable was fundamental to articulating my research and one of my main 
concerns has been to shed light on the mechanisms through which family political memories 
persist.  I have drawn on Lira’s perspective, but I have also departed from her analysis.  My critique 
of Lira’s work is that memory ghettoization did not start nor took place only within the sphere of 
political parties, but has its roots in something which seems to me much more stubborn but less 
institutional than them: family life and everyday life forms of relatedness.  
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iv) The family as memory producer 
Concerned with the problem of stability of memory contents, I have sought to understand its 
dynamics not in the domain of power and politics, but in the site of everyday life. To this end I 
therefore draw a distinction between the politics of memory and the memory of everyday life and 
situate family memories in the latter category. In chapter 2 I introduced Assmann’s approach to 
communicative memory, which situates family forms of memory transmission defined by 
embodied forms of relationships.  
Throughout the thesis I have argued that the local patterns of family relatedness are a clue to 
understanding the ways in which loyalties and legitimacies have been woven into family political 
memories of state violence. This is something which has usually been left aside in the Chilean case, 
possibly as one of the taken-for-granted ´facts´ and also due to the dismissal of private life and an 
approach to family as a natural entity which is there. In chapters 4, 6 and 7 of the thesis I dealt 
with the experience of family transmission of political memory. I explored the issue of temporality 
and saw in intergenerational forms of memory transmission the shaping of a long term family 
identity, a memory of state violence which, being entangled with family narratives, has 
contributed to the formation of communities of political memories (which are not the same as 
political communities in an institutional sense, i.e. they do not correspond to political party 
alignments).  
Rather than seeing family memory as a producer of ‘pure’ memories, throughout the thesis I have 
reconsidered the relationship between family memory and state memory under the military 
regime, where the family acted not only as a privileged site for forbidden memory transmission, 
but also as a bridge to other forms and producers of memory – such as the school, which is often 
signalled by my interviewees as the most relevant ´public´ space of encounter in terms of memory 
making. In fact, among my interviewees there was a coincidence in triangulating their personal 
identities, the families and the school, the school being the place where the culture of fear was 
‘displayed’. However, there were two exceptions to this, and both of them people who studied at 
schools where the majority of the educational community were opposed to the regime. This 
experience configured different dynamics, and what I can conclude is that they had a less 
tensioned experience of the distinction between inside and outside than the other interviewees, 
and experiences such as stigmatization or the mark, for instance, was unknown for them. 
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I have shown how political memories were deeply influenced and mediated by the contexts in 
which they were remembered, but this does not mean that family memory depends in any simple 
sense on state memories. On the contrary, in Chapter 6 I put forward the concept of 
intergenerational narratives which are transmitted between generations and provide affective ties 
to a sense of self and lineage. I have argued that the dynamics of family memory sheds light on the 
affective investment that the political memories of the opposition had, and how political 
memories - either images, narratives, discourses, etc. - circulating in the public space were rooted 
in the dynamics of family transmission and the making of intergenerational selves. My interviews 
gave me an insight into how political memories may be intergenerationally transmitted and 
embodied. Thus, in framing my approach to the family as a memory producer I contest approaches 
such as that of the historian Stuart Woolf, who argues: ‘There must always have been a 
continuous but asymmetrical relationship between them: family and community memories, not 
just in modern times, seem to me inconceivable without the constant presence of public 
memories and have certainly always been nourished by the latter; whereas the converse is 
certainly not true’ (Woolf 2005). I dispute with Woolf the subordinate character that he assigns to 
family memory in relation to other forms of memory production. However, it is not my intention 
to discuss which kind of memory is most relevant, but to shape a perspective in which family 
forms of relatedness contribute to the making of stubborn memories, and where families and their 
forms of relatedness contribute to shaping political remembering.  
However, the fact that I am arguing for considering the family influence in the shaping of memory 
culture, does not mean that my argument accepts family position uncritically. On the contrary, I 
agree with authors such as Serpente and Sosa when they suggest that family memory is a sphere 
which needs to be denaturalized. In the thesis I found it productive to explore how family 
memories are not good, reactionary, evil or revolutionary per se. In fact, I introduced Chapter 6 by 
exploring the peripheral memory of the family of one of Pinochet’s supporters and how this 
memory has discredited and bypassed public information concerning human rights and abuses 
committed by the military regime. I raised his case in order to de-romanticize the influence of 
family memory and explore to what extent the work of family memories may ensure the stability 
(persistence) of certain unvoiced stories, but also the extent to which they might be based on a 
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Here are some of the questions that have emerged during the process of research: should family 
memories be co-opted by official memories? Whether a gap between these two forms of 
memories may be a danger to democratic forms of convivencia? I am thinking here, again, of the 
works of Welzer and Hohenlohe. They explore the extent to which family memories of the third 
generation Germans shows that they are undergoing a new twist in terms of a culture of ‘never 
again’, or more simply, in the consensus that the actions committed by the Nazis were evil. That is 
to say, to what extent is a public ethic emerging from the family position? What happens when 
families defy or challenge a public ethic? I think that my analysis shows that such a question is 
relevant for the Chilean case and does not have a straightforward answer. I have shown how 
family political memories might be stable, because they are affectively invested, and that they are 
‘resistant’ in relation to other forms of public narratives. They mobilize a sense of truth and a 
memory of history; in the single case of a right-wing supporter of Pinochet I analysed the very 
same pattern. Here I want to go back to Crenzel’s concern, described in the introduction, when 
commenting on Lira’s work: who can own family memories and the values promoted by them? 
What do they mean in terms of democratic convivencia? They may protect democracy, but they 
may also undermine it.  
In other parts of the thesis I also argued that memory is not teleological, and I also explored the 
idea of countermemories to show precisely how conservative stems may result from the 
reworking of memory contents. In chapter 7 I explored how within the intergenerational 
continuities there are also forms of value subversion and that family legacies can be confronted. 
Gómez Barris, for instance, stated that the family was a shelter which kept people’s identity safe 
during and after the dictatorship. In her account, the family appears as an unproblematic and 
somehow fixed concept. She considers that the film Fernando Ha Vuelto by Caiozzi ’ , in which the 
family comes together around the encounter with their desaparecido member, is a metaphor for 
Chilean society’s dynamics of memory where family was isolated from the public space. Family 
loyalty would define political identity and would align family members around their affective ties. 
However, as I have argued in the thesis, there has been a range of different experiences and 
commemorative practices and family relationships between members and with the past.  In 
Chapter 7 the concept of family countermemories shed light on the way the space of family 
memory is also a space for the reworking of memory, disrupting family and cultural memory 
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frameworks and questioning them in an attempt, for instance, to give social acknowledgment to 
certain emotions that have been ignored. Thus I explored cases where the politics of mourning 
were challenged or reclaimed, and therefore suggested that family memory is not only a place for 
tradition and affective ties, but also for contention and rupture. I explored how within the families 
not every memory has the same weight, and that what is rendered memorable is always a 
selected narrative which is passed on as the familial narrative. Suggesting that the family 
memories of the opposition rested on a certain kind of politics of family and mourning which has 
favoured a certain gendered bias, I gave examples which illustrated that in the making of political 
remembering within my interviewees there was a bias in terms of gender.  Family legacies, for 
instance, were often (in the majority of the interviews and to a striking degree) the stories of 
militant men. This last aspect has not been taken into account in the memory debate in Chile. 
 
 
v) The afterlife of violence  
It interesting and relevant to note that during the days in which I have been finishing the writing of 
the thesis, there has been an ‘explosion’ of memory acts and events in Chile, even more than on 
the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary, to which various observers referred as a 
‘commemorative boom’ (Perotin Dummon 2005; Collins et. al 2013). This year, something new has 
happened: an overwhelming consensus on the evil of the dictatorship and state terror for first 
time ‘triumphed’ in the public debate: by this I mean the media debates that frame public opinion 
through radio, newspaper, internet, virtual social nets and fundamentally TV. Historical 
documentaries that just months ago could still be censored, were now programmed at the ‘peak 
times’. There are a few thoughts I would like to highlight here, also, to conclude my research in the 
best way I could have finished: forty Septembers after the bombing of La Moneda Palace and 
Allende’s death. 
Gómez-Barris’ concept of the afterlife of political violence, introduced in Chapter 1, reinforces and 
challenges at one and the same time the commemorative boom of the fortieth anniversary of the 
military coup. Although during the 90s the critique of social amnesia was characteristic of the 
sectors committed to human rights, the manner in which the anniversary of the military coup is 
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being commemorated today reinforces the underlying assumption of this thesis. This is that the 
past persists – and matters. As I mentioned above, TV series, journalistic reports, conferences and 
film festivals are just some of the examples of ways in which the coup is being memorialized this 
year, undermining the previously wide-spread belief that the memory impasse would directly 
affect only those immediately involved while the rest of society contemplates it neutrally. The 
thesis has been concerned in fact with decentring the focus on the first generation victims by 
focusing on the second generations instead. I have shown in what sense - and overall how – 
bearing a political memory is not limited exclusively to those with first-hand experience but rather 
something which has shaped a political culture in the long term, by promoting a relationship with 
imagined others and with the state. This is a relationship which has been learned and forged 
through intergenerational narratives and imaginaries which have passed from one generation to 
other. 
At the same time, displacing the focus from the first generation to the second generation also 
pushes the boundaries of what we understand by the legacies of political violence: by exploring 
how the past has an afterlife, in its modes of subjective and intersubjective struggles, I have aimed 
to open new enquiries into how the culture of fear has left traces which go further than has yet 
been recognized. In this thesis these traces have been related to the work of memory, but it also 
prepares the ground for future research into other forms of legacies, for instance, of 
neoliberalism.    
On the other hand, dealing with the afterlife is also a way of contesting and challenging the 
predicament of commemorations: the fact that they produce pasts. For example, with the aim of 
contributing to historical reflection, various social actors today are calling on society to reflect on 
‘the tragedy’ that afflicted Chile four decades ago. However, rendering the past as past also entails 
the risk of ´monumentalization’. James Young argues that monuments should not do the memory 
work, thus replacing the society’s responsibility for this (1992). I would like to argue that this is 
important to the Chilean case, because the political crisis, the violence that followed and the 
division of memory is not part of a ´tragedy´, which is how it is now being described within political 
language, but is rather part of more complex intersections between class, life stories, cultural 
patterns of relationships, family beliefs, modes of remembering and also modes of screening. This 
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also challenges how we understand the scope of violence and how do we think of the legacies of 
state violence forty years after the 11 September military coup.  
Drawing on the concept of the ‘afterlife’ and also on Butler’s reference to ‘the tasks of mourning 
that follow political violence’ this thesis destabilizes the ideas of past and present, something 
which, in the light of today’s commemorative mood, seems important to bear in mind. Time – in 
its forms of past, present and future - has been problematized from the start of the project, which 
was conceived of as an investigation into the transmission of memories of political violence to the 
second generations. My interviewees shaped and selected the stories from their present, and it is 
also in the present that some of them are still haunted by political memories. In this sense, these 
memories belong neither to the past nor to the present, but rather to both, and certainly they are 
also tied to forms of making and imagining the future. 
 
 
vi) The second generations and the dilemmas of memory 
One of the expressions which has circulated in the light of the anniversary of the coup is that there 
are the new generations who are called upon to overcome the past. It is this assumption that the 
new generations are alien to local dynamics and learn the history through forms of cultural 
memories only, that the thesis rebuts.  
As was outlined in chapter 1, justice has been done in a significant number of cases, there is a 
Museum of Memory and two reports of the Truth Commission have been published. However, it is 
at that moment when the past seems to be past - in other words, when it is memorialized - that a 
perspective on the presence of the past is relevant. The predicament of commemorations is that 
they produce pasts, while some of the struggles of the afterlife of political violence take place in 
the present. Speaking of the second or third generation, in this sense, is preferable to my 
perspective than speaking of the new generations. This, because it recognises its liaison with the 
past, and its being part of a memory chain; a milieu of memory, in Habermas’ terms.  
Hirsch’s concept of postmemory highlights the relationship a second or third generation can have 
with a first generation. However, although her work has been inspiring and crucial to this thesis, I 
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have also identified a point of departure from her work. I have been concerned with forms of 
memory which challenge the idea of the ‘post’. My concern has been to show how there is an 
afterlife which stills has forms of presence, so my questioning of what is visible and what is 
narratable resonates more with the concept of haunting that we find in the likes of Avery 
Gordon’s work, for instance, than in Hirsch´s postmemory. Where the concept of postmemory did 
remain useful however, was in my analysis of the films of the second generation, discussed in 
chapters 5 and 7. There, the members of the family (usually the son or the daughter) develop a 
reflection of their family story. As I have previously argued, these forms of cultural memory 
simultaneously create and reflect new narratives and new sources of memory. I have used them in 
the thesis as a way to illuminate dilemmas and narratives which are beyond the imaginable, but 
once they are narrated, they triggered forms of recognition (in Hoffman’s words). 
Just a few days before I finished the thesis, Juan Emilio Cheyre – the chief of the army during the 
government of Lagos (2002-2006) was confronted by Ernesto Lejderman on public TV. Cheyre had 
passed into history as the person who bridged the armed forces and civil society and in such 
condition of prestige and public trust that he was currently the chief of the electoral system. 
However, he was recently questioned by the son of two activists who were executed three months 
after the coup and whose deaths were falsely treated as being the result of having blown 
themselves up with their own dynamite. Lejderman denounced the fact that although Cheyre was 
the person who took him to an orphanage when he was two years old, he did not give any 
information about what had happened to his parents before any of the Human Rights 
Commissions. He says to Cheyre on public TV:  
I invite you to break the pacts of silence and say where the corpses of the desaparecidos 
are, and what happened to my father and mother. I invite you to give substance to your 
words. 
In this encounter it is the second generation who interpellates the first generation, and not the 
other way: it is not the legacy of the first generation which really matters here, but rather the 
second generation’s questioning and searching. Lejderman’s position is that of the second 
generation: at the same time as he wants to know about his own parents’ destiny, he demands to 
know about the figure of the desaparecido.  
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As we saw in both Assmann’s and Hoffman’s references in Chapter 2, the second generation are 
searching for traces which could lead them to the reconstruction of their past (they have inherited 
a past which demands to be known), but they actively differentiate themselves from the first 
generations. Contrary to what happened in the case of the Holocaust, the second generation’s 
response to the past in Chile has not necessarily been ‘organized’ or ‘political’, if by this we 
understand collective action with a clear goal and program or an underlying utopia. Although a 
few of my interviewees have been affiliated to organizations such as AFDD, HIJOS or other similar 
groups which struggle for the memory of the human right violations, they are not ‘representative’ 
of the role that the second generation has had in the Chilean case. However, it is easy to fall into 
the temptation of seeing the second generation dichotomically as either activists or passive actors, 
trapped in between honouring or failing their parents’ legacy. Avoiding a reductionist view, I 
suggest that in order to open the meaning of what it means to have political agency, it might be 
helpful to think of different forms of appropriating the world and relating critically to family 
political memories and its legacies.  
I have developed a point of view which not only distances itself from Manichean memory frames 
which differentiate between the good and the evil in Chilean history but which tends moreover to 
give space to the grey zones of memories, which describe experiences which reflect the impossible 
circumstances in which people are placed. In framing legacies I have shown how the memory of 
state violence might not offer a reductionist victim portrait but a complex phenomenon like 
resistance, suffering, feelings of belonging and opposition to others. With this, a different kind of 
agency has been possible, one which, if it is not militant, is not treacherous either. 
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